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Synopsis 
In this thesis we aim to explore how electricity generation companies cope with the 
transition to a competitive environment in a newly deregulated electricity industry. 
Analyses and discussions are generally performed from the perspective of a Genera-
tor/Producer, otherwise they are undertaken with respect to the market as a whole. 
The techniques used for tackling the complex issues are diverse and wide-ranging as as-
certained from the existing literature on the subject. The global ideology focuses on com-
bining two streams of thought: the production optimisation and equilibrium techniques 
of the old monopolistic, cost-saving industry and; the new dynamic profit-maximising 
and risk-mitigating competitive industry. Financial engineering in a new and poorly 
understood market for electrical power must now take place in conjunction with - yet 
also constrained by - the physical production and distribution of the commodity. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Problem 
Statement 
1.1 Structure of the Dissertation 
In this chapter the justification for the study that has been undertaken is outlined, setting 
the stage for the analysis of the behaviour of a market participant in a deregulating 
market for electricity. In order to proceed, it will be necessary to define the broader area 
of research which currently relates to the financial economics of energy markets, and the 
strategic analysis of market participants. The area of specialisation is then located within 
the global changes that have taken place in the world's energy markets- particularly in 
those for electrical power. Having located the specialisation, a practical context for the 
development of a simulation model for an actual participant will be presented, followed 
by the development of a model and subsequent analysis of the insights gained from the 
model and the modelling process. Some summaries and conclusions of the study will 
then be given, providing an overview of the success of this research endeavour. After 
this introductory chapter, the remainder of the thesis will proceed as follows: 
Chapter 2 will give a general overview of the current types of issues tackled by researchers 
in the field of electricity markets, thus providing a broad survey of the topics which are 
dominant in current worldwide research on the subject. 
In Chapter 3, the literature review of Chapter 2 will be refined to a survey of the 
techniques and issues which currently prevail in the modelling of generation companies' 
trading strategies, particularly in pool-type markets. 
Chapter 4 will present the context for a simulation study of a local generating company. 
It will thus describe the current state of transformation of the South African power 
market, and in particular the current changes within Eskom: the original parastatal 
enterprise producing the bulk of the country's electrical energy requirements. It will 
also provide the background for the simulation study conducted in subsequent chapters. 
In the context of Chapter 4, the development and construction of a stochastic simula-
tion model, as an aid to strategic decision-making, for a single generating unit will be 
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described. This is undertaken in Chapter 5. 
The results, findings and associated experimentation of a unique simulation model are 
outlined in detail in Chapter 6, with some concluding remarks, discussions and sugges-
tions for further research summarised in the final Chapter 7. 
1.2 Global Reform In Energy Markets 
Worldwide there have been recent radical transformations in the economics of electricity 
trade. This is amid the reforms of many other industries, ranging from telecommuni-
cations, to primary energy commodities, to bandwidth and emissions to name a few . 
Characterising these reforms is a move toward the ideology of a free market, including 
the unbundling and privatisation of large-scale monopolies and parastatals which have 
traditionally operated these large-scale technical systems. 
The intentions are for the industries to have a structure and regulatory framework which 
allows the price of the relevant commodity to be efficiently and cost-effectively deter-
mined, solely through the interaction of supply and demand for that commodity. As 
will be discussed in later chapters, there are many difficulties in achieving the so-called 
ideals of a completely fair market, where price essentially reflects the underlying costs 
of production, extraction or management of the commodity, as the case may be. Fur-
thermore, it is hoped that replacing centralised control in one industry with cooperative 
behaviour of smaller sub-participants will allow the sector to function more efficiently 
and cost-effectively as a whole. 
The new market participants are therefore exposed to financial risks to which all firms 
engaged in economic competition are exposed, but are further compelled to meet the 
technical constraints of a national (or sometimes cross-border) electrical grid. In such a 
grid, demand must continually be satisfied on a real-time basis with strict adherence to 
frequency, voltage levels, safety measures and any other constraints that assure proper 
operation of the system. 
The themes of this dissertation that are to be covered in the survey of literature and 
the subsequent modelling process are motivated by a conglomeration of the following 
concepts: 
Electricity market reform 
Transformation of the electricity sectors in various countries from monopolies to indus-
tries dominated by competitive forces [20] is investigated, including the unification of free 
market forces with electric power system (unit commitment) concepts and the commodi-
tisation of electricity. Unit commitment is the responsibility of an electricity producer 
to obtain an optimal schedule of all of its units while satisfying all of the plants' technical 
requirements i.e. deciding when and which units to start-up or shut-down. Generation 
dispatch is the decision on what the individual power outputs of the scheduled units 
should be. 
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Financial markets, derivatives and risk management 
Invoking a discussion on the development of financial markets for the electricity commod-
ity, including a description of derivatives markets that were soon conceived in response to 
the commoditisation of electricity. The derivatives markets have routes in the manage-
ment of risks associated with the trade of a commodity whose prices are highly volatile, 
and whose required volumes are also very uncertain. These tertiary markets have sub-
sequently been engulfed by the speculative trading activities prevalent in other markets, 
especially in developed countries such as the United States. 
Literature review 
• summarising the types of problems tackled by researchers in the evolving research 
area of electricity economics and discussing some of the ways in which to tackle 
these issues. 
• Additionally, classifying the changes that have taken place with respect to market 
design and structure in various countries' electricity sectors, highlighting the ways 
in which these changes have emphasised the need for strategic decision-making 
tools. 
Specialisation 
Focusing on the South African market and its dominant supplier, Eskom. There is little 
to no research that can be found on the subject of restructuring in South Africa's elec-
tricity market, even though the intentions to transform were declared some years ago, 
during the same era when drastic changes had commenced in other countries. Eskom be-
ing the original monopoly (and now the subject of current unbundling and privatisation 
efforts in the country), a study is envisaged which considers one of its subsidiary genera-
tors as a market player. The study is conducted with a view to ultimately developing a 
representation of the entire market, though the building block for such a representation 
is given the immediate and direct attention. 
Mathematical modelling 
Following on from the above point, we aim to develop, in the light of other research, a 
mathematical modelling and simulation tool for understanding a competitor's behaviour 
in the South African market for electricity generation, and using such a model to im-
prove and understand an individual participant's performance in the market. Regarding 
the literature, a survey will be undertaken which includes an account of the types of 
modelling techniques used by researchers, describing their endeavours in other markets. 
Although the model of this thesis will be somewhat unique, it will be motivated in the 
light of techniques and aims of those reviewed in the survey. 
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1.2.1 Development of Energy Markets 
Structure 
The financial engineering of national energy markets has resulted in various constituents. 
The grid itself forms a market place where buyers and sellers meet. It may not necessarily 
participate in any power trading, but can act as a facilitator. A spot market may serve 
as the primary power pool, providing a medium for the physical commodity to be traded 
in hourly time periods. At a higher level we find a financial futures market providing the 
instruments for price hedging and other risk management tools for power procurement 
and cost mitigation. 
Markets vary by nature (day-ahead, real-time and ancillary services) and can be sub-
classified according existence of demand-side participation, firm bids and offers, location-
specificity, presence of financial markets and existence of bilateral agreements. 
Electricity spot markets are the short term markets where energy is traded for immediate 
delivery, or for the following day depending on the design of the auction. The spot market 
will therefore serve as a reference market for long to medium term transactions. In many 
countries, the spot market constitutes a day-ahead market, a congestion management 
procedure, an adjustment market , a reserves market and a market for ancillary services. 
Of these the day-ahead mechanism constitutes the largest transaction volumes and is 
therefore considered the most important for research purposes, though some researchers 
[4] explicitly consider the adjustment and reserves market in their analysis of optimal 
offers. 
According to [30] there are four different types of energy markets: 
forward energy market which is the day-ahead auction of electricity to the pool. 
planned production market is the day-ahead market for the power generation plan 
in order to meet demand forecasts and system constraints. 
real-time production market meets the second-by second demand for energy and 
assures safe delivery and satisfies other system objectives. 
ancillary services market is needed to assure reliable system operation. 
In this dissertation the literature on systems encompassing the first two of these will be 
surveyed, followed by the development of an associated simulation model for analysis of 
strategic behaviour. In addition to these four markets, one further market is considered 
in the literature review of Chapter 2 for the sake of completeness: 
derivatives market the tertiary level of trade where financial risks may be hedged us-
ing instruments based on the underlying commodity (in this case electrical power). 
Electricity and other commodities such as coal, natural gas and oil may all be traded (on 
paper) through a commercial exchange that trades in the more conventional interest rate 
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and paper equity commodities, for example the trading which occurs on NYMEX (New 
York Mercantile Exchange). Full scale commoditisation of electricity can clearly only 
take place in the most advanced of the world's energy markets, where there is sufficient 
liquidity to enable free trade in both the commodities and the derivative instruments. 
Derivatives are on old concept in all markets: contracts were frequently arranged to 
hedge exposure to price fluctuations, with ad hoc methods of valuation. Nowadays the 
agreements are formalised and standardised in the hope of improving the efficiency with 
which they may be used as effective risk management tools, and must consequently be 
priced to reflect their optionality and minimise the possibilities of speculative arbitrage 
inefficiencies. 
System-wide models try to capture aspects of the whole supply system (as discussed in 
[51]). Such models treat the system price of electricity as an endogenous variable such 
that supply and demand are matched within the system. These models are useful for 
utility planners and policy makers in the sense that they measure the market perfor-
mance by comparing the resultant market price under different market scenarios. The 
researchers in this instance, rightly caution against over-consideration on the total scope 
of scenarios. This could result in an a low long-run system price under perfect knowledge 
of the future. A policy-maker using these kinds of models can examine price-scenarios 
as a result of a participant's actions, but cannot use them to make policy decisions for 
the participant itself. 
Differences to Financial Markets 
Energy commodities have an evolving tertiary market unlike the already established 
tertiary markets for equities and interest rates. This is particularly true of electricity 
in which the evolution has been spurred on by the widespread deregulation and subse-
quent unbundling and privatisation of the traditional industry monopoly that has been 
occurring worldwide. 
The line between secondary and tertiary markets for energy is not as clearly defined as it 
is in the conventional financial markets. Correlations between short and long term pricing 
are much less pronounced in energy markets, both between and across commodity types. 
Modelling difficulties are rife as the markets are new and less understood. Therefore 
a greater part of the behaviour is attributable to the stochastic or random element, 
as constrained by our understanding of the market mechanisms governing prices. An 
example is the effect of supply constraints which initiate price shocks. Having said this, 
there is also much to be learnt from the developed tertiary sectors of other markets. 
The derivative products in energy markets are often contingent on functions of the 
underlying asset price e.g. an average, a maximum, a minimum, a range, or any other 
function depending on the needs of the parties to the contract. The pricing must capture 
this underlying functionality. Further difficulties arise in the market transition from 
traditional to deregulated. In the former, many pricing inconsistencies existed and these 
need to now be managed alongside the newer contracts of the latter, and the respective 
risks aggregated, even though these risks are vastly different. 
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1.3 Development of a Simulation Model for a Market Par-
ticipant 
The aims of the simulation model developed in the later chapters will be to mimic the 
actions of a single trader, acting in the market on behalf of an individual electricity 
generation unit over a specified time period. Initially - and albeit in a simplistic 
manner- it is hoped to be able to represent both the unit commitment and the trading 
strategy (or supply function) characterising the daily operations of the unit, including 
production and sales through an auctioning mechanism in the EPP. The intentions of 
the model and its resultant formulation are motivated by the following ideas and aims: 
• Examining the long term effects on the benefits accruing to a generator as a result 
of a particular strategy adopted. This will be explored through the inclusion of 
various endogenous parameters or experimental factors. The choice of parameters 
will be justified and explained in Chapters 5 and 6. 
• Including sufficient exogenous and contextual parameters to enable an assessment 
of the extent - if any -to which the trading environment affects the total benefit 
accruing to the market participant. 
• Gaining insights from the apparent significance (or insignificance) of any inter-
action within and between the two groups of factors above, and explaining the 
significance or otherwise of these interactions as revealed by the simulation out-
comes. 
• Using tht· model to confirm whether altering the levels of the factors affects the 
benefits according to our expectations, thus confirming any intuitive understanding 
we may already have. 
• When levels of the factors are changed and results do not coincide with our ex-
pectations, it is hoped that these anomalies can be explained and new insights 
revealed. 
• Revealing the scope for using the model for determining an optimal supply func-
tion/bidding strategy and explain the conditions under which this strategy may 
be adopted. 
• Determining whether or not the results obtained are consistent over various time 
horizons, and explain any inconsistencies should they arise. 
• Ultimately revealing how satisfactory the model is in its current form, suggesting 
and - where possible - implementing amendments and improvements to the 
formulation. The identification of any deficiencies and associated implications will 
also be an important aspect of the exploration. 
• Identifying areas for further research and development of the model in a real-life 
situation: In keeping with trends in the current scientific research on the subject 
we may, for example, postulate the amalgamation of several units into generation 
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clusters (otherwise referred to as generation companies), and then take a further 
step by forming an aggregate model of the entire generation sector through the 
amalgamation of all the clusters and then ultimately with the remaining market 
entities (these being the grid, the consumers and derivative markets). Theoreti-
cally, should the latter be achieved, we shall have obtained a representation of an 
entire system describing the entire power economy. 
It is also prudent to make clear that the express intentions of the model are NOT- at 
least for the purposes of this dissertation - to achieve the following: 
• Providing exact numerical answers or recommending strategies to be adopted in 
reality. Any results and insights would need to be first explained to a representa-
tive of the generation company concerned in the light of the model formulation. 
For practical purposes, further interaction and co-operation would be required to 
achieve a desired level of practical representability. To some extent the research in 
this thesis is possibly more of theoretical interest. 
• Although some of the parameters suggest the need for optimisation routines to 
determine the best trading and production strategies, we shall first be identifying 
the importance of the factors in the context of the model, after which recommenda-
tions will be made on how to adapt these to obtain realistic and workable strategies 
for finding the optimal behaviour. 
• Formulating an entire representation of the electricity market in South Africa which 
would enable advice to be given on regulatory or system management issues. 
• Including to any great degree the use of derivative instruments and risk manage-
ment tools, or suggest the use and valuation of such instruments and tools for 
the market participant. The sections on risk management and energy derivatives 
are given for interest, completeness and in keeping with current research topics in 
electricity markets, but must be covered owing to their peripheral importance for 
any model. 
It will become apparent that the modelling approach adopted later in this dissertation is 
unique when compared to the approaches of other researchers. This is justified in many 
respects. 
Firstly, each researcher bases their study on a different market, and each of these markets 
has a unique structure with regard to its design, type of auction, stage of transformation, 
existence of derivatives market, types of generating plant and regulatory environment; 
each model that is developed will then depend on the individual characteristics of the 
selected market. 
Secondly, the intended aims of research will differ, thus necessitating different modelling 
techniques for say, analysing participant behaviour, analysing market design, finding op-
timal offering strategies for generators, analysing proposed reforms in market structure, 
managing risks or designing and valuing derivative contracts. 
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Thirdly, most of the techniques revolve around the concept of one or other kind of 
simulation methodology. Such methods are adaptive in nature, enabling and encouraging 
learning through experimentation. As such, a great deal can be gained from trying new 
approaches and then noting the relative advantages and disadvantages of the technique 
in the light of others. Many of the methods adopted in the works referenced by the 
bibliography are claimed (by their authors) to be useful in a wider modelling sense, in 
that they enable a self-critical development of modelling tools for systems as dynamic 
as, and with the unprecedented uncertainties, which characterise electricity markets. 
Hopefully the nine aims stated above can be achieved, and if not, the reasons for the 
deficiencies can be explained. Regarding the four intentions which are not fundamental 
for this dissertation, it is hoped that suggestions will arise during the modelling process 
that would offer insights into how to achieve them, and where possible suggest ways 
of incorporating them into the developed framework. In both instances, the resulting 
discussions will at least provide a platform for suggesting further research into this wide-
ranging and rapidly developing field of study. 
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Chapter 2 
Characteristics of Modern Power 
Markets 
A broad coverage of the most pressing and relevant research areas in electricity markets 
is given in this chapter. The topics covered are those which crop up with abundant 
frequency in the sample of literature listed in the bibliography. Although the sample is 
from a huge volume of material that is currently available on the subject, there are some 
common threads that crop up time and again, even in the relatively small sample of this 
thesis. Power markets are a research area that has experienced an overwhelmingly rapid 
growth since their very recent initiation. The aim of this chapter is therefore to attempt 
a classification of the main threads in the selected sample, giving a brief history, defining 
some important concepts, and elaborating on a few of them in detail. 
The chapter is divided into six sections. The first one outlines in an introductory manner 
the changes that have taken place in power sectors worldwide, and will define the con-
text for research, describing the types of markets, the participants, thus motivating the 
investigative studies that have been observed in the literature. Section 2.2 will examine 
strategic decision-making by market players and Section 2.3 will look at risk assessment 
and management in competitive markets for electricity. In the fourth section we look 
at the characteristics of electricity prices, particularly their importance, how they are 
modelled, and some of the available methods for forecasting and modelling them. Sec-
tion 2.5 will cover electricity derivatives and associated financial risk management, and 
the final section will give a brief overview of the chapter. 
2.1 The Economics of Electricity Production 
2.1.1 Introduction 
Great effort has been invested in restructuring traditional monopoly power industries, 
the objectives being to introduce fair competition and improve economic efficiency. The 
design of the market is crucial to providing the necessary mechanisms to enable vigorous 
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competition without disrupting the operations for the supply of electricity or unfairly 
distorting prices. 
Recent research in the field of power markets is both wide-ranging and far-reaching. Top-
ics range from studies on different types of markets such as regional and cross border, 
though are predominantly conducted intra-nationally. Researchers have attempted to 
model the competitive environment, drawing on expertise from other areas of financial 
economics, while explicitly modifying the approaches to allow for the special character-
istics of the electricity commodity. 
Studies have been undertaken in order to examine the extent and success of competition 
in various markets, and for scrutinising auctions as a viable means of enabling the 
sale of electricity through pools. Other work has concentrated on the appropriateness 
of bilateral trading in markets and whether it is preferable to a pool as a means of 
facilitating the trade of electricity. 
Often, the question arises as to whether particular participants in a market are capable of 
exerting untoward levels of market power [13]. Significant market power is an undesirable 
feature of efficiently competitive markets, and which can be a consequence of unwanted 
levels of concentration in the market. Models have been proposed to assist regulators 
in determining flaws in, or suggesting improvements to, the market structure, as well as 
for identifying collusion among participants or the abuse of market power. 
Authors have also commented on the stability of electrical energy markets [2] and ques-
tions have been raised about the appropriateness of the new market structures and, 
which try to russess the extent to which the reforms have achieved their intended out-
comes. Some challenge whether the reforms have resulted in any improvements at all 
by attempting to quantify the changes, and others investigate proposed changes in the 
structure before they are implemented by pre-empting the outcomes with system-wide 
simulation models. Improvements are recognised through reduced spot prices, efficient 
production scheduling and uninterrupted supply. 
A substantial amount of work has looked at finding the optimal strategies for individ-
ual market participants, particularly generators, including the analysis of supply (and 
demand) functions and improving the strategic decision-making of these participants. 
Search for optimal strategies is expanded upon in Chapter 3, and provides the motiva-
tion for the model of electricity trade developed in subsequent chapters. 
Lastly, a growing area of research, attributed to the sudden liberalisation of the electricity 
industry and the associated uncertainties, is that of electricity derivatives. Later in this 
chapter (Section 2.5), summaries are given on issues surrounding the design, valuation 
and risk management of derivative instruments that are traded in the world's more 
advanced power markets. Adjacent to derivatives issues are some topics on the valuation 
of generation assets and the study of real options. A few studies on the effects of capacity 
payments and network effects have also been found in the survey of the literature. 
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2.1.2 Power Market Development 
There has been a worldwide restructuring of the public sector as a consequence of lib-
eralising political ideologies which commenced in the early years of the last decade [34]. 
A primary benefactor of the change has been the electricity industry where the restruc-
turing is driven by expectations of lower prices, greater efficiency and increased need for 
investment. The global trend began with Chile in the 1980's and escalated rapidly in 
the 1990's with many other countries following thereafter. 
Many questions arise as to how the transformation should take place while ensuring the 
focus is concentrated on the industry's most pressing needs. In particular, questions have 
arisen such as how to restructure, how to create the right market mechanisms, and how 
to regulate both the changing environment and the newly established market. In such 
a dynamic environment there are huge strategic uncertainties; changes are accepted by 
participants on an act of faith and there is little historical evolution from which to evoke 
an understanding. Clearly countries whose markets have so far lagged in the development 
should have the distinct advantage of hindsight with the experience of others at their 
disposal, but cannot be too complacent as their needs will be very specific to the way 
their local market has been constructed. 
A crucial difference has arisen amid market reforms with regards to the ways in which 
generation plants were operated. Under the regulated regime, the operator of the unit 
only needed to consider technical aspects of the production, where simple minimisation 
of costs resulted in the maximum attainable profit. In the deregulated system, profits 
depend on the success of the strategies chosen for offering production capacity to the 
pool, and the subsequent market-clearing process. 
The methodology of system dynamics is one that has been widely suggested as a tool 
for solving a broad range of strategic problems and for developing potentially dynamic 
strategies [34]. Where no history of market evolution is available, it is common to 
use simulation as a tool for testing the appropriateness of modelling strategies through 
sensitivity analysis. Strategies can be assessed through the use of simulation tools. 
Gary and Larsen [19] address the issue of new capacity investment in electricity gener-
ation with particular reference to the long-term production capacity in the UK. They 
advocate the need for moving away from the traditional methods - in particular equi-
librium models that rely on a reserve margin approach - toward disequilibrium models 
that incorporate information feedback systems and behavioural policies. (Reserve mar-
gin in this context is the percentage excess generation capacity over peak demand.) They 
also stress that their methods are preferable to the (often costly and detrimental) 'trial-
and-error' approach that has often previously characterised the making of decisions in 
transforming industries. The approach presented in [19] does not apply to the (bidding) 
strategies of an existing generating company (hereon referred to as Genco ), but has the 
potential of being adapted accordingly, as the methodology is contextually important. 
Their theories are verified using a simulated comparison of equilibrium versus behav-
ioural policy assumptions and a strategic scenario analysis. The improvements to the 
market are significant when measured by the increase in resultant reserve margin and 
electricity pool price reduction. 
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Characterising the changes in power markets is the move from a sector with traditionally 
monopolistic features to a competitive industry requiring rapid adaptation. Some of the 
challenges include price uncertainty, the forces of capital markets, ownership uncertainty, 
transition regulation and the availability and disclosure of information. Electricity is also 
the victim of furious development of a tertiary market where the commodity may now 
be traded many times before it is consumed, and where huge corporations now run an 
enormous trade in energy without even producing any of it. Sioshansi [46] documents the 
dramatic increase in resales of power in the US from virtually none in the mid-nineties 
to $452 million in the third quarter of 1997. The existence of such intermediaries is 
aimed at improving the efficiency of the trade and the supply of electricity by effectively 
'outsourcing' the decisions to a third party. It is hoped such a party would provide the 
time and resources in order to improve the performance of their clients (at a cost) through 
managing their risk exposures, reducing their costs and increasing their revenues. The 
obvious dangers of large-scale power trading have been proven with the collapse of Enron. 
In industrialised countries the primary goals of the restructuring and privatisation of 
the electricity industry are to improve both operational and economic efficiency through 
lower costs and improved technology. Maintenance of the grid is also an important 
issue, a good example being the collapse of the power supply in the northeastern United 
States in August 2003. The incident sparked off much political debate, and resulted in 
blame being laid upon the lack of upgrades to old capital assets. (The actual failure 
was initiated by a lightning strike on a power station near Niagara Falls, though the 
overriding cause was said to be the subsequent overloading of the region's antiquated 
grid in the aftermath of the strike [see archives of UK Telegraph newspaper, 15 August, 
2003]. Italy was hit by similarly disastrous outages in both June and September of the 
same year.) 
Changing technology with regard to electricity production and environmental concerns 
also play a role in industrialised countries. Examples include the increasing use of renew-
able energy resources such as wind, solar and geothermal energy, and the establishment 
of emissions trading arrangements to address the environmental impact of the burning 
of fossil fuels. 
Regarding political and economic concerns, there are four key factors supporting the 
need for industry reform [12]: 
• Poor performance of the state-owned or state-run supply and inadequate expansion 
of service. 
• Inability to finance new capital investment and maintain existing assets. 
• Transfer of subsidies to more pressing public issues. 
• Revenue potential through the sale of state-owned generation and transmission 
assets. 
In developing countries, the primary aims of privatisation are to create financial inde-
pendence of large enterprises and to raise capital for other concerns. 
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2.1.3 Methods of Reform 
There are two principal changes that are possible with regard to deregulation of state-run 
enterprises, namely changes in ownership and structural changes. 
Ownership changes 
There are four definable changes in ownership that characterise market reforms: 
Commercialisation: a change in the behaviour of the owner in the form of greater 
market orientation. 
Corporatisation: a relinquishing of control of enterprises with regulatory influence 
remaining. The entity becomes a company registered in terms of the Companies 
Act. 
Privatisation: a complete change of ownership and sale of enterprises so that the per-
formance of the economic activity is carried out by a private sector business. 
Liberalisation: occurs when an industry adopts of a free market model through private 
sector participation. 
It can be noted that the pace and order of the changes in ownership has differed dra-
matically between national power sectors. 
Structural changes 
Alongside the methods are reform there are three main structural changes that prevail 
in the electricity sector. The changes are: 
• Unbundling of the single enterprise into separate, independently run entities of 
Generation, Transmission (in its own right a natural monopoly) and Distribution. 
• Further hierarchical unbundling of the generation and distribution entities into 
individual, competitive business units consisting of: 
1. in the case of generation, individual power stations or clusters of production 
units under the umbrella of a single company, and; 
2. in the case of distribution, individual regional electricity distribution compa-
nies (RED's). 
• Moving away from wholesale markets where large quantities of electricity are sold 
for fixed tariffs for an extended period to more flexible sales and purchase arrange-
ments over shorter time horizons. 
• Tending toward full-scale retail competition where electricity is purchased close to 
the hour of its generation (and consumption) at the prevailing spot price. 
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2.1.4 Electricity Pools and Contracts 
A pool-type market is characterised by a central dispatch and pricing mechanism, 
first created for England and Wales, with similar markets now operating in Australia, 
New Zealand and parts of Latin America. In contrast to centralised pool are the decen-
tralised markets where participants trade power bilaterally (or even multilaterally) in 
advance of the dispatch to consumers. The advance trades are then forwarded to the In-
dependent System Operator (ISO) for dispatch at the time of production. A commonly 
discussed version of a decentralised market is the California Power Exchange [3]. Ex-
amples of hybrids of bilateral or multilateral markets and centralised bid-based markets 
can also be found in the literature [43]. 
Power pools were established with the aim of realising cost savings [33, 45]. Power pools 
are also an ideal location in which a derivatives market can be established. A pool is a 
coalition of market actors, created to improve efficiency and reduce prices by increasing 
trading possibilities. It is hoped that the creation of pools will more effectively capture 
the value of the power commodity through pricing on an hourly basis, rather than the 
traditional fixed cost, long term-type contracts that were common in the regulated era. 
Pools can be classified according to their type of membership into energy producer, 
distributor, extractor and consumer pools. The analysis of power pools is a broad field 
with its own unique academic merits. 
Markets for electricity may exist within pools (say between generators), or across pools, 
or even across national borders. Power systems may consist of one or many pools (of 
varying or similar types) at the same level of hierarchy [30]. 
Analysing power pools 
Makkonen and Lahdelma [36] do a simulation study to analyse power pools in the dereg-
ulated energy market, focusing on the situation in the Northern European countries 
(Finland and Norway in particular). In so doing they emphasise the need for sophisti-
cated techniques for deciding on actions to be taken by distributors and pool members 
in an increasingly complex environment. A simulation study is conducted for long-term 
market analysis. The model is based on energy optimisation software known as EHTO, 
and is used to calculate the benefits of different types of pools and to compare policies 
for allocating the common benefits of the pool among its members. 
They begin by describing the evolution of the Northern European market to one in which 
the grid, a natural monopoly, forms a marketplace for power trading between producers, 
distributors, and industrial consumers. They claim this introduction of competition has 
drastically reduced the spot price of electricity in those countries. Along with improved 
technologies for metering and accounting, competition has resulted in new types of elec-
tricity contracts and derivatives being introduced alongside the older existing ones. A 
consequence is the difficult problem of managing complex portfolios of contracts. 
Three types of pools and their associated functions are defined: 
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Producers' pools permit central optimisation of production reducing the need for 
shutdowns and start-ups. 
Consumers' pools benefit from economies of scale, diversity of load curves, increased 
marker power and centralised demand side management. 
Distributors' pools combine the benefits of producers' and consumers' pools, and can 
be sub-classified into: Long-term supply; Short-term supply; Spot market and; 
Trade pools. 
Contracts 
Three types of old contracts that are traded m the pool are described by the same 
authors: 
• A long-term multi-tariff contract with capacity limits and separate capacity and 
energy fees (determined with reference to indexes of cost factors such as fuel prices 
and currencies). The durations of the contracts are from one to several years. 
• A fixed bilateral contract with a fixed contract fee and an hourly energy fee (varying 
according to intra-day time periods). 
• Adjustable bilateral contracts are like the fixed ones except that the amount of 
energy to be bought is only specified up to a maximum amount an hour or more 
before delivery. 
The duration of the bilateral contracts is often between a week and a year in length. 
A monthly settlement of the energy traded in the three contract types takes place. 
Deregulation has resulted in the older contracts being overpriced and distributors of 
electricity are no longer able to forward their increased costs on to the consumer owing 
to competitive market fears. Costs are higher because the acquisition of energy is higher 
(relatively speaking) for the old contracts than for the new. 
Optimising the contract portfolio under the above circumstances requires advanced risk 
analytical techniques and an understanding of various financial instruments. The new 
contract structures must reflect more accurately the hourly variation in electricity price 
and demand. There is typically no capacity fee and energy fees vary from hour to hour 
according to actual spot price, marginal production costs, or forecasts of the two; power 
limits may vary hourly. Dynamic contracts such as these are sensitive to the volatile 
market and include risks to the purchasers. 
In addition to the new short-to-medium-term contracts are the instruments of the spot 
and futures markets designed to replace (or used alongside) old contract types for min-
imising energy procurement costs and hedging risks. An example of the most basic 
commodity traded in the newly established markets is a fixed forward contract for 1 
megawatt-hour (MWh) of electricity for a particular hour. In Finland, trade for the 
forwards is open a week ahead and closed two hours prior to delivery. 
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Other forward instruments are formed as aggregates of the hourly contracts to intra-day 
periods, whole days, weeks and four-week blocks to summer /winter season forwards. 
Instruments for price hedging and risk management are traded on a separate exchange, 
settled on the spot market price and are financial contracts with no requirement for 
physical delivery. 
Maximising the profit of a pool involves an intractable dynamic, combinatorial multi-
criteria decision problem under uncertainties, where risks also need to be minimised. 
An opportunistic decision strategy is assumed to avoid the combinatorial nature of the 
problem. The assumption is questionable given the realistic presence of inaccuracies in 
price and load forecasts, as well as other uncertainties. Risk analysis is conducted based 
on simulation techniques using different scenarios. In the medium-to-long term scenario 
tests are run to determine the potential risks, or derivatives are used to hedge the risks. 
In the spot market, risks are smaller and the pool can act as a risk-neutral decision-
maker. Similar methods are used for independent market actors if three conditions are 
satisfied: 
1. forecasts are available from all members 
2. pool members are informative of all contracts made 
3. pool members cannot trade simultaneously with the pool. 
Various pool benefit allocation methods are discussed, then pool performance is analysed 
using a simulation model with three components (namely an optimisation model, a 
balance booking application, and spreadsheet application). The approach uses an upper-
level spreadshe1~t framework allowing interactions between the three components and is 
similar to that used in Vlahos et al. [50]. Three of the distributors' pool types are 
analysed and four different benefit allocation methods are compared numerically using a 
pool containing three regional distributors. Their research is therefore largely descriptive 
of the types of pools and the participant behaviour, though is does prescribe a benefit 
allocation strategy. 
With their integrative modelling approach, Vlahos et al. [50] hope to tackle issues such 
as the long tenn impact of developments in the electricity pool on the contract market, 
the effect on the competitive position of market players after regulatory changes, ability 
of generators to tactically manipulate the pool, and analyse the effects of abrupt changes 
in circumstances. Their work is similar to Makkonen and Lahdelma [36] who examine 
profitability of pools under spot markets, new contract structures and old contracts. 
The England and Wales Experience 
1. NETA: The England and Wales (E& W) Experience [26] 
Before the implementation of the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) 
in March 2001, the generation market consisted of a pool which was a centralised 
mechanism to dispatch day-ahead electricity on a marginal pricing basis in order 
to meet forecast demand. The arrangement (established after liberalisation of the 
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electricity industry in 1990) aimed to reduce prices through competition, however 
only a few of the generators were setting the prices and exploiting their mar-
ket power, so supply-side pressure to force prices down was limited. In addition, 
a centrally forecasted demand reduced the corresponding demand-side pressure. 
The resultant situation was an illiquid, rigid market with inhibited derivative de-
velopment and reduced liquidity, resulting in increased margins and raising prices. 
Moreover the arrangements in the pool were inflexible to the needs of all market 
participants. 
The structure of NETA was a two-sided market with simple, firm bids and offers 
with bilateral contracting chosen in favour of a centralised market. It allows flexi-
ble governance and real-time (at least until the 1 hour gate closure) balancing and 
settlement arrangements with hourly trading. Real-time trading represents a full-
scale commoditisation of electricity with increased competitive pressures on the 
generators. Characterising the change is a forward and futures market for electric-
ity allowing long-term trading and short-term power exchanges where participants 
can 'fine-tune' their contract positions. At the time of writing of this paper, the 
new arrangements had proven successful for the particular industry and therefore 
provided an instructive lesson to other energy companies and policy makers. 
2. Bower and Bunn [8] do a "Model-Based Comparison of Pool and Bilateral Mar-
ket Mechanisms for Electricity Trading" in which the Revised Electricity Trading 
Arrangements (RETA) in place prior to NETA are compared (in advance) with the 
proposed bilateral trading characterising NETA. The arrangement in place at the 
time of RETA was the centralised pool market described above. The researchers 
develop a computer simulation model of the electricity market allowing the agents 
(generators) to compete with each other under the proposed new arrangements, 
and develop their own trading strategies (modelled via artificial intelligence). Their 
(ironic) conclusion is that the new arrangements would result in increased prices. 
The increase had two causes: 
(a) Firstly, hourly bidding would allow generators to more effectively segment the 
market between on-peak and off-peak hours allowing more consumer surplus 
to be extracted than under daily bidding, so that tacit collusion would be 
easier. 
(b) Secondly, the potential for over-bidding by baseload generators is made easier, 
reducing competitive pressure on generators with mid-merit plant. 
In their final conclusion they note that neither of the industry structures (existing 
or proposed) would be more effective in the England and Wales situation because 
of factors specific to the national context, and that a more thorough reform would 
be required. Both arrangements have been successful in the countries where they 
have been implemented. The bilateral market has in fact proved effective as shown 
by Hesmondhalgh [26], though the idea they proposed in this paper of assessing 
the impact of a proposed change prior to its implementation is a good one. A 
possible reason for failure of the new arrangements (as foreseen by the authors) is 
that two initiatives were timetabled at once making it difficult to identify which 
one of the changes had the required or unwanted impacts on the market. 
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The papf·r by Hesmondhalgh [26] is a worthwhile demonstration of the use of 
simulation tools to analyse the effects of potential changes in trading arrangements 
in pool-type markets. 
It can be seen from this subsection that the question of how to allocate benefits that 
arise from pool-type markets among the parties in the pool is an important one, and has 
been addressed by a few researchers [36, 50]. They tackle the benefit-allocation problem 
under the premise that pools are indeed an efficient way of aggregating suppliers, and 
that cost savings can actually be achieved when compared to non-pool arrangements. 
2.1.5 Auctions 
The auction mechanism has been the widely accepted tool for setting electricity prices 
since deregulation in markets first commenced. Although auctioning has been effectively 
implemented in areas such as resource allocation and commodity trading, electricity 
trade requires modifications to the traditional process, because of the commodity's non-
storability, and its constraints with regard to production, transmission and distribution 
[24] . The various types of auctions and market rules will now be described. 1 
Uniform price versus pay-as-bid auctions 
In uniform price auctions every winning bidder receives the same market clearing price. 
Price-taking generators in these types of markets will be systematically encouraged to 
offer their production at close to their marginal cost. According to Rajaraman and Al-
varado [42] most power markets adopt the uniform-price type of auctioning mechanism. 
Contrastingly, in pay-as-bid auctions, every winning bidder gets paid at its winning bid. 
Generators in pay-as-bid markets will bid close to their expectations of market price. 
The obvious question that arises here is which method results in the lowest overall price 
to consumers. 
Multi versus single-round bidding 
Certain markets allow for bids to be revised after the initial auction results, thus it is 
possible to have two or more rounds of auctioning. Where multiple rounds are possible 
we have what is known as multi-round bidding. Where no revision is allowed we have 
a single-round bidding/sealed auction.2 Similarly, certain markets enforce fixed bidding 
blocks for the day (e.g. E&W) [39], while others allow the offer stacks to vary throughout 
the day (e.g. New Zealand). A further refinement of the variable, intra-day offer curves 
ideology, is to allow generators the opportunity during the day to vary their quantities 
1 Note that many of the particular designs mentioned in this section - and in the thesis in general -
are subject to changes, so inconsistencies may arise where regulatory structures have changed. 
2There is some ambiguity in the meaning of 'sealed' in auctions, some authors use the term to imply 
offer prices in the auction are confidential , others suggest that the auction is closed after the first round 
of bidding. 
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offered (though not their prices) for five minute (e.g. Australia) or half-hour intervals 
(e.g. E&W) [3, 40]. 
Supply functions 
Some markets have restrictions on the number of tranches that can be offered in a 
particular period, e.g the New Zealand market is limited to five per half-hour period [37]. 
Another restriction on the type of supply function may be that it must be increasing 
in price, or even linearly increasing over the range of volumes offered. Auctions which 
allow participants to submit several offers (from sellers) and several bids (from buyers) 
are termed multiunit as each firm will submit tranches on behalf of each of its units (in 
the case of sellers) [4]. The reader is referred to Section 3.3 for a detailed definition of 
supply functions. 
Multi and single-part offers (bids) 
Markets which allow separate prices for unit start-up, no-load operation and energy 
are often termed multipart bid markets (e.g. E&W). Those which only permit a single 
energy price, inclusive of fixed or variable costs are termed single-part bid markets (e.g. 
California). In the latter, firms must internalise all costs and constraints in preparing 
their bids as the bidding structure does not explicitly allow for recovery of the costs. 
Either of the two market types may still permit the inclusion of several price tranches 
for blocks of energy that they wish to produce [54]. 
Discriminatory pricing 
Some markets (e.g. New Zealand) may adopt discriminatory pricing which depends on 
the location of the supplier and requires the implementation of a Locational Marginal 
Price (LMP) mechanism [24]. Discriminatory and uniform are the two main pricing 
arrangements in deregulated power markets. 
Double auctions 
Both offers from producers (e.g. Genco's) and bids from buyers (e.g. distribution com-
panies or retailers) can be submitted to each auction [4]. 
Day-ahead markets 
Auctions are often of the day-ahead type such as the E&W and South African markets. 
In day-ahead markets the clearing takes place 24 hours before the actual generating day 
begins. Generators will submit a supply function for each hour of the following day 
before a specified deadline [9]. 
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Other variations 
Markets can also vary by virtue of the timing and availability of information flows which 
may depend on the information technology at the disposal of the participants and the 
system operators [43]. 
2.1.6 Generator-only market 
A generator-only market is characterised by a vertical demand function. Most markets 
have, to date, not progressed far enough to have enabled full-scale demand-side bidding, 
resulting in the inelastic demand curve against which supply is matched. Even in markets 
where consumers can respond to the daily price publication, the prices are still set based 
on a point forecast of demand for each hour. In addition to the initial response by 
consumers in such markets, there is a limited amount of real-time demand response 
as well [9]. As markets tend toward fuller competition we will see the emergence of a 
downward sloping demand curve for electricity. The demand curve has also been treated 
to some extent in [53, 54]. 
Techniques have been devised by many researchers which address the question of finding 
the optimal structure for an electricity industry that maximises competition without 
compromising reliability of supply [50]. Such research is useful for regulators who must 
make structural decisions. Tools are also required by the regulators for determining 
the most appropriate regulatory framework for providing the correct incentives to com-
petitors (such as generators) without compromising the quality of supply received by 
consumers. 
2.1.7 Monopolies and Oligopolies 
It is becoming very uncommon to find traditional monopoly power industries as the wave 
of liberalisation sweeps throughout the world with its well-meaning intent of introducing 
fair competition and improving economic efficiency. 
The topic of oligopoly is separate, though not indistinct from the issues of price-takers 
and price-setters in competitive markets. By definition, an oligopolistic generation sec-
tor will consist of both price-setters and price-takers, and a monopoly will consist solely 
of one price-setting Genco. Even in completely fair markets, some companies will have 
the ability to influence the ultimate price outcome because of the type of plant they 
operate as well as the effects of peaks and troughs in demand (both expected and un-
expected). For example, baseload thermal generators (coal and nuclear power stations) 
will automatically have the greatest say in the resultant price during hours where loads 
are fairly stable, whereas peaking-type units (fuel/gas-fired, pumped storage or hydro-
schemes) can more-or-less dictate prices in peak periods (which by nature tend to be 
more uncertain) or times of uncertain sudden load increases. 
In oligopolies, ~orne of the generators are large enough to influence prices through careful 
choice of their supply function. Price-influence is a consequence of the economies of scale 
in generation, barrier to entry, a limited number of producers and also due to the spatial 
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distribution of customers resulting in transmission constraints and losses from distant 
suppliers [3, 54]. An oligopoly is the common status of an industry that has had the best 
intentions of reaching pure competition, but has become stuck in waves of regulatory 
uncertainty, abuse of market power and information flow problems. 
Reasons for the tendency to oligopoly (rather than perfect completion) are the special 
features of the electricity supply industry, and can be summarised by the following points: 
• There are usually a limited number of producers. 
• Investment size is generally large causing barriers to entry. 
• Location: 
1. transmission constraints isolate particular customers from the reach of many 
generators 
2. transmission losses discourage sales/purchases over large transmission dis-
tances 
Much of the research in the above realm has been conducted in order to identify loop-
holes in the design that may worsen the effects of the above features and seek ways 
of choosing/improving a design to create sufficient competition and limit the scope for 
gaming, and decreasing the tendency to oligopoly. 
2.1.8 Participants and their behaviour 
Many authors have identified their version of the participants in an electricity market. A 
particular overview can be found in Ghosh and Ramesh [20] who postulate the existence 
of following participants in a modern market: 
• Generators 
• Suppliers 
• Customers 
• Speculators 
• Intermediaries(Power marketers/Power traders) 
The challenge for the participants (and for researchers) is how to cope with uncertainty 
and the challenge for regulators (and again for researchers) is to find the optimal industry 
structure and best regulatory environment for the participants to interact. 
2.1.9 Other aspects electricity generation markets 
There are many other challenges facing the deregulated power industry. A particularly 
pronounced one is: 
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Changing technology Examples include improved metering and accounting advances 
that allow the markets to function more efficiently and advances in generation technol-
ogy which result in new investment in generation plant. On a related front, there are 
increasing environmental concerns and the tendency in (mostly developed) countries 
toward the implementation of renewable forms of energy procurement. 
2.1.10 Tools for investigation and analysis 
A wide range of tools have been developed and adapted by researchers. Among the 
tools are: game theory and equilibrium concepts for analysing behaviour of market par-
ticipants; Markov decision processes for incorporating various market states; algorithms 
for optimising decisions that affect the profit outcome of market participants (see sec-
tion 3.4); Optimisation of offers (producers) and bids (consumers) allowing for system 
constraints, clearing prices, transmission and network constraints, outages, and ramping 
rates. 
There are two main groups of models of that have been developed in the wake of reforms 
and generator competition [4]: 
Models representing all of the generation companies. Models representing all 
Genco's are largely simulation or equilibrium-type models. 
Models that focus on a particular generation company. Single Genco models 
can be categorised according to: 
1. the manner in which the company may affect the spot market i.e is the company 
a price-taker or a price-setter? 
2. treatmen1 of uncertainty: is the spot market modelled in probabilistic or deter-
ministic terms? 
3. detail of representation of generation units: 
(a) an aggregate model of all the companies units with one unique cost curve and 
a maximum output. 
(b) models which distinguish the individual generation units but ignore intertem-
poral constraints. 
(c) models which consider units' intertemporal constraints. 
Models of electrical power systems - as with strategic system models in general - can be 
described as being descriptive (conjecturing a picture of reality) or normative ( determin-
ing an exact course of action) [18]. The modelling activities of electricity markets exhibit 
characteristics of both of the two types of models, resulting in prescriptive analyses which 
are neither exclusively descriptive or exclusively normative. 
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This section has given some important definitions and described the types of markets 
underlying the trade of electricity, as well as the characteristics of the markets. The 
types of contracts and trading arrangements have also been described. Much of the 
literature surveyed for the remainder of this chapter, and subsequently in Chapter 3, 
relies on a knowledge of the terminology introduced in this section, as authors assume 
an understanding of the terminology, concepts and assumptions as part of their platform 
for model development. 
2.2 Strategic Decisions by Market Players 
2.2.1 Needs for Strategic Decision-making 
Companies in newly deregulated markets, need assistance in formulating and imple-
menting strategy at a corporate level, as well as in adapting their traditional methods of 
strategic analysis to the new and transforming market environment. Albuyeh and Ku-
mar [1] engage in an outline of the requirements for decision support for electric power 
market participants and also emphasise the need for models to be flexible. Their article 
is largely a written account of the needs for decision support, and the necessary features 
of such tools. 
Generators, the suppliers of electricity in competitive energy markets, are challenged 
with exposure to a great deal of financial risks which necessitate the need for decision 
support models. Particular decision support is required with regard to scheduling, fol-
lowed by the selection of an appropriate bidding strategy [30]. The difficulties arise, 
for example, in the treatment of uncertainties such as rival behaviour. Other market 
participants (distributors and consumers - both small and large) will also have the need 
for such models. 
There are also various terms or horizons over which decision support is required e.g. from 
long-term planning (such as capacity investment and resource planning) and contracts 
administration to intermediate to short-term planning and spot market offer preparation. 
A related issue is the management of complex portfolios of contracts from pre- and 
post-reform eras where contractual obligations between suppliers and consumers that 
were agreed in the regulated era must now be met by the suppliers. The contractual 
obligation must be met alongside the management of the new types of contracts of the 
deregulated era. Management in this context also implies quantifying and managing the 
risk exposures attached to all types of contracts. 
One of the main goals of research in strategic decision-making is to maximise the sup-
plier's profit from selling electricity through whatever medium is available (e.g through 
the pool or through bilateral contracts). Real-time tactical and operational decisions 
are crucial in highly volatile energy markets and motivate the need for a reliable Deci-
sion Support System (DSS) in choosing the optimal unit commitment and generation 
dispatch. 
Strategic decisions must also be made in the face of new market opportunities, for 
existing and new suppliers. The strategic decisions will assist in the identification of 
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opportunities a" well as in assessing their viability. 
One of the most important needs for strategic decision support has been in assisting 
the adapting market participants in the transition from traditional (engineering-type) 
production cost models to a financial market environment. 
2.2.2 Methods of Conducting Strategic Decision Making 
A stochastic short-term planning model for a price-taking generating company is used 
by Kaleta et al. [30] as a key analytical tool within the decision support process. Price 
uncertainty is treated by imposing a set of possible price scenarios with associated prob-
abilities. Several risk criteria are then considered and the problem (i.e. the generation 
scheduling and bidding strategy) becomes a multiple criteria optimisation problem. The 
criteria include various risk measures as well as some extreme events risk measures and 
the solutions are adjusted to the risk preferences of the generator. 
System dynamics in conjunction with sensitivity analysis has been proposed as method 
for adapting and formulating strategies in [34]. The authors suggest the use of such 
tools as a means for learning where no industry evolution, experience or history exist, 
if not for the decision-making itself, then for simply understanding the strategic and 
regulatory risks that prevail. In this context, simulation is not used as a means for 
predicting the future evolution of the market, but rather a means of understanding the 
important connections and boundaries in a complex system without trying to capture 
abundant detail. The marked differences which are visible across different countries' 
markets reinforce the need for highly adaptive simulation models. Additionally, the aim 
should be to benefit from the traditional advantages of system dynamics models, namely 
that they are behavioural, high-level and depend on feedback. 
In an article by Vlahos et al. [50], an integrative modelling approach for understanding 
competitive electricity markets is presented as a vehicle for systems thinking, allowing op-
timisation and spreadsheet models to exist within an overall strategic simulation model. 
The approach used by the authors in this instance was termed 00/DEVS: Object Ori-
entation and Discrete Event Specification Formalism. The 00 /DEVS platform allowed 
the integration of the strategic modelling tools into an industry simulation model, thus 
addressing the deficiencies of the solitary use of system dynamics, namely: 
1. Inability to generalise and aggregate models representing entities in a system. 
2. Insufficient level of detail being modelled. 
3. Lack of rP-usability. 
4. Continuous rather than discrete time structure. 
Decision support systems 
An example of a computer-based decision system for Scottish Genco's is given by Rob-
son et al. [44]. Such models demonstrate the importance of reliable information and also 
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on improving access to such information. The models can improve response times and 
provide reliable prescriptive methods for meeting the trading requirements of a Genco. 
More specifically, the models can be used to assess a Pool or trading partner's require-
ment for energy, value the energy available for trade, and ultimately recommend an offer 
price for the energy to be traded. The ideas in their paper are useful, although specific 
to the spot trading of an external Genco to the E&W pool, and are based on a somewhat 
dated market design (1996). The latter point is a common difficulty in the fast-changing 
markets for electrical power. 
Strategic gaming has been used for supporting the evaluation of business strategies and 
policy options in evolving power markets. Kleindorfer et al. [32] emphasise the impor-
tance for accurately representing institutional details in the analysis of regulatory and 
bidding strategies for network investment in the E&W pool. As with other approaches 
mentioned in this section, the executives of the companies concerned can learn/ pre-test 
strategies in a realistic setting. The particular model developed by the authors was 
termed EPSIM (Electric Power Strategy Simulation Model). The EPSIM model was 
built with a view to implementation in different markets and for different types of strat-
egy support, which makes it very versatile compared to the approaches of other authors, 
who are confined to a specific market design, and solved only one specific problem. 
Model versatility is essential for dynamic industries, and appears to have been imple-
mented successfully in various applications, including the modelling of the E&W pool, 
and a large regional power pool in the United States, as well as in evaluating the desir-
ability of a joint Argentine-Chilean interconnection agreement. They are also used more 
traditionally in modelling bilateral contracts between Genco's and distribution compa-
nies under transmission constraints (similar to [8]) . Their approach also has the added 
advantage of integrating software packages with spreadsheets and mathematical models 
such as linear programming. 
Other researchers have examined: 
• Integrative modelling approaches for understanding competitive electricity markets 
[50]. 
• The use of system dynamics [34] . 
• Stochastic short-term planning models [30]. 
• Multicriteria Decision Support [30]. 
• Scenario testing (on exogenous factors such as hydraulicity, demand and fuel 
prices). 
2.3 Risk Management in Power Markets 
Two areas of risk management prevail. The first is that of general risk management in 
electricity markets and the second relates to that of energy derivatives (which is covered 
more explicitly in [10, 41]. The general risk management issues of this section are t ackled 
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directly in [7, 15, 16, 46, 55]. Indirectly they have been tackled in the models for strategic 
decision support of the previous section, and in generator trading strategy models of 
Chapter 3. The risk management of energy derivatives will be covered in Section 2.5 of 
this chapter. The management of electricity price risk, however, is important in both 
the contexts of general risk management and derivative risk management, and is covered 
in this section. 
Sources of Risk 
The main sources of risk in power trading are: 
• Trading in a commodity that requires real time delivery and must (generally) be 
consumed immediately. 
• Market risks such as credit risk, uncertainty of demand, and uncertain competitor 
behaviour. 
• Adaptation of a monopoly to a competitive environment, with constantly changing 
market structure and regulatory influences. 
• Taking into account the specific properties of the electricity market such as the 
characteristics of electricity prices and system constraints. 
• In developing countries, or even in countries with developing electricity markets, 
there is the additional risk of having to cope with the uncertainty in a deregulating 
environment [50]. 
Caution is required with the application of complicated risk management strategies to 
a young, unadapted market. A notorious example of too little attention being drawn to 
the implementation of risk management strategies was the Enron collapse. Additional 
caution is due when conducting empirical tests of models in pricing and risk management 
in an illiquid market as there is little data to conduct such tests, resulting in a greater 
reliance on modelling assumptions. 
In a privatised market with increased competition, price volatility is exacerbated, so 
tools need to be developed that minimise the exposure to the risks associated with the 
increased volatility. Note that volatility need not always reduce the potential profits of 
market participants: large losses due to extreme price movements experienced by one 
participant could imply large gains to another. Nevertheless, it is therefore also im-
perative to quantify this volatility and incorporate it into pricing models. A dynamic 
environment stresses the need for the appropriate management of the instruments within 
a company's investment framework. The parameters of the models we use for valuation 
and management are also dynamic, so any portfolio containing these instruments must 
be frequently updated and recomposed as these parameters change. This must be done 
within the constraints imposed through transaction costs and other similar market inef-
ficiencies. 
There will often be a choice between using an approach of testing various scenarios 
to determine trade constraints versus the utilisation of derivative instruments for risk 
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hedging. Naturally, the relative costs and the existence of a sufficiently liquid market 
for these instruments, will determine which would be preferable. 
2.3.1 Classification of Risks 
Suppliers, distributors and traders in a competitive market place are all subject to a 
variety of risks. Broadly these risks are related to either market (price and quantity, 
volatility, correlation and liquidity), commodity (storage, capacity, delivery and trans-
mission) or human behavioural (trader, analyst, manager, credit and model) risks. 
One of the variables which incorporates and summarises most of these risks is the elec-
tricity price, so much of the research is directed at managing the risk associated with 
uncertain electricity prices. 
Electricity price risk 
Electricity price risk is the risk associated with uncertain electricity prices and is one of 
the most important risk factors in energy trading, as it is fundamentally driven by many 
other risk factors. Bjorgan et al. [7] (among many others) focus on the risks represented 
by fluctuating electricity market prices. 
Being a commodity with a very complex physical characteristics, and one which is being 
treated to a greater extent like a free-market commodity in recent times, electricity 
poses a variety of risks for those who buy and sell it. The long-term, fixed pricing of the 
regulated era is no longer applicable. As a result, the price of the commodity is volatile 
(i.e. high frequency of change) and the magnitude of the price movements are larger 
than those of other commodities. There are manufacturing, transportation, delivery 
difficulties, as well as speculative trading, which all contribute to electricity price risk 
[10, 41 , 55]. 
In regulated markets, the price risk resultant from this volatility was effectively passed 
on to consumers. Nowadays the risk is shifted to producers, emphasising their need for 
risk management. The use of standard hedging tools is not always an option since the 
possibility of extreme price movements increases the risks of trading (i.e. pricing and 
hedging). 
Weron [55] uses time series and autocorrelations to prove that the price of electricity is far 
more volatile than other commodities. Some of the implications of the price uncertainty 
are that caution is required when using traditional valuation techniques for financial 
instruments in the electricity markets, and that more complex models should be used to 
capture the unique price dynamics. 
Owing to the influences of weather, volatility, seasonality, technology, political and/or 
regulatory uncertainty, plus possible interactions between these factors, there is a sub-
stantial resultant price risk to buyers and sellers of energy commodities. There is also 
the added concern that the introduction of the derivative markets- though originally 
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intended to enable reduced levels of price uncertainty, and besides inducing the partici-
pation of all parties concerned - creates an ironic additional price volatility that needs 
to be managed. 
Market Risks 
Denton et al. [ L5] categorise market risks encountered by energy asset operators (i.e. 
electricity producers) in terms of the risk horizon: 
1. Short-term/operational risks (less than 1 month) related to the most economic 
dispatch and scheduling. 
2. Intermediate-term/trading risks (1 month to 1 year) related to fluctuations m 
forward prices and their inter-period correlations. 
3. Long-term/valuation risks (greater than 1 year) related to the long-term viability 
of generating plant, in the wake of uncertain technological, regulatory and pricing 
influences in the future. 
Other sources of risk which have been classified by various authors are: 
• Market rules, market segmentation and regulatory risks. The power markets ex-
hibit uncertain environments with poorly understood risks which are unquantifi-
able and which may arise from unknown sources. 
• Risks associated with the uses of financial instruments such as derivatives. 
• Basis risk is a cross-commodity risk that arises when a firm is exposed to price 
differentials between two commodities. An example is a coal-fired generator who 
sells electricity at the spot price and buys fuel at the coal price. Such a company 
is exposed to the uncertainty of the price differential, which ultimately is what 
determines their profit margin. 
• Credit risks equate to the probability of trading partners defaulting on their con-
tractual arrangements and obligations. 
• In energy markets there are often cross-locational or geographic risks related to 
production and distribution. These are related to transmission and network con-
straints (for example failure and/or reliability of the grid). 
• ModellinE; and management risk related to the appropriateness of both modelling 
approaches and risk management strategies adopted by a company. 
For this thesis, and in the studies mentioned in Chapter 3, the focus of risk management 
is predominantly related to price (and quantity) risk, as these are the most likely to 
mitigate the profits of a Genco. In any realistic risk management application, due 
consideration will also have to be given to the other risks mentioned in this subsection. 
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2.3.2 Risk Assessment and Quantification 
An important aspect of risk assessment is consistency with asset valuation methods. It is 
also necessary to combine and quantify the physical and financial risks in any assessment. 
Some of the techniques proposed for risk quantification include: 
• The Riskmetrics and Creditmetrics methods of J.P. Morgan, though these relate 
more to firms in equity and other financial commodity markets. 
• Immunisation and portfolio analysis . 
• Value at Risk (VaR). 
• Sensitivity analysis (e.g. the 'Greeks' of the next subsection). 
• General tools of financial engineering. 
• Models of bidding behaviour . 
• Scenario testing. 
• Simulation e.g. of power portfolios and optimal portfolio selection [49]. 
• Mixed and comparative methods. 
Within the general framework of a simulation tool for supporting risk analysis, BatHe 
and Barqufn [5] focus on the forecasting of fuel prices, these being the key risk factors 
which influence electricity market prices and their inherent stochastic volatility. Hence a 
quantitative rather than fundamental approach is adopted. A multivariate Generalised 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedastic (GARCH) model is designed to generate 
future fuel price paths, using a Principal Components decomposition to deal with the 
difficulties of multidimensional conditional covariance between the base-fuel indexes. 
Dhalgren et al. [16] summarise risk assessment in energy trading, especially that of price-
risk. The common thread of their paper as in other related research is that of adapting 
risk management/assessment techniques to a newly competitive power industry. 
2.3.3 Methods of Risk Management 
A discussion of the growth of trading and risk management services in liberalised elec-
tricity markets is discussed and motivated in [46]. 
• General risk management can be handled with real options models and stochastic 
optimisation techniques. Denton et al. [15] give an example of the application of 
real options models to the risk management requirements of Genco's. 
• The 'Greek' hedging techniques mentioned in the section on derivatives later in 
this chapter, namely Delta, Gamma, Vega, Theta, Rho, and other factors . 
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• Financial instruments such as futures and options. 
• Portfolio ,malysis. 
• Market analysis. 
• Production limits. 
• Transmission hedging. 
These are the general techniques of risk management. Some examples of the specific 
research on risk-management in electricity markets are now described in some detail. 
Managing Electricity Spot Price Risk 
Bjorgan et al. [7] focus on the risks represented by fluctuating electricity market prices. A 
particularly useful application is discussed in the context of contractual decision making, 
and in particular the determination of the optimal portfolio when offering energy to a 
spot market. The situation is simplified by assuming a particular cost structure and no 
market power. A formula is derived for the number of futures contracts that minimises 
the variance of the profit distribution. 
Vehviliiinen and Keppo [49] do an interesting application of financial risk management 
methods to deregulated electricity markets. They present a method of solving for the 
optimal risk-aware electricity portfolio taking into account the important aspects of 
electricity price behaviour (namely seasonality and non-storability). The approach used 
is to maximise the expected utility from an electricity portfolio in order to allow for an 
agent's preferences with respect to profit and risk. This they achieve by converting a 
stochastic utility problem to a deterministic non-linear programming problem with the 
use of Monte Carlo simulation to create the VaR measure for complex portfolios. The 
advantage of Monte Carlo simulation over scenario-based analysis in this case is that 
several stochastic variables may be evaluated simultaneously without seriously affecting 
computational performance. 
Elaborating on the approach in [49], a general stochastic framework is developed to model 
all uncertainties in the market (for example, electricity spot price, marginal production 
cost, demand patterns and weather indexes). A liquid futures market is assumed, with 
transaction costs and taxation both ignored. They simplify the spot price process by 
assuming that all the information about the future behaviour of the spot is contained in 
the forward price curve (see also [10, 41 ]). They also assume a lognormal distribution 
around the expected value by assuming that the fat tail of the true spot price distribution 
is mitigated through the use of price averaging in each discrete time period. To estimate 
volatility, they use historical rates, maintaining that implied volatilities are not practical 
owing to both illiquidity in options markets and a lack of analytical (closed-form) pricing 
formulae. 
Next, the stochastic processes for the above factors are expressed simultaneously in a 
multivariate Ito process, and the derivative contracts dependent on these factors are 
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similarly expressed by application of Ito's lemma (see the Appendix, page 179). The 
factors, instruments and electricity contracts (physical and financial) are combined into 
a portfolio from which an expression for total wealth can be derived at the end of the 
simulation period. 
They then find the optimal portfolio for the agent by converting the stochastic utility 
function to a second order approximation thereof, resulting in a non-linear programming 
formulation. Specific assumptions regarding utility functions are made and tradeable 
assets are assumed to be linearly independent (i.e. they have non-identical payoffs). 
The estimates of the factors required for solving the formulation are obtained through 
Monte Carlo simulation. In the case of constrained optimisation, a wide variety of non-
linear programming methods may be employed to arrive at a solution. 
A mathematical formulation is then given for pricing the instruments, evaluating the 
portfolio (hence obtaining a distribution of simulated outcomes), and solving the opti-
misation problem. 
Finally, a practical example is given within the framework of the Scandinavian market 
and numerical results derived from two perspectives: the first being that of an industrial 
electricity end user with a fixed consumption, and the second a generator of baseload 
electricity. In both cases the agents are able to reduce their VaR by optimising their 
portfolio (and hence their hedging level) according to their specific risk preferences. 
The framework presented in this paper certainly permits risk management in the case 
of agents with more complex portfolios than those given in their examples (assuming 
the processes determining the uncertainties are known and can be modelled, and that 
market instruments can be described by these processes). One necessity is that futures 
contracts for electricity can be used as tradeable assets, so as to overcome the non-
storability /tradeability of the spot asset. A limitation of these methods, as acknowledged 
by the authors, is that the data for model parameter estimation is limited and price 
processes are to date not well understood. The idea of using VaR as the appropriate 
measure of risk is justified and motivated in this paper. Scenario analysis is suggested 
to discover more about the risks of the portfolio. As indicated in many other instances, 
the use of financial methods in risk analysis can be useful if the unique properties of 
electricity markets are taken into account. 
BatHe and Barquin [5] present a simulation method for risk analysis in a wholesale 
competitive electricity market. Within the general framework of a simulation tool for 
supporting risk analysis, they focus on the forecasting of fuel prices, these being the key 
risk factors which influence electricity market prices. The other factors not focused on 
in this paper include items such as short-term demand and hydraulicity (hydro inflows), 
and the strategic behaviour of agents in the electricity market (which itself influenced 
by the other three exogenous factors). 
This paper is once again motivated by the common thread in this field, namely the 
introduction of competition in the energy industry, and in particular among generators. 
They advocate the use of economic and statistical models (such as game theory and 
time series) over those used in engineering science, the latter being unable to (easily) 
cope with the inherent uncertainties of electricity markets (over and above the classical 
uncertainties in the monopolistic indus try). 
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Their focus is therefore on the building of a time series model of base fuel prices (e.g. 
oil, gas and coal), ignoring the other generator-specific variable costs which would be 
over and above the fuel costs. As mentioned on page 29, a multivariate GARCH model 
is designed to generate future fuel price paths, using a Principal Components decom-
position to deal with the difficulties of multidimensional conditional covariance between 
the base fuel indexes. 
The (Monte Carlo) simulation framework for the risk analysis within which the fuel price 
modelling takes place is outlined in this paper. The aim, via a fundamental approach, 
is to model the uncertainty on the price drivers' behaviour and obtain a future price 
distribution using a market model with scenarios dependent on the above-mentioned 
exogenous factors. Each variable represented within the factors must not be correlated 
with any other variables within that factor; clearly a questionable criterion in the case 
of fuel prices. A further necessary assumption is that the agent is a price-taker and is 
therefore unable to exploit their power in the fuel purchasing market. Having said this, 
the individual agent's strategic behaviour must be captured to reflect the fundamental 
aspect of the analysis, as must the time period over which the analysis takes place. The 
outcomes of the scenario analysis will be market prices, production costs and profits, 
along with their associated density functions. From these outputs, VaR (or other feasible 
risk measures such as factor sensitivity) may be derived. This approach allows the 
multivariate G ARCH model to take care of the most important input determining a 
generator's behaviour, allowing the clustering within the scenario generation process to 
take care of the other factors. This considerably reduces the number of key variables in 
the general market simulation. 
The multivariate GARCH model suggested also helps overcome some of the problems of 
applying a Black-Scholes-type model of asset prices (i.e. lognormal prices), in particular 
with regard to the assumption of constant volatility. Commodity prices - as confirmed 
in many other references where market implied values have been calculated -display 
mean reversion, and a strong correlation between price level and volatility exists clearly 
violating the crucial B-S assumption. Being a multivariate model, it is able to capture 
the strong correlations between the various fuel prices. The price behaviour of the fuel 
commodities can thus be captured in a vector GARCH model as follows: 
Let St = (sit, ... , SKt)' be a vector at time t of K variables (commodity prices). The 
evolution of the variables is captured in a vector autoregressive process of order p 
St = M + A1 ·Bt-l+···+ Ap · St-p + Ut 
where M is a vector of dimension K; Ai, i = 1, ... ,p, are fixed coefficient matrices of 
dimension [K >: K]; Ut is a white noise with non-singular covariance matrix Eu and, 
Here the mean-reverting model is implied in the case of p = 1. 
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In the case of a vector GARCH(m, r) model, Lu of Ut depends on the last r residual 
vectors and its m previous values. 
where V, ~and 8 are square matrices of dimension K. 
A Principal Components Analysis of L is then made. From this the multivariate GARCH 
process can be decomposed into a set of K univariate models of the form: 
2 s: 2 s: 2 () 2 () 2 
akt = Vk + Uk1 · Ekt-1 + · · · + Ukr · Ekt-r + k1 · akt-1 + · · · + km · akt-m 
Each of the k, (k = 1, ... K) is then weighted by its corresponding eigenvalue. The 
weights of the eigenvalues will correspond to the relative importance of the model vari-
ables. The parameters of each GARCH process are estimated using maximum likelihood 
by means of the Berndt, Hall, Hall and Hausman algorithm. 
After the estimation is complete, the scenario analysis is then undertaken by simulating 
a large number of fuel price paths and the density functions of the clustering criteria 
are thus determined. As stated in the general model, the agent-specific variable costs 
(and the proportions thereof which are attributed to fuel costs) are calculated from a 
weighted aggregation of the scenarios. 
Finally, a case example is summarised, and the authors conclude by stating the impor-
tance of being able to quantify the impact of various inputs' effects on the electricity 
market price. 
Unit commitment in conjunction with financial markets 
This topic is discussed to some detail in the short term/operational risk section of [15]. 
Here 'short-term' implies less than one month. (Hourly) unit commitment along with 
(minute by minute) economic dispatch represent the well-studied scheduling problems of 
the regulated industry. The authors specify how to schedule units in the most economic 
manner taking into consideration unit economics, physical constraints and incremental 
transmission losses while meeting the total commitment to power. In the regulated 
world, revenues from the scheduling were known and rates fixed; sales and purchases 
were analysed in an equivalent manner across Genco's. The deregulated regime requires 
a market-price-based unit commitment. 
Trades over shorter and longer periods have been valued using a spark spread model 
(see Section 2.5). Decisions to trade or schedule were based on the value of the spark 
spread option which is effectively a real option available to the generator on whether it is 
profitable to enter the market for trading, and if it is then the optimal sales level can be 
determined with the same model. Since a spark spread instrument models the conversion 
of a fuel to electricity (pricing takes into account the volatilities of the underlying fuel 
price), the pricing mechanism is deficient. It will tend to overvalue the plant by failing 
to consider: 
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• physical constraints on operations e.g. hourly minimum and maximum operating 
ranges; maximum hour-to-hour changes in output, or ramp rates and ; 
• cycle time constraints, or minimum hours 'on' and 'off'. 
The models also fail to account for variable costs other than those relating to the fuel 
itself e.g. maintenance, tax and labour. Another especially important consideration is 
the heat rate (or energy conversion efficiency) which is treated as linear in traditional 
spark spread models, and is in truth a non-linear parameter. This latter notion is 
supported by Deng et al. [14]. 
Two scenarios, deterministic and stochastic, were discussed. 
Deterministic case: A unit commitment formulation is given using a decision tree 
(Discrete State Space model) showing paths of possible output changes (including ramps 
or shutdowns and on or off-times at each node) and the possible cost and revenue sce-
narios are then mapped out by the branches of the tree. In the deterministic case, the 
known variable costs (including the fuel price) and the power prices are superimposed at 
the relevant nodes on the decision tree, and net profit is maximised using a backward-
iterating dynamic programming algorithm. The tree then yields the optimal dispatch 
path and asset valuation at every node along the path. 
Stochastic ca'>e: In the situation of uncertain market conditions the authors propose 
an approach whereby a mean-reverting stochastic process with drift and time-varying 
volatility, for the logarithm of the spot price is assumed in the most general case. Oth-
erwise a simpler process could be assumed. As mentioned in the section on derivatives 
and in reference [10], this is equivalent to a one-factor futures price model, and the 
process is discretised into steps in keeping with a discrete space formulation. Parame-
ters for the model are estimated using maximum likelihood. This is a common method 
of price-mapping in derivative valuation (see Section 2.5). 
The process is discretised and a multi-level trinomial tree or trinomial forest is created 
through an amalgamation of the energy price tree with a tree as outlined in the deter-
ministic case above. The result is a trinomial forest with each node having four values 
characterising the state of the generator with respect to time, price, output level and 
run-time. It is not clear whether the authors have a separate tree for power and fuel 
prices, or the price captured at each node is the differential between the two. The latter 
however seems more likely as they then proceed to value the option directly from the 
tree using a backward induction technique. 
The stochastic optimisation algorithm returns two results: 
1. The valuE" of the asset over the operation period which equals the expected profit 
earned under optimal dispatch. 
2. The optimal dispatch rule at each time period and operating state and price. 
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Several benefits are visible from this approach: 
• The effect of price volatility on plant valuation is shown. 
• A set of decision rules i.e. what actions to take at a given node of the forest. 
• Random outages could be included in simulations of optimal unit operations. 
The effects of non-constant heat rate on the spark spread model is shown graphically. 
It is similarly shown that ramp rates also lead to an over-valuation of a unit on the 
spark spread model. Similar results would hold for start-up costs and minimum run 
times, with the effects compounded when these are coupled with non-linear heat rates 
and ramp rates. 
No mention is made of the auctioning process in the short term. The authors have 
focused their attention on the technical aspects of generation in a deregulated market, 
where deregulation (in at least the short term/operational risk sense) simply implies that 
power and fuel prices are stochastic. It is effectively assumed above that the trading 
environment is perfectly liquid, and the unit is neither a price-taker nor a price-setter. 
In truth, a unit operator exists in a world with elements of the regulated load fulfil-
ment/cost minimising world and the trading and derivatives world, played out in a less 
than liquid market, with sales structured to seek the maximum profit. A method anal-
ogous to Lagrangian relaxation techniques is used for handling the real options model 
in an illiquid market where power prices are adjusted iteratively until supply matches 
demand. Despite being computationally expensive, the real option model can produce 
a distribution of the value of a unit as a function of the underlying energy prices; from 
this the appropriate risk metrics ('Greeks' and VaR's of Section 2.5) can be obtained. 
In the intermediate term (a few weeks to a year), forward prices are the dominant fac-
tors, and trading and hedging require attention. Monthly forward prices must also be 
consistent with the short term (hourly) forward prices. The appropriate risk measures 
in this time frame are VaR, and alternatives EaR (Earnings at Risk) and CFaR (Cash 
Flow at Risk). Methods for attaining these using the real options approach are dis-
cussed. Further relevant risks in the intermediate term are credit exposure, transmission 
congestion and portfolio optimisation. 
Long-term asset valuation (several years in length) are discussed and the risks resultant 
from markets and regulation e.g. with respect to environmental policy. Key techniques 
used include scenario analysis with production cost models, examining fundamental 
market drivers and developing scenario-based price projections. The traditional models 
will - especially at high levels of demand - undervalue generation assets owing to the 
effect of strategic bidding behaviour on prices. An attempt to overcome this is made with 
the use of game-theoretic approaches, however this fails under non-equilibrium market 
conditions, a fact which many other researchers have also identified as a weakness. 
Drawbacks of the production cost models are: 
• Their inability to adequately address market price uncertainty. 
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• They assume perfect information transparency - an unlikely scenario in deregu-
lated ma1 kets where information is commercially confidential and potentially un-
available. 
Given improved computational ability, the stochastic real options models lend themselves 
to longer term scenario valuation exercises and therefore have the ability to overcome the 
described shortcomings. In conclusion this paper demonstrates the use of real options 
models for valuing generation assets and managing risks of trading, investment and 
portfolio optimisation, over various time periods in increasingly complex environments. 
A major drawback is its failure to examine the intricacies of the auction-type trading 
mechanism that now prevails in modern power markets. 
A literature survey of techniques of portfolio analysis and price-risk hedging is given 
in [16], and is described in an industry-wide sense rather than with a specific focus on 
Genco's. Methods are surveyed from the two separate areas of analysis, namely power 
systems and financial analysis. Further research is identified as being necessary in the 
following areas: 
• Modelling the electric power grid to understand the risk of gaming using transmis-
sion capacity. 
• Modelling the bidding behaviours of market players for accurate risk assessment. 
• Designing market rules to mitigate risks inherent in gaming. 
• Transmission enhancements for removing bottlenecks and congestion. 
• Methods for valuing transmission rights to hedge transmission system congestion. 
2.4 Electricity Spot Prices and Forward Curves 
This section deE>cribes the characteristics of electricity spot prices (interchangeably known 
as System Marginal Prices or SMP's), then discusses the types of models that have been 
proposed for modelling them, followed by a summary of the various uses of the price 
models in real-life applications. The last part discusses the electricity forward curve. 
2.4.1 Characteristics of Electricity Prices 
The electricity price is an important variable in any modelling activity which takes place 
in power markets. It has different characteristics from most commodities (including 
those of other energy commodities) and has therefore served as a worthy contender for 
the attention of many researchers. Though power prices may incorporate some of the 
behaviour of traditional commodities, they are riddled with intricacies. 
One of the unique characteristics is that the electricity price economics is characterised 
by young, immature markets where the price drivers are complex. Additionally, the 
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effects of economic cycles are subdued (owing to the ever-present demand for electricity) 
and there is a high frequency of market events. Furthermore, there is a notable impact 
of convenience yield (due to storage difficulties), a low correlation between short and 
long-term pricing, prevalent seasonality, and levels of regulation varying from highly 
regulated/low-activity to deregulated/high-activity in decentralised markets. 
Electricity spot prices can therefore exhibit extreme volatility - more extreme than what 
is understood as extreme in the conventional markets - and are completely unique in 
that respect. The uniqueness is due to the balancing of various supply and demand 
factors, particularly owing (on the supply side) to storage problems and (on the demand 
side) to weather influences and grid reliability [55]. 
Prices in particular power markets may also be location-specific (leading to the formation 
of Locational Marginal Prices (LMP's). Formation of LMP's may be due to the structural 
design of the market making allowances for production, transmission, consumption or 
regulatory constraints across various regions of the grid. 
The resultant distribution of electricity price returns exhibits a noticeably long tail, which 
means that the probability of large price increases occurring is substantial. Ghosh and 
Ramesh [20] also attribute this volatility to the interface between the trade of electricity 
and the physical realities of producing it. Additionally electricity prices can sometimes 
be negative when suppliers are forced to sell their energy to avoid the costs of shutting 
down- forced sale of a commodity is something generally unheard of in any other market. 
The fundamental price drivers in energy markets in general are very different to those 
in other developed markets for equities and most other commodities. 
Seasonality, mean reversion and jumps are characteristics of electricity prices that have 
drawn the attention of price-modelling analysts. They are now described in more detail. 
Mean Reversion is the tendency of energy spot prices to revert toward a long-term 
equilibrium level. The tendency is noticeably strong in electricity as confirmed 
by empirical studies on historical prices. Some analysts explain that the prices 
gravitate toward their long-term level, which in turn is determined by the cost of 
production. If the cost of production is identified as the main determinant of price, 
it has been suggested that cost-based models for pricing the energy (usually for 
energy producers rather than extractors) are used for predicting long-term mean 
levels of prices. 
Along with the concept of mean reversion, we obtain the notion of price equilibrium 
half-life. The half-life is the time taken for the price to return half-way to its long-
term equilibrium. A sufficient time-span of data are required to ensure that the 
effects of mean reversion are not smothered by stochastic variation. 
Stochastic Volatility refers to the unpredictability of the asset price standard devia-
tion itself. The concept can be used to explain the seasonality inherent in electricity 
prices. The stochastic element itself may be analysed in two components: 
1. A deterministic element (explicable changes in volatility) that has a time-
dependent functionality (i.e. we know the type of function which governs the 
randomness). 
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2. A true random part containing noise which can't be accounted for in the 
functionality (the unexplainable variation in volatility). 
Jumps are sudden and large changes in the spot price. They are usually unexpected 
and discontinuous; empirical examples can be found in many electricity markets. 
Spikes in one direction are often neutralised with an equal and opposing spike in 
the other direction, particularly when mean reversion is very strong. 
Seasonality is applicable to both price and volatility. It is effectively a consequence 
of supply and demand factors across regions and climate/weather differentials be-
tween seasons. The effects will be dampened when using models of average prices 
because the averaging of prices (say over a year) would hide the (intra-annual) 
seasonali1y. This element of the price dynamic can be represented by a separate 
deterministic function in a pricing model. 
2.4.2 Methods of Modelling Spot Prices 
In the regulated era, prices of electricity were calculated with reference to the long-run 
marginal costs of electricity production, and the energy was produced at least cost with 
few competitive forces affecting the prices. Various cost-based models were developed 
to meet the pricing requirements. 
In deregulated markets, electricity prices have fundamental price drivers which differ 
from other commodities, so researchers have been driven to find new methods of mod-
elling them. Fortunately, complex pricing models have been developed for interest rate, 
bond, equity, and other commodity markets. A prevailing difficulty with using the mod-
els is that many of them have to be adapted for the special characteristics of energy 
commodities, and even more so in the case of electricity prices. 
This section describes a few of the stochastic models that have been suggested by several 
authors on the subject e.g. [10, 41]. Generally, all of the stochastic models will have 
two components, one allowing for drift and the other for stochasticity. Some have a 
deterministic function added to the drift and stochasticity terms to allow for seasonality 
influences. 
Elsewhere in this thesis, other methods of modelling electricity prices will be found. Sec-
tion 3.2 in Chapter 3 examines how prices are formed as a result of interactions between 
buyers and sellers, and for the most part, treats the electricity price as endogenous to 
the system models. In Chapter 4 [p. 100], the model prescribed for use by Genco's in 
the Eskom Power Pool is given, though it is somewhat simplistic as it only contains 
a seasonality function plus a random error component. The price model (and the de-
mand model) developed in Chapter 5 is a lognormal model with seasonality factors and 
stochastic volatility, but no mean reversion or jumps. 
Stochastic spot price models begin as the simple lognormal, Black-Scholes-Merton type. 
Then we progress to a 1-factor mean reverting model. To accommodate the volatility 
of the spot price we can use a 2-factor model that extends the single-factor to include a 
stochastic convenience yield that itself is also mean-reverting. A 3-factor model extends 
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the 2-factor analogy by permitting interest rates to be stochastic, introducing an added 
source of variability. The model-type depends on the ultimate use of the derived prices; 
specifically the type of derivative instrument being valued determines the appropriate 
spot price model. Typically, the numerical methods of trees and Monte Carlo simulation 
are applied to the chosen price model when calculating the values of the instruments. 
Cost-of-implementation is a determining factor with regard to the level of model com-
plexity permissible in any price-modelling methodology. 
The stochastic models below are in increasing order of complexity. The more complex 
the model, the more accurately we can emulate the price behaviour, but complex mod-
els are more difficult to handle. The associated dependent models for risk management, 
derivative pricing, and others, increase proportionately in complexity (and with a greater 
cost for implementation). In each of the models that follow, the discretisation for the 
stochastic process is given. Discretisation necessitates the use of Ito's lemma which is 
discussed in detail in [10, 28, 41]. The application of Ito's lemma produces an algebraic 
formula which could be included in a simulation or pricing model, where the electric-
ity price is being modelled as an exogenous variable which changes over discrete time 
intervals. 
Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) 
GBM is the simplest representation of electricity price behaviour and is characterised by 
constant parameters, f.l and a. The model is also known as the (single-factor) Lognormal 
Price Model as the price returns are assumed to be normally distributed. In reality, both 
parameters can be expected to vary over time, so the model is not realistic for modelling 
electricity price behaviour in general, although it can be used as a simplification for 
modelling the SMP variable in specific applications where the exact price path is not 
crucial for the analysis. 
dS = f.LSdt + aSdz 
where 
S = stochastic process for the asset price 
dS = change in the asset price process in an infinitesimally small time incre-
ment 
dt = size of the time increment 
dz = change in a Wiener process during dt and represents the underlying 
uncertainty driving the model 
f.l = instantaneous drift rate 
a = instantaneous volatility 
The process can be discretised for simulation modelling as follows: 
6xi = f.LXi6t + a.jZSj,Ei 
where 
Xi= 
6xi= 
Ei = 
the level of the price at the i'th time increment 
the discrete change in the asset price in 6t at the i'th time increment 
an independently sampled number from a N(O, 1) distribution at time 
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Mean reverting process 
When prices show a tendency to revert to their long-term mean, the following stochastic 
differential equation provides a simple description of the price behaviour when volatility 
is still assumed to be constant. 
dS = a(J-L-lnS)Sdt + aSdz 
where 
is the mean reversion rate a>O 
1-l =InS where S is the long-term level of the spot price. 
Letting x = ln 8 and applying Ito's lemma gives: 
The process can be discretised for simulation purposes as follows: 
In reality, S is not constant and more complex models would be needed to obtain a more 
realistic view. Essentially, the (log of) price modelled by this process will exhibit an 
equilibrium drift with oscillations around the drift. 
Stochastic volatility 
Stochastic volatility is the instability of the spot price volatility itself. When the volatility 
parameter of electricity price process is assumed to be non-constant over time, then we 
have an accompanying equation which governs the behaviour of a in the simple GBM 
process above: 
dV = a(V - V)dt + ~JV dw 
where 
V a 2 is the spot price return variance 
V long-term level of the variance 
~ JV volatility of the variance 
a mean reversion rate 
dw underlying uncertainty (correlated to dz with correlation coefficient p) 
The process can be discretised as follows: 
6.x; (/-l - ~a2) 6.t + a.JEiE1,i 
6.Vi a(V- Vi)+~~ (PEI,i + RE2,i) 
where (other variables defined as above) 
40 
the level of the variance at the i'th time increment 
the discrete change in the variance in 6t at the i'th time increment 
are independent identically distributed N(O, 1) variables sampled at 
time i 
A variation on this model by Pilipovic [41] suggests treating the long-term mean as the 
second factor rather than the volatility. 
Jump models 
Electricity prices commonly exhibit sudden, unexpected and discontinuous changes. The 
changes are commonly followed by a quick reversion to long-term levels and are often 
explained by a sudden surge in demand, or large-scale failure of generating units, which 
would result in the sudden price increase. The simple GBM model can be modified 
to include sudden and significant, large changes in electricity prices. The first of two 
mentioned in Clewlow and Strickland [10, Chap. 2] is a simple extension allowing for 
jumps, and the second, an equation allowing for jumps with mean-reversion: 
1. Pure jump diffusion model: 
dS = p,Sdt + aSdz + ,..,sdq 
where 
dq is a discrete time process governed by cpdt 
cpdt = Pr[dq = 1] is the average number of jumps per year 
"' =proportional jump size such that ln(1 +"') "' N (ln(1 + K:) - h 2 , 1 2 ) 
K: = mean proportional jump size 
r = standard deviation of ln(1 + "') 
Discretising we get: 
( 1 2 1 2) (/\"; 6xi = r- ¢[ln(1 + "')- 2, ]- 2a 6t + ay 6tc:1,i + 
+ (ln(1 + "')- ~~2 + ')'c2,i) X I[u;<<t>l>t] 
where 
I = { 1 if true 
[u;<<t>l>t] 0 otherwise 
and Ui is a Uniform(0,1) random variable (other parameters as previously defined). 
2. Jump diffusion with mean reversion: 
dS = a(p, -ln S)Sdt + aSdz + ,..,sdq 
(All parameters defined as above) 
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There are other variations on the above themes which are not given here in detail as 
this subject is -.;ery much a research topic in its own right. Examples include allowances 
for seasonality functions (such as phase and shift Fourier models) and 3-factor (or even 
multi-factor) models. 
In summary there are three main methods of modelling electricity prices: 
1. The cost-based models of the regulated era used by electrical utilities and also for 
pricing long-term contracts. Cost-based models will depend on primary fuel costs 
and running costs. 
2. The stochastic models of this chapter and the model developed in this thesis which 
may or may not include mean-reversion, jumps, stochastic volatility and seasonality 
factors. 
3. The endogenous methods of determining price via equilibrium or supply function 
methods described in Chapter 3 
Some authors have suggested methods which incorporate characteristics of more than one 
of the above methods. Examples include pricing based on the behaviour of the underlying 
primary energy commodity price (as per reference [49] in Section 2.3 above), or more 
directly on the demand profile for electrical generation with the inclusion of weather 
variables (often temperature, illumination and wind cooling) or looking at future prices 
as implied from market forward curves [47]. Artificial neural networks are yet another 
technique being used for modelling prices. 
Parameter estimation 
The plethora of parameters introduced in the above stochastic equations will need to 
be estimated if the models themselves are to be implemented. The essential tools for 
estimation are time series, method of moments, maximum likelihood, least squares, 
empirical examination of historical price data, and the intuition of market analysts 
and traders. Time series, for example, can be used to analyse prices and calibrate 
the parameters by way of extracting seasonality and identifying events e.g. negative 
autocorrelations will demonstrate a tendency of prices to mean-revert. There are many 
options for estimation and the choice of method will depend on the level of complexity 
permitted, the type and purpose of the model being developed, and the amount of data 
at the disposal of the modeller. Most of the methods are outlined in more detail in the 
references [10, 11]. 
2.4.3 Uses of Spot Price Models 
As explained in the previous section, the type of model being used will depend on the 
purpose of the modelling. The purposes range from: 
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• Evaluating optimal bid/offer or scheduling strategies for market participants, in 
both day-to-day trading and long-term strategic decisions such as capacity in-
vestment. Here the forecasts of SMP's will be important for the decision-making 
process. 
• Valuing derivatives based on underlying electricity spot prices as well as valuation 
of generation and transmission assets. 
• Risk assessment and risk management: quantifying exposure to price uncertainty 
and managing portfolios of electricity supply /purchase contracts and derivative 
instruments. 
• Analysing market power, design and participant behaviour, where the SMP is a 
(benefit) measure of the effectiveness and efficiency of the market. 
It is important to note that the ultimate use of the price values and the type of model be-
ing used are mutually dependent. For example, many of the stochastic models described 
above will have applications in derivative valuation and risk management, whereas the 
endogenous price models will be used in conjunction with the uses in the fourth point 
above. 
2.4.4 Electricity Forward/Futures Curves 
Forward curves1 contain information about the electricity spot prices at various points 
in the future and are used for locking into prices for future trades in the spot commodity. 
A futures curve is a standardised form of forward curve that is published on an exchange 
where standardised contracts for future trade are regularly bought and sold. Contrast-
ingly, a forward curve may be an individual Genco's view of the expected future spot 
prices, or the collective view of a few Genco's in the same market. Forward curves may 
be in backwardation or contango, the former implying that futures prices are lower than 
spot prices, and the latter implying that the futures prices are greater than the spot. 
So far, the definition of a forward curve is the standard one used in other markets. 
However, with electricity (and some other energy commodities), the forward prices will 
not (in general) be equal to the expected future spot price. The reason for the inequality 
is the convenience yield or cost-of-carry, which represents the relative advantage (or 
disadvantage as the case may be) of storing the electricity as opposed to having a long 
(agreement to buy) or short (agreement to sell) position in the paper market for the 
commodity. Although electricity can not as a rule be stored (unless, for example, the 
Genco owns a pumped storage facility), the primary energy used to generate the fuel 
can be stored. Consequently the difference between forward prices and expected future 
spot prices will imply a specific convenience yield on the underlying fuel price. 
The well known problem of being unable to create an arbitrage-free portfolio in the elec-
tricity spot market results in pricing difficulties not experienced in other markets (very 
1the terms 'futures' and 'forward' will be used interchangeably. Strictly speaking, futures agreements 
are forward agreements that are standardised and traded on a recognised exchange. 
43 
large to infinite cost of carry) . The solution here seems to lie the creation of a futures 
and forward market on expected future spot prices and an option/swap market, which is 
not based on the underlying spot price, but rather on the newly-formed futures/forward 
market. The creation of the notional futures/forward market is a very important con-
cept tertiary markets for electricity. It seems logical given the non-storability (in the 
conventional sense of storing a commodity) [14]. The implications are that a conve-
nience yield differential will arise between the spot and futures/forward market. The 
creation of the latter markets will thus enable arbitrage free pricing to proceed in the 
way commonly practised in conventional markets. The need for a way around dealing 
in the spot market for commodities has been partially met by the establishment of the 
forward market, and the associated forward curve analysis. The forward prices then 
become the price discovery mechanism and form the basis of derivative construction and 
valuation. Forward curves are still sensitive to the important features of the underlying, 
namely transaction costs, seasonal changes and convenience yield. In immature markets 
the forward curve is unique to individual participants. Methods for deriving the forward 
curve (in electricity) include arbitrage pricing (based on the cost of the generating fuel) , 
an econometric approach (based on a simulation of all the underlying variables which 
determine price) and a spot price modelling approach (based on the modelling of the 
stochastic parameters that drive the price) . 
It is more common in developed electricity markets to model the forward prices rather 
than the spot prices which are comparable to market values and which often form the 
basis of inputs for derivative pricing and risk management models. Modelling of forward 
prices is done in an analogous manner to non-energy markets provided there is an estab-
lished and reliable forward curve, and traded instruments are based on forward contracts 
rather than spot energy. Forward curves define the basis of the covariance/ correlation 
structure across all underlying commodity prices. Principal components (eigenvector) 
analysis of market forward curves/planes is used to explain the dynamics of the forward 
price curve/plane. Here we are effectively calibrating a model to the market data. The 
changes and shapes of the forward curves within markets can be expressed in terms 
of the most important volatility components. Numerical techniques therefore become 
essential when pricing derivative instruments. 
Forward prices can be derived from the spot price models, or contrastingly, the spot 
models can be made to be consistent with market forward prices. 
Forward prices in energies are not, in general, equal to the expected future spot price. 
This explicable anomaly occurs in other markets too but is enhanced here with the 
effects of convenience yield, rather than just simple dividends in other stock markets. A 
forward curve should capture the expectations of future supply and demand for the spot 
commodity, adjusted for the differences in characteristics between paper and physical 
markets. 
Convenience Yield 
Defined in commodity markets, convenience yield represents the return on a commodity 
earned through holding an inventory of that commodity. It is relatively much more 
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important in energy markets than financial markets. A similar definition was proposed 
by Ghosh and Ramesh [20] who define it as something which is unique to commodities 
held for consumption purposes. Convenience yield can be expressed as the difference 
between the benefits and costs of holding an underlying asset (whenever either of the 
two attributes are actually relevant). It is analogous to a dividend yield in capital 
markets and is thus treated in the same way. Unfortunately, with electricity, the cost of 
carry can be infinite - or at least very large relative to the value of the electricity itself 
due to its non-storability. It is therefore an exception and cannot be treated in such 
a rudimentary way as dividend-yields. This argument explains the existence of many 
other modelling approaches that have been developed for electricity prices. Convenience 
yield is also an important variable underlying the energy forward curve. 
An implied convenience yield represents the relative advantage/disadvantage of holding 
the underlying spot asset as opposed to a forward position in the asset. It can be positive 
or negative and in the short-term represents a storage problem, in the long term a fuel 
extraction problem. It is the resultant differential between short and long term prices 
net of any other explained pricing differences. It is often implied through discrepancies 
between forward prices and spot prices rather than expressed as an explicit value. It is 
the rate that balances the current spot price with the forward prices after allowing for: 
• real growth in the asset value. 
• storage, insurance and obsolescence costs. 
• non-systematic risk. 
• the risk free rate. 
The greater the possibility that there will be shortages of the asset in the future, the 
higher the convenience yield. If users of the commodity have a high inventory and the 
chances of shortages are slim, the convenience yield tends to be low. 
Cost-of-carry The following is a general formula relating the spot price to the futures 
price when part of the difference between the two can be attributed to a convenience 
yield: 
F = Se(c-i'J)T 
where 
S = the current spot price, 
c = cost of holding the asset i.e. the convenience yield, 
o = continuous yield generated by the asset, 
T = maturity date of the contract. 
Multi-factor forward curve model An example of a model which is used to model 
the forward price at time t for maturity at T is: 
dF(t, T) n 
( ) = ~::::ai(t,T)dzi(t) 
F t, T i=l 
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where 
n 
ai(t, T) 
dzi ( t) 
number of independent sources of uncertainty (usually 1,2 or 3), 
the associated volatility functions determining the size and direction 
of the shifts in the curve due to factor i, 
independent source of risk due to factor i . 
Many other models for forward curves are dealt with in some detail by Pilipovic [41] and 
Clewlow and Strickland [10]. 
2.5 Electricity Derivatives 
The study of electricity derivatives is largely a sub-study of energy derivatives, which 
in turn falls under derivative studies in general. The special features of the underlying 
spot price in the case of electricity (including the characteristics described in Section 2.4, 
ensures that techniques will be drawn from the most specialised research in the field. 
In this section, the issues surrounding electricity derivatives are introduced, followed by 
some points outlining the challenges presented. Following the introduction and outline 
is a detailed classification of the types of derivative instruments found in the most de-
veloped electricity markets. Some of the methods used for pricing derivatives are briefly 
described, and some notes on their uses and risk management are also given. 
2.5.1 Introduction 
Traditionally, markets existed through the undertaking of agreements between parties 
that would benefit through an achievable hedging arrangement. The traditional agree-
ments (between say customers, utilities and power producers) are quickly being replaced 
by derivative instruments with the intention of standardisation for trading. The out-
come will be a reduction in transaction costs and the increase in prevalence of a range 
of hedging tools for both buyers and sellers. Traditional contracts in the old markets 
were generally of a long-term nature, with regimented tariff structure as dictated by 
the appropriate regulating authority. Non-derivative instruments/contracts for physical 
delivery (Power Purchase Agreements) and the capacity-based long-term type contracts 
of the past have given way to energy-based, short-term contracts and spot-market trade. 
New contracts for spot market trade have not only been designed to replace the old 
overpriced ones, but also to be used in conjunction with them, and while meeting the 
commitments of the old contracts. 
Exotic contracts are of little use without standardisation and the ability to trade in a 
liquid market. The arrangements may meet the hedging requirements, but the market 
may be too 'thin' to make the participation worthwhile. 
Very often, el~:'Ctricity derivatives will be of the Asian (average price type) in order 
to accommodate the need to hedge against extreme price fluctuations over particular 
periods of time (say even in the prices over a particular day). 
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Many papers deal with the development of options markets for power trading in a market 
setup, giving due consideration to power system planning and operational constraints 
and requirements e.g. [20] which deals specifically with options markets for bulk power 
trading. 
Real Options 
In the 'real options' environment we attempt to value optionality in the following types 
of strategic financial situations: choice of technology; production decisions; investment 
timing decisions; options to temporarily /permanently shut down plant; other similar 
decisions with respect to real and/or physical assets. Denton et al. [15] published a 
paper on the management of market risk which is measured with the use of option pric-
ing methodology (using closed-form solutions and trinomial tree/forest methods). The 
application is done with reference to participants in electrical energy markets. Results 
can then be used to schedule production and for asset portfolio optimisation. 
An approach using real options is also given in [14] where real options-based valuation 
formulae are derived for generation and transmission assets. The formulae in turn are 
based on valuation formulae derived for spark and spread options on electricity futures. 
The authors therefore propose a way of valuing generation (and transmission) assets us-
ing options valuation methodology. Like many other authors, they derive their formulae 
under assumptions of both GBM and mean reversion for the futures prices of electricity. 
Comparison of historical values with the theoretical ones reveals that the methods are 
more accurate than simple discounted cash flow techniques. Further development in 
the field could progress through the inclusion of operating optionality of the generator, 
which would thus attempt to incorporate the presence of system technical constraints . 
Refer also to [38] for an example on the use and valuation of real options. 
2.5.2 The Challenges 
Some of the challenges defined and explored in the arena of electricity derivatives relate 
to: 
• Valuation. 
• Extreme short-term volatility of prices and volatility smiles (see Glossary). 
• Modelling of mean reversion, seasonality and jumps in spot prices. 
• Non-storability of the asset and the associated convenience yield necessitate 
futures-based replication of the electricity derivative when valuing electricity deriv-
atives . The methodology relies on being able to make a portfolio consisting of an 
electricity futures instrument and a risk-free asset. Deng et al. [14] derive valuation 
formulae for spark and spread options using portfolio-replication methods. 
• Differences to financial markets and differences of electricity to other commodities. 
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• Cross correlation of energy commodities which each have their own stochastic 
volatility and multidimensional conditional covariance. 
• Using a fundamental or technical approach for analysing prices. 
• Integration with power system concepts [20]. 
2.5.3 Classification of Financial Instruments 
It is important to note that any list of types of instruments traded will be far from ex-
haustive. Optionality has always existed in agreements between parties and had evolved 
before the derivatives markets were formally established. Thus, we now have huge com-
plexities within the contracts that need to be evaluated accordingly. 
1. Firstly, derivatives may be classified in terms of who the counterparties are to 
the agreement. Instruments traded between two independent parties are termed 
'Over-the-counter' (OTC) and those traded through an intermediary are termed 
'exchange traded'. The incidence of credit risk will demand a more thorough 
scrutiny with OTC instruments. In a new and emerging derivative market such 
as energy, OTC will by far outnumber exchange-traded instruments per volume 
traded. 
2. Any derivative may also be classified according to its perceived complexity. Simple 
instruments e.g traditional calls or puts, or any other well-understood instrument 
that is frequently traded (including those traded OTC), are termed 'vanilla'. In-
struments with a more complex or less understood structure are termed 'exotic' 
or sometimes 'second generation'. Most derivatives traded in energy markets will 
currently be of the OTC, exotic sort. The simple types of calls and puts are sel-
dom traded in energy markets because of the exotic nature of most price risks that 
need to be hedged. Contract-types termed 'exotic' in conventional markets are 
often considered 'vanilla' in energy markets. Some practitioners may also equate 
exotic options to path-dependent options, rather than simply treating the latter 
as a subset of the former. 
A detailed classification of the types of derivatives now follows. 
Futures and Forward Contracts 
Futures and forwards are agreements to exchange assets at a future date with the former 
being standardised and exchange-traded (and therefore subject to substantially lower 
levels of credit risk), the latter being a more direct agreement between two parties (with 
an appropriately greater level of credit risk). Such agreements are priced using a cost-of-
carry relationship that allows for the differential between financing costs and the yield on 
the asset i.e. convenience yield. Pricing deviates from this standard in energies as quite 
often there is further optionality built into the contract (e.g. with respect to location 
of delivery). When contracts have built-in optionality with respect to the quantity or 
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volume of the energy that is agreed to be bought or sold, we value this optionality 
through the specification of a 'swing option'. 
Forwards may form the basic unit of trade in an energy derivatives market, starting from 
a simple contract for hourly electricity, to few hour blocks for peak and off-peak trade. 
Aggregating the daily units, we get weekly, then four-weekly and seasonal to more long 
term contracts. 
Swaps 
Swaps (also known as Contracts-for-Differences or CFD 's) are used to lock into a series 
of prices for the purchase of a predetermined quantity of underlying. Types include 
vanilla, differential (also termed margin or crack swaps), participation, double-up, ex-
tendible, and variable volume swaps. They are generally valued as functions of forward 
prices. 
Simple Vanilla swaps involve a simple exchange of fixed prices for the floating (under-
lying) price going at each of the agreed payment times. They effectively comprise 
a series of forward deals. 
Variable Volume swaps have a 'swing' option in that the quantity or volume of the 
underlying to be traded is not known in advance. 
Differential swaps are similar to vanilla swaps except that the difference between two 
floating prices is exchanged for a fixed amount at each agreed payment time. They 
are thus used for hedging basis risk. A particular example is a margin or crack swap, 
where the price difference is between a raw commodity and its refined product (e.g. 
the difference between the coal price and the electricity price). 
Participation swaps are a specialised type of vanilla swap that entitle the holder to 
a portion of the benefits arising from upside gains as a result of favourable price 
movements. The gains would have been lost under a vanilla swap agreement. A 
participation swap is equivalent to simultaneously taking out a vanilla swap with 
a long position in a floor option, which in turn has a strike equal to the amount of 
the fixed payment. 
Double-up swaps allow participation in favourable price movements (which would be 
lost under a vanilla swap), often in exchange for an option to double the volume 
of asset traded. 
Extendible swaps are double-up swaps with an option to extend the swap period for 
a predetermined period. 
Bunn and Day [9] give a description of the most common forward agreements traded 
between electricity market participants. Many generating firms often sign contracts for 
large proportions of their output with regional electricity companies and large industrial 
users. Such contracts enable them to hedge their exposure to volatile pool prices and 
take the form of simple vanilla swaps. A generator will sign a contract to trade a volume 
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9t at a fixed strike price ft for hour t. When hour t arrives, ft is compared to the SMP 
for the hour, St . There are two possible outcomes: 
ft > St: the buyer pays the seller an amount equal to (ft - St) · 9t 
ft < St: the seller pays the buyer an amount equal to (St - ft) · 9t 
The net effect in an agreement between a Genco and a consumer is that the generator 
receives (pays) an amount Ut- St) · 9t from (to) the consumer if it is positive (negative). 
The arrangement ensures that the Genco receives the strike price for 9t MWh of elec-
tricity regardless of what the market price is; They are protected from low prices when 
ft > St, but also miss out on the extra income they could have received when ft < St . 
Note that the Genco is still exposed to volume risk here, as the capacity agreed in the 
contract, 9t, may not be the actual volume ultimately traded for the hour. 
Options 
1. Options are first classified according to the type of transaction action they entitle 
the holder to: 
(a) A call option gives the holder the right, but not the obligation, to purchase 
an underlying asset according to prespecified conditions of time, volume, date, 
and price averaging which are all specified in the agreement. 
(b) Contrastingly a put option gives the holder the right, but not the obligation, 
to sell an underlying asset according to the prespecified conditions. 
2. All options will be one of two types. 
(a) European options that may only be exercised at the specified maturity 
date. 
(b) American options that may be exercised at any time, or on one of a series 
of specified dates, up to and including the maturity date. American options 
are often simply referred to as 'early exercise' options. 
Non-path dependent options 
1. Caps, floors and collars (they are sometimes known as CFD's, though it is more 
common to refer to swaps as CFD's) 
Cap - a series of call options priced as a single contract. 
Floor - a series of put options priced as a single contract . 
Collar - a combination of a long position in a cap and a short position in a floor. 
2. Swaptions - options on swaps. 
Payer swaptions - a call option on a swap 
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Receiver option - a put option on a swap 
3. Compound options - options on options . 
Standard - calls or puts on simple calls or puts. 
Captions -a call option on a cap. 
Floption - a call option on a floor. 
4. Spread options - are written on the difference between two prices. 
Calendar Spreads - options on the difference between two futures prices on the 
same underlying asset but with different maturities. 
Crack spreads - the futures contracts underlying the option are based on differ-
ent commodities. A particular type of crack spread is a spark spread which 
is based on the difference between the electricity price and the price of the 
fuel used for generating the electricity. Other types of spreads encountered in 
electricity markets are location spreads, which have payoffs determined by the 
differences in location-specific electricity prices (otherwise known as LMP's). 
5. Exchange options - are written on the relative performance of two futures prices. 
Out-performance exchanges -payoff is determined on the better of the relative 
performances of the futures prices on two different commodities. 
Percentage out-performance exchanges - payoff is determined on the per-
centage by which a futures price on one commodity out-performs that of 
another commodity. 
Path-dependent options 
Types include Asian, barrier, lookback and swing options . 
Asian options have a final payoff that is based on an average (arithmetic or otherwise) 
of prices, rather than on the simple difference between the spot and strike prices. 
Average Price - payoff is based on the difference between the strike price and 
the average spot price over a period of the option's life. They are also known 
as 'fixed-strike Asians'. 
Average Strike - payoff is based on the difference between the average of a series 
of strike prices and the spot price over a period of the option's life. Also known 
as 'floating-strike Asians'. 
Barrier options may commence existence or expire when a specific price level is reached 
by the underlying asset's spot price. 
Knock-out - cease to exist when a specific barrier level is crossed/reached. They 
may be of the 'down-and-out' or 'up-and-out' type. 
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Knock-in - come into existence when a specific barrier level is crossed/reached. 
They may also be of the 'down-and-out' or 'up-and-out' type. 
Lookback options have a payoff dependent on the highest or lowest price attained 
over a period of the life of the option. 
Fixed Strike - Payoff is calculated on the difference between the maximum or 
minimum spot price over the period and a fixed strike price. 
Floating Strike - Payoff is calculated on the difference between the maximum 
or minimum of a series of strike values over the period and the spot price at 
the date of expiry of the option. 
Ladder - Discrete level version of a lookback option and may be of fixed strike 
or floating strike type. If the spot price crosses a specific level during its life, 
a minimum payoff is locked into. 
Cliquet - Discrete time version of a lookback option and may be of fixed-strike 
or floating-strike type. If the spot price has crossed a specific level at each of 
the linapshot dates, a minimum payoff is locked into. 
Swing options as described above, may be classified according to the types of coun-
terparties to the contracts in which they are embedded. Swing options have arisen 
due to the increasing uncertainty with respect to demand (being the quantity ul-
timately consumed by the end users), and the fact that one needs to hedge this 
volume risk. The optimal decision on the quantity of energy to buy or sell de-
pends on the energy price as well as the quantity already bought or sold to date, 
so they are treated as path-dependent American-style options where the volume is 
the path-dependent variable. 
1. 'Price-driven swing options' occur when the counterparties can both buy and 
sell the underlying energy in the market place, allowing the holder of the 
option to maximise the swing value of the contract. Varying quantities of the 
energy commodity can be delivered according to the terms of the contract 
which may specify particular maxima and minima. In addition, a base-volume 
(greater than or equal to zero) may be set which specifies the value around 
which the quantity delivered or withheld may swing (zero would imply an 
option to take no delivery at all). The number of times the swing from the 
base-volume value may occur may also be specified in a contract of the 'swing' 
sort. 
Pricing of swing instruments is carried out by means of a no-arbitrage as-
sumption in conjunction with a numerical tree method. 
2. If only one of the parties can take or withhold from delivery of the energy 
commodity, then we have a 'demand-driven swing option' . The contract is 
usually between dealers and the retail sector of the marketplace, though in-
dustrial users may also enter into demand-driven swing option contracts. An 
example would be a contract between a supplier of electricity and the resi-
dential users, of whom the latter may take delivery of the commodity though 
may not participate in the electricity market themselves. 
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Pricing is more complicated in under such circumstances as we need to account 
for the functional relationship between prices and quantity demanded . 
In summary, we have the following types of derivative currently traded in developed 
tertiary markets for the electricity commodity: 
• Futures and forwards. 
• Swaps. 
• Options: Asian, path-dependent, and other exotics (Swing, Look-back, Barrier, 
Ladder). 
• Real options. 
2.5.4 Methods of Valuation 
Valuation methods reflect the complexity of the behaviour of the underlying spot asset, 
and thus tend to be complex in their own right. A broad outline of methods is discussed 
in this subsection. Traditionally, methods for valuing derivatives range from the following 
main approaches: 
• Valuing equivalent portfolios which replicate the position in the derivative using 
combinations of positions in the underlying asset and a risk-free asset. 
• Using a futures-based approach where the underlying asset is a forward contract 
in the underlying asset, rather than a position in the asset itself. 
• Analytical formulae and closed form solutions. 
• Numerical trees which map out the possible price paths of the derivative or the 
asset itself. 
• Simulation and Monte Carlo methods. 
• Distribution analysis. 
In this section attention is drawn to the more popular methods of valuation in advanced 
tertiary markets for energy commodities, namely trees, Monte Carlo simulation and 
analytical formulae. 
Closed form solutions 
Black-Scholes-Merton approach: A method based on the principles of no-arbitrage, 
risk-neutral valuation. We construct a replicating portfolio in the underlying asset and 
calculate the expected discounted payoff using a simplified assumption about the be-
haviour of the price of the underlying asset. Model parameters can be simulated or 
estimated from historical data, or implied, or based on a mixture of the approaches. 
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Relaxing some of the assumptions leads to variations on closed-form theme; we can 
modify the underlying parameters (e.g. in the case of the volatility smile) or use the 
basic form of the formula and numerically integrate to arrive at results for the individual 
parameters. 
Closed-form solution techniques can also be incorporated within the framework of other 
valuation techniques (simulation and trees) and vice-versa. Integration of techniques 
may happen when we wish to value American-style options or path-dependent options. 
The method of pricing is easy and tractable but unrealistic and oversimplified, especially 
for complex instruments. The technique can accommodate these complexities to an 
extent through the application of approximations to the general pricing formula (see for 
example [41]). The reader is referred to the Appendix (page 179) for details of some of 
the common closed-form solution formulae. 
Numerical techniques 
The general methods and main disadvantages of trees and Monte Carlo simulation are 
now discussed. 
1. Trees 
Method: Trinomial trees are more common than binomial trees for valuing electricity 
derivatives. They involve the discretisation of the price modelling process and the 
construction of trees of possible price evolution with three possible movements at 
each branch. The probability of each movement are calculated using arbitrage 
arguments. Dynamic programming or recursive techniques are used to calculate 
price trees and numerically value the options using the possible prices at each 
point in time. The expected present value of the instrument is then calculated. 
The technique is useful for American options and optimal exercise strategies. It 
provides a good framework for the risk management strategy as well because we 
can incorporate the volatility term structure. 
We discretise the price process over a small time period D.t such that the change 
in the asset price over this period is D.x. Then we define Pu,Pm, and Pd to be the 
respective probabilities that the price increases, remains the same, or decreases 
over D.t . The space step cannot be chosen independently of the time step, and it 
has been shown that a good choice for D.x is a~. Equating the first 2 statistical 
moments of the price change over D.T and using the constraint , 
Pu + Pm + Pd = 1 
we can solve for the values of Pu ,Pm, and Pd· Next we transform the price process 
back to an asset price tree depending on the type of price process used. 
Let i denote the number of the time step and j the level of the asset price relative 
to its initial value. Then if C;,j represents the option value at node (i,j) then the 
option value at maturity is 
CN,j = max[O, SN,j - K]; j = - N, . . . ,N 
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Using the assumption of risk neutrality we can excursively calculate each Ci,j via 
backward induction, 
or if the option is American style, 
The current option value is given by Co,o. 
Drawbacks: Problems arise with complex path-dependent options where we end up 
with some very complicated forests. 
2. Monte Carlo Simulation 
Method: Once again, we discretise the price process then simulate possible outcomes 
using random numbers until convergence is obtained. We thus obtain a probability 
distribution of outcomes. The Monte Carlo technique is useful in that it can be used 
to price a wide variety of path-dependent options. It is fairly easy to implement 
and is increasingly used in many other wide-ranging applications because of its 
versatility. 
The basic procedure is outlined as follows: 
Let Cr,j be the j'th simulated option value = max[O, Sr,j - K], then 
Co,j = Cr,j exp (-faT rudu) 
which simplifies to P(O, T)Cr,j if ru is constant or deterministic. 
After M simulations, we estimate the mean and standard deviation (SD) of the 
simulated distribution of option values: 
Standard Error(Co) 
where SD(Co) 
1 m 
M LCo,j 
j=l 
SD(Co)/.f"M 
1 M 
--"(Co ·- Co)2 M-1L '1 
J=l 
Drawbacks: The method can be computationally expensive and may therefore require 
substantial time to get an accurate answer, especially when the underlying price 
process and/or the derivative has a complicated payoff structure. The computa-
tional expense can be solved to an extent by using variance reduction techniques. 
Another consideration is the valuation of American options where the simulation 
must be done in conjunction with a tree method. 
55 
Combined and other methods 
To add to the increasing complexity of the markets, the valuation techniques have ex-
perienced unsurpassed growth in complexity. The result of the complexity is that many 
methods now draw on mixed techniques in the quest for viable alternatives to existing 
pricing approaches. 
An approach to valuing American-style options with Monte Carlo simulation using a 
dynamic programming argument which is relatively computationally efficient is discussed 
in [22]. It is traditionally thought that Monte Carlo methods break down here when early 
exercise is a possibility, though it may be more of a fear of computational complexity, 
than an inability to value the instrument. 
Volatility is important for both valuation and risk management such as VaR methods. 
Traditionally, volatility can be defined as the annualised standard deviation of price 
returns. There is a tendency for volatility to behave very differently over the life of the 
instrument. Time series models are useful in evaluating long term volatility levels e.g. 
ARCH and GARCH models. Volatilities may be related across time periods and also 
between commodities through a price correlation structure. In general volatility is an 
important area for the application of statistical wares such as time series, least squares 
and maximum likelihood). Efficacy of these techniques can be tested and benchmarked 
via the appropriate goodness-of-fit tests . 
Most models are extensively parameterised, so various techniques have been employed 
to estimate these parameters. Examples include time series, market-implied estimation, 
simulation (including historical), maximum likelihood, least squares and regression. 
2.5.5 Uses of Derivative Instruments 
Since almost everything is being traded nowadays, the need for derivatives to hedge 
exposures to retail prices and for speculation has increased dramatically. Examples 
include the recent introduction of bandwidth and emissions commodities (the latter 
being a key issue facing northern European countries recently where emissions are an 
important factor in the determination of generating strategies). Technological advances 
and the development of 'greener' forms of electricity (wind, solar, hydro, etc) may have 
an important effect, with the added uncertainty with respect to the time frame with 
which change can occur. 
In the adaptation to the market environment, the risks associated with both price and 
quantity have necessitated the introduction of the types of contracts described in the 
classification earlier in this section. 
For example, spark spread and a location spread options have arisen due to the differ-
ences between the electricity price and the fuel price used for generating it, and due to 
differences in location-specific electricity prices (respectively) [14]. The development of 
spread options is an important realisation of the fact that there is a significant element 
of basis risk in energies. Basis risk can be defined as the risk resulting from the difference 
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in price between the same product (or between a product and its spot value) in different 
markets. 
There is an increasing prevalence of Asian-type options due to high volatility and spikes 
in the price of electricity, such that the average price of electricity (received by) Genco's 
and (paid by) consumers can be hedged. 
There is also an increasing in the use of weather derivatives for hedging risks in electricity 
markets (see for example, reference [48] for a thorough exploration on the subject of 
weather derivatives) . Derivatives are also used to value real options and therefore for 
obtaining generation and transmission asset values. Such options are also useful for 
comparing observed instrument or asset values to their theoretical ones. 
2.5.6 Risk Management of Electricity Derivatives 
This subsection deals with management of price risk for institutions which trade in 
energy derivatives, and are then faced with the management of risks of those derivative 
positions. 
The main risks facing a company trading in an energy tertiary market are: geographic; 
market segmentation; pricing and contractual; credit; and transmission procurement. 
Alternatively these risks could be classified as market, commodity and human risks. 
Deregulation has certainly resulted in substantial price uncertainty in modern power 
trade. The risk associated with price uncertainty can lead to significant pricing incon-
sistencies, a worrying factor when price is the fundamental input to a derivative pricing 
and risk management framework. 
Risk management is also a young arena in the field of energy derivatives. The portfolios 
containing the risk-hedging products need to be immunised and readjusted within the 
dynamic framework. Electricity companies such as Genco's need to set up portfolios 
of positions in both sales of their electricity and their purchases of primary energy, as 
well as derivative positions in these underlying commodities. The arrangements must be 
made in such a way that their portfolio is immunised against undesirable changes in the 
values of the variables. The key to immunisation lies in sensitivity analysis. Consistency 
between pricing and risk management is a highly desirable feature in model selection. 
Various sensitivity metrics can be used for quantifying risk exposures and then adjusting 
the portfolio composition. The metrics are summarised as follows (the first five of these 
are generically referred to as the 'Greeks'): 
Delta: sensitivity to price change - The most important of the first-order hedging 
sensitivities. It is used to immunise a portfolio or instrument within a portfolio 
against changes in the price of the underlying. It tells us how many units of the 
underlying asset we need to buy or sell in order to protect against impending price 
changes. 
Gamma: sensitivity to changes in Delta - Gamma is also very important. It is 
a second-order sensitivity with which we immunise the portfolio against changes 
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in the change in price of the underlying. It tells us how frequently (with reference 
to absolute price change) we need to apply Delta-hedging to remain Delta-neutral. 
Cross-Gamma risk occurs when instruments and/or assets in the portfolio are 
correlated, and it therefore represents an additional secondary effect that we need 
to hedge. A simple example would be an electricity producer who is naturally long 
in electricity but short in the generation fuel and is aiming to be delta-neutral in 
both when the prices of the electricity and the fuel may be correlated. 
Vega: sensitivity to volatility change - Vega represents a first-order hedge against 
changes in the volatility of the underlying. 
Theta: sensitivity to time - Theta is not something we are able to hedge, but some-
thing we ought to be aware of. It is the change in the value of the instrument with 
respect to time e.g. options generally decay with time as there is less time for them 
to realise gains, as their effective optionality is lower. 
Rho: sensitivity to changes in interest rates - The first order exposure to inter-
est rates is of little importance in energy markets as other factors tend to outweigh 
the effects of uncertainty in interest rates. 
Factor hedging of exposure to possible changes in the structure of the forward curve 
(its shape determined by the factors in the mult i-factor forward curve) . First and 
second order interactions between factors need to be considered if appropriate. 
(Monte Carlo) Simulation is useful tool for assessing the effectiveness of the hedging 
strategy adopted. 
VaR - Value at risk is a confidence interval for the potential changes in a portfolio value 
in a given time horizon. Various industry standards are available and though their 
use in energy markets is questionable, they have been widely imposed across all risk 
management fields. Effects are once again exacerbated by the generally extreme 
nature of energy price behaviour. We are assuming an underlying probability 
distribution of portfolio returns at the time horizon. Four approaches are available: 
Delta, Delta-Gamma, Historical and Monte Carlo simulation. Techniques are laid 
out in the Riskmetrics documents of J.P. Morgan. Again, we include all the price-
modelling and parameter estimation paradigms of valuation in a manner that is 
consistent between risk management and valuation strategies. Versatility at the 
valuation stage will make the risk management task easier, as we will already have 
the inputs to perform the calculations. 
Credit Risk deals with the part of the risk of the portfolio not related to pricing fun-
damentals, but more to the changes in the credit rating of the counterparties to the 
agreements held in the portfolio. In the worst case the counterparty may default 
completely on their obligations and we are then concerned with the recoverable 
value of the portfolio with respect to that party. Creditmetrics (also a product of 
J .P. Morgan) provides an industry-wide mechanism for calculating and managing 
credit risk. When examining the overall exposure we need to take into account the 
correlations between the market players to which we are exposed across industries 
or sectors. Statistical techniques prove useful in the latter case, and distribution 
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theory may also be used to model items such as recovery amounts and the oc-
currence of defaults. Testing of credit risk models via scenario analysis as well as 
stress testing provide further enhancements to the credit risk strategies. 
Portfolio Analysis: using minimum-variance techniques to determine optimal hedging 
strategies. At present, this branch of investment analysis appears to be of minimal 
importance in young energy markets where the primary concerns are liquidity 
and pricing. However, it is necessary to be aware of it should markets evolve as 
expected, and techniques must be updated accordingly. 
In energy markets it has been widely accepted that simple VaR methods (using the 
'Greek' sensitivities above) do not provide sufficient accuracy, and the more sophisticated 
methods of historical and Monte Carlo simulation and will provide more accurate risk 
analyses. 
2.6 Overview 
This chapter has given a very broad overview of the types of research topics currently 
prevailing in the realm of modern electricity markets. A great deal of terminology has 
been introduced and the important aspects of electricity economics have been highlighted 
with a brief coverage of strategic decision making in Section 2.2. The notion of system-
wide modelling was also mentioned in this section and is important for providing an 
ultimate goal for the development of a progressive model of electricity trade. The issues 
of that section will be expanded upon in more detail in the following chapter. 
A history of power market development, processes of deregulation, and the type of mar-
ket structures found internationally were described in the first section. Of particular 
importance are the types of pools and contracts, the various possibilities for auction 
arrangements and some economic terminology regarding oligopolies, price-takers and 
price-setters. The experiences of other markets provide useful lessons to markets cur-
rently undergoing transformation, although quite often the needs for strategic decision-
making will be highly circumstantial and specific to the structure of the market question, 
and also to particular participants in that market. 
The area of risk management was discussed in some detail in Section 2.3, and though 
not dealt with in an explicit manner in the remainder of this thesis, it serves as a guide 
to the types of concerns raised in any strategic simulation activity. It is conjectured that 
the model of this thesis may ultimately be adapted to the type of risk assessment and 
risk management strategies of that section. The section also highlighted the types of 
risks facing modern power companies and proposed some (often complex) methodologies 
for solving a variety of risk management problems. The complex methods will serve as 
a benchmark for the approach adopted later in this thesis, and have value with regard 
to both justification for , and a critique of the model. Also of value in Section 2.3 is the 
idea of correlated variable stochasticity in the study by Otero-Novas et al. [39]. The 
importance of this notion will become apparent in the analyses of Chapter 6. 
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The study of pricing models in Section 2.4 is useful for comparative purposes for the much 
simpler model of the electricity price variable which will developed in the formulation 
of Chapter 5. While emphasising the characteristics of electricity prices in deregulated 
markets, one is reminded of the ease with which model deficiencies become apparent 
when attempting to capture the important characteristics of the SMP variable. An 
awareness is therefore created with respect to modelling of SMP's in this section, and the 
technical characteristics that were described will become important given the prospect 
of practically implementing the model of this thesis. 
Markets curreutly lagging in development (e.g. in South Africa) will not, in general, 
have progressed sufficiently to justify any detailed inclusion of the techniques mentioned 
in Section 2.5 in the models developed for the market in question (e.g. with regard to 
electricity derivatives and their associated risk management). Underdeveloped markets 
do not have a sufficiently high level of competition or liquidity of trade to enable efficient 
pricing, trading and risk management of complex instruments such as weather derivatives 
or real options. However, the techniques may be useful in the provision of guidelines for 
the valuation of particular OTC contracts currently traded in (say) the EPP. For the 
model of Chapter 5 there is at most scope for inclusion of the simple forward contracts 
in the model, in the form described on page 50. In the case of the EPP, it would be 
justified by virtue of the current hedging arrangements that are in place between the 
Genco's of the pool and the Generation Production and Sales division (see Chapter 4). 
This chapter has also provided a comprehensive coverage of the range of mathematical 
techniques that have been used to facilitate risk management, derivative valuation, SMP 
(and other variable modelling), parameter estimation techniques, and strategic decision-
making in general. The chapter which now follows focuses on the application of these 
types of tools to the challenges presented by generator trading strategies. 
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Chapter 3 
Generator Trading Strategies 
The subject of generator trading strategies has been tackled at length by researchers 
in both a direct and an indirect manner. The previous chapter discussed some of the 
more general research areas in power system economics, often incorporating the trading 
strategies of generators indirectly. The focus was on how the strategies are incorporated 
in a wider modelling sense. This chapter aims to review a range of techniques used 
to model these trading strategies, drawing on research papers that have dealt with the 
subject directly and, where relevant, drawing on sections from the broader papers and 
extracting the treatment of trading strategies for inclusion in this survey. 
The chapter will therefore be divided into five sections. The first section will highlight 
some of the modelling work that has been done, justifying the study of trading strategies, 
and summarising references for the types of research problems identified in the literature. 
The second section will examine the various treatments of price-formation and the types 
of strategic behaviour adopted by participants in electricity pools. In the third section, 
electricity supply functions are defined and various approaches to modelling these func-
tions will be elaborated upon. Section 3.4 examines various techniques for obtaining the 
optimal bidding strategy.1 Finally, Section 3.5 will summarise the aspects of generator 
trading strategies that have been examined in the models alongside those aspects that 
have not been tackled in the various analyses. 
3.1 Modelling Activities in Electricity Markets 
The types of modelling activities that have so far taken place in respect of modern 
power markets will be described below. The nature of the subject has meant that 
most researchers, while attempting to solve problems in isolation, have been forced to 
examine aspects that they had not intended to, but did so in order to achieve their main 
goal. The result is that many of the themes below have been dealt with by researchers, 
1 Strictly speaking 'bidding strategy' should refer to the actions of a consumer who bids for electricity, 
however the term is used interchangeably with 'offering strategy' which is the more correct version for 
generators 'offering' their energy to the market. 
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without them having expressly intended to do so. Quite often, the research areas have 
transcended many themes and many cross-overs become apparent. 
Optimal offering strategy 
Optimal offering strategies are tackled explicitly in references [4, 11, 21, 25, 42, 52, 53, 54] 
With the advent of a competitive market for electrical power comes the desire of partici-
pating Genco's to maximise their profits in respect of power sales. In addition, regulators 
will seek methods of modelling how participants will behave under competition and with 
various market designs in place. SO's will also need to know how participants are likely 
to bid so that they can ensure the grid operates safely and reliably. Generators will se-
lect the appropriate offering strategy after allowing for the effects of variation in system 
demand, unit commitment, costs, and other influences. 
The researcher of the optimal strategy sought by generators must consider a vast array 
of factors. Such factors range from: 
• the type of market. 
• rival behaviour. 
• uncertainties (such as the probability of offers being accepted). 
• price-setting ability. 
• type of supply function. 
• risk profile of the Genco. 
• treatment of system variables (such as price and demand forecasting). 
• effects of outages, network conditions and system locational/nodal constraints. 
• Volumetric (quantity) and market (price) risks that the Genco may be exposed to. 
Obviously taking all these factors into account is a large task, and the modeller will 
not be able to tackle them all. A more prudent approach - vindicated in most of the 
research - is to examine a few of the aspects (whichever are the most important for 
the aims of the model and the type of market) and make some simplifying assumptions 
for those that are deemed less important for the purposes of the analysis (such as ignore 
them). In most cases the researchers attempt to identify any deficiencies in their models 
as a result of their simplifications, and mention the possibility of upgrading their models 
in future work. 
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Conditions for optimality 
Some authors [11 , 37] have investigated the conditions under which the supply functions 
offered to the market give the optimal response to a range of demand outcomes, and 
derive bounds on revenue lost when approximating their supply functions and those of 
their competitors. Their analyses may also consider the existence of supply function 
equilibria. 
Neame et al. [37] determine the optimal offer stack from the perspective of a price-taker, 
while [40] does the same for the situation of a price-setting Genco. The price-setting 
ability of a Genco is an important aspect distinguishing two unique treatments of price-
formation in electricity pools. 
Oligopoly versus perfect competition 
See references [13, 17, 42, 51] for modelling of both system-wide and supplier-specific 
offers assuming all of the suppliers are price-takers (i.e. a perfectly competitive market) 
[51] , or none of them, or some of them [13]. The latter two cases represent the instance 
of an oligopoly. 
Market Design 
Rajaraman and Alvarado [42] examine the impact of design rules on the bidding strate-
gies and profits of Genco's while He et al. [25] look more generally at the impact of 
liberalisation. The latter study concludes that without the presence of demand-side bid-
ding, the newly liberalised market will suffer a reduction in social welfare with increased 
costs to consumers. Other models have been developed for markets that permit revision 
of bids one or more times prior to the time of actual production. Researchers also aim 
to measure the extent of market power under varying conditions of market design, e.g. 
with respect to the type of clearing mechanism in place. 
System-wide models 
Studies have been done on entire systems of Genco's, or even entire power systems. These 
model prices, demand levels and production levels based on current and historical values 
[39]. Modelling tools have been developed and explored for analysing market structures 
and offering strategies for the benefit of regulators and system operators. These tools 
contrast with the ones developed solely for the benefit of individual generators. Fer-
rero and Shahidehpour [17], Rajaraman and Alvarado [42] show that the pool optimal 
schedule is not equivalent to that of an individual participant who must maximise his 
own benefits. The nonequivalence poses the philosophical question of whether pools and 
competition are a viable means of power trade, and asks whether the ISO should allocate 
any benefits arising from pool-type markets, or whether participants should merely be 
allowed to seek their own benefits. Furthermore, which of these two ideologies results in 
the greatest overall benefits to consumers and producers? 
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Some models are of two or three suppliers and are usually not extendible to the more 
general case of n suppliers. 
Longer term analyses 
Keppo [31] examines the long-term optimality of a multireservoir hydropower scheme, 
including the use of weather derivatives to hedge rainfall uncertainties, and other deriv-
atives for hedging price uncertainties. Other authors have also attempted to extend 
their models to examine longer term strategies, thus moving away from the single period 
(hourly or daily) problem in general. 
Derivative markets 
Models of the more advanced markets in developed countries must incorporate the effects 
of derivative arrangements on the trading strategies (when these are used as a means 
of hedging market risks), or even decide on the optimal utilisation of such contracts. 
Choosing the optimal strategy is directly related to deciding on an optimal portfolio of 
sales and purchase contracts for a given level ofrisk preferences [7, 35, 43]. It is therefore 
necessary to examine the relationship between contract profitability, bidding strategies, 
risks and availability of information. Keppo [31] conducts a study in this realm where 
weather derivatives are included in the portfolio. 
Other issues 
Authors have attempted to develop self-scheduling mechanisms for suppliers in an 
auction-type market for electricity [24, 30]. Others have tried to capture aspects of 
adaptation and evolution of bidding strategies. 
The following sections examine some more detailed aspects of the above topics, drawing 
on the specifics of the most common themes and providing a reference for some of the 
model development that takes place in Chapters 5 and 6. 
3.2 Price-Formation and Strategic Behaviour in Electricity 
Pools 
Two approaches prevail in the methodology of modelling electricity prices, and usually 
the approach depends on the purpose of the modelling. When aiming to find an appro-
priate bidding f>trategy, and the scale of the model is too small to capture the full range 
of deterministic influences, it would be more appropriate to treat price exogenously i.e. 
as in external variable with its own fundamental economic drivers. If on the other hand, 
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price was the measure of appropriateness of regulatory strategy, the level of competition 
or price-setting ability of market players in a wider market sense, the price would be an 
explicit output of the modelling process. 
Broadly, two approaches can therefore be identified. Firstly, there are methods which 
treat the electricity price as an exogenous variable governed by some probabilistic process. 
Examples of price models include the jump diffusion and mean reverting models de-
scribed in Section 2.4, neural networks, techniques based on Fourier and Hartley trans-
forms, and time series analysis. These models produce forecasts for prices (often the 
SMP's) that relate actual prices to demands and past prices, assuming the outcome for 
each hour is a random variable conditioned on the price history [11]. 
The second possible treatment of price is through modelling the competitive behaviour 
of all Genco's in the market (and possibly the large consumer companies as well [53]). 
In such cases, the SMP is treated as an endogenous output of the modelling scheme such 
as the one described in [9], and the concern is with analysing strategic behaviour rather 
than proposing a tool to develop offering strategies. 
3.2.1 A model of price formation in the England and Wales Pool 
A detailed exercise in modelling price-formation in the E&W electricity pool is carried 
out in [9] for the ten year period from 1990 to 2000. In this study, the methodology 
of computational learning and gaming is used and recommended as an approach for 
modelling competitive markets. The model is simultaneously used to identify situations 
of market misconduct or deficiencies in market structure. Characterising the E&W 
market is a small number of generators with large amounts of information in common, 
a situation that lends itself well to this type of modelling. 
The authors of the paper maintain that market power persists, despite the amount of 
research and regulatory intervention in the restructuring process. The persistence of 
market power has resulted in widespread accusations against generators within many 
pools that market power has been abused. Concerns have also arisen surrounding the 
philosophy of electricity liberalisation itself. The approach used to analyse market con-
duct in this paper permits discontinuous supply functions, asymmetric markets (with 
respect to competitor size) and includes forward contracts, the latter having a significant 
impact on most modern spot markets. 
The methodology is validated in the situation where analytical results can actually be 
computed and it is shown that a conjecture of fully optimised best response is inferior 
to bounded rationality coupled with incremental goal-seeking. 
The model proposed by the authors is one of the entire E&W pool with the aim of 
determining the key determinants of the price outcomes over the period from 1990 to 
2000. The process that they adopt enables the isolation of the effects of structural 
changes, relating to costs and regulatory intervention, from the continuous evolution of 
learning and gaming (without convergence to particular equilibria). 
The approach is one of computational modelling inspired by evolutionary economics and 
is a viable representation of reality. The contribution of this model is two-fold: 
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1. From a theoretical standpoint it provides a model for competitive electricity mar-
kets . 
2. In an applied sense it provides a basis for identifying whether high market prices can 
be attributed to faults of market structure (unsatisfactory regulation) or market 
conduct (exercising market power through collusion of generating firms). 
Demand inelasticity is relevant to this discussion as it enables market power to be exer-
cised at low levels of supplier concentration. 
The computational approach provides a benchmark against which to assess generator 
conduct, therefore providing a baseline for diagnosing (separately) both market structure 
and generator conduct when actual prices are observed to be greater than the marginal 
costs of production. 
The model of the supply functions is an evolutionary one, meaning that the progression 
of daily profit-maximising behaviour is simulated rather than solving for equilibrium 
conditions. The profit-maximising behaviour reflects the ability of Genco's to form con-
jectures about their opponents' actions, and maximise their own profits according to 
these conjectures. The methodology is based on the fact that a market with only a few 
Genco's, who repeatedly partake in daily auctions, and where there is a large amount of 
common information, will result in a "continuous evolution of learning and gaming ... ". 
As a result the methodology permits freedom in the type of function being used, namely 
discontinuous supply curves with asymmetric firm-sizes . In addition, financial contract-
ing is incorporated into the model, as it is clearly an aspect of the markets that has a 
substantial effect on the overall pricing in the spot market. 
The experimental characteristics show the presence of 'price-cycling' in the supply func-
tion modelling, suggesting agents cut prices to enter the market , followed by increasing 
them once they have attained sufficient market share, all the while constrained by ca-
pacity. Such activity is prevalent when supply functions are allowed to be discontinuous. 
The severity of the cycling is dependent on the degree of concentration in the market . 
The authors use a satisficing mode of bounded rationality1 to represent real decision-
making with a level of pragmatism. The method is a reasonable alternative to the 
unrealistic scenario of fully optimised best response to competitors' actions. At lower 
demand levels the level of cycling is reduced since altering the supply function has little 
effect on profit& at these lower levels. When limiting the extent of the optimisation, the 
supply functions become stable. A partial best response model does seem to capture 
the cycling and hence the dynamic character of the real market. Independent Power 
Producers (IPP 's) are treated as price-takers who are unable to act strategically- their 
supply functions are effectively constant in terms of the model. 
The problem of estimating short-run marginal costs (MC's) is discussed. In the past they 
have been based on efficiency and fuel cost data, which is less appropriate in modern 
times because of privatisation and improved efficiency, so instead, efficiency is estimated 
from data of fuel consumed and the quantities of electricity produced by each firm (say 
1 i.e. choosing what is 'good enough' rather than what is best under limited capacity for choosing 
what is 'best'. 
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from compulsory environmental reports). A third more obvious way is to simply examine 
the firms' reports on marginal costs - if the reports are available! 
With regard to the assumptions on demand, three scenarios ranging from inelastic to 
more elastic linear demand curves are explored and the results compared. Contract-cover 
presents a difficulty from a data perspective, so two scenarios of relatively high cover are 
explored, giving six scenarios in total. One outcome of this analysis is that with higher 
contract cover, we have lower prices indicated by the supply function, in fact they are 
close to MC if nearly all sales were contract-covered. 
Overall, the modelled supply functions are above MC, but less than the observed sys-
tem supply function. Hence the modelled functions indicate that the existing market 
structure is a profit-maximising oligopoly (as indicated by the former), and that there 
is evidence of collusion (indicated by the latter). 
A further observation is that in low demand periods, pricing could even be under MC, 
probably indicating that firms are avoiding shut-down costs. An alternative explanation 
is that MC's could have been overestimated for these periods. 
It is noted that the differences between observed and modelled supply functions are wider 
at greater levels of contract cover. Also, higher demand elasticity meant lower prices 
(except where contract cover approaches 100% and begins to dominate the influence of 
demand elasticity). 
In conclusion, this paper develops a detailed model of price formation and offers a model 
that is a good reflection of reality. It has normative qualities in the sense of providing 
the evolutionary approach to modelling price-formation, and is also of descriptive value 
in identifying problems of market structure and conduct, and such problems can be 
identified through the prices that emerge from the simulations. The observed periodicity 
of the pricing cycles was dependent on the degree to which agents adopted an optimising 
behaviour. A highly bounded rationality and limited goal-seeking attitude was identified 
- a plausible result given the complexities of a daily auction process and associated 
uncertainties. 
The paper was also valuable from a policy-making perspective, providing methods for 
unravelling collusion or conduct problems, and structural problems where regulatory 
action would be required. 
Deficiencies of the model are a lack of reliable information on contracting levels, and 
uncertainty with regard to how firms recover their fixed costs. In trying to cover the 
latter, firms may bid substantially above MC, especially if they are including long-run 
profit margins in their mark-ups and/or looking at the expected prices or forward curves 
in their decision process. Finally it has been recently observed that after voluntary 
divestiture of some generation assets, system prices did in fact decrease. An obvious 
question to be asked is why this paper does not accommodate any of the physical, or 
system constraints as they may quite readily affect pool-price formation. 
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3.2.2 Simulation of a wholesale market 
The authors of [39] present a simulation model of a wholesale electricity market. The 
outputs of the model are expected bid prices and quantities, system hourly prices and 
generation schedules. The model takes into account bidding strategies of generators and 
market structure, and reflects the profit-maximising behaviour of the market agents. 
Their model is termed COSMEE and it is used to simulate a real wholesale market. 
Three types of price formation in markets for electrical energy are described, each de-
pendent on thE' type of market: 
Wholesale price: a unit commitment or economic dispatch program is used to de-
termine the wholesale price via some kind of least cost optimisation algorithm. 
Least-cost approaches are common in the studies of regulated markets. 
Spot Price: variable costs of the marginal unit plus an allowance for recouping of 
allocated start-up costs (start-up costs therefore treated externally to the bid). The 
results of such pricing rules (as implemented in Argentina and E&W) are different 
depending whether production costs rather than consumer costs are minimised. 
In the past the rules have led to stability and fairness problems when many near 
optimal solutions are present. Such difficulties also motivate the need for type of 
model proposed in Chapter 5. 
Auction: clearing price is determined where the quantity willingly supplied by the 
aggregate supplier entity equals the required demand for a particular hour. It 
is therefore required that the suppliers internalise their strategies, technical con-
straints and start-up costs in their offers. Recent trends in markets such as those of 
Norway and Australia have lead to auction-type processes for clearing the market. 
The advent of auction-type markets- especially when the national market is such that it 
integrates all three of the above market types- has resulted in simulation models having 
become the necessary tools for defining the strategies of the generators and analysing 
the potential effects of regulatory or risk management decisions. A simple chronological 
simulation tool with embedded optimisation of total system costs will not account for the 
effects of bidding strategies (since in reality bids will not necessarily reflect costs only). 
Previous attempts to model strategic aspects of supplier behaviour have included: 
1. Game theory for examining the influences of market power and the effects of con-
tracts or capacity payments. 
2. Cournot models of oligopoly. In a Cournot model, each supplier assumes that the 
quantities produced by rival firms will remain unchanged in response to their own 
output, and will tend to lower the price of the commodity. Cournot competitors 
are defined as those who are able to modify prices whereas marginal competitors 
submit offers close to their marginal costs. 
Such models failed to account for technical constraints, unit commitment and intertem-
porallinks (hence the gap which this paper attempts to fill) in addition to an advance-
ment on total cost chronological simulation. 
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Primary uses for the simulation model envisaged in this paper are: 
1. Describing generator strategies and their effects on price formation. 
2. Analysing the effects of potential regulatory decisions. 
3. Risk management. 
The authors use the model to simulate the market under two different strategy assump-
tions: 
Perfect competition (uncoordinated simulation) where each competitor is essentially 
an independent price-taker. 
Oligopoly (coordinated simulation) where groups of units belong to firms who try to 
maximise profits. 
In so doing, this model can help analyse the effect of each of the bidding strategies, 
therefore aiding regulatory decision-making and identifying the effects of the strategies 
on the behaviour of other market agents. 
Model type: An iterative mixed model based on generalised Cournot and Bertrand 1 
equilibria, with refinable beliefs (about competitors' behaviour) at each iteration is de-
signed. Simulations are run on the two types of market, taking into account intertem-
poral links and technical constraints into the offering strategies. 
The following assumptions are made: 
1. Market clearing is based on simple bids. 
2. Demand is inelastic (i.e. non-responsive to price) and divided into hourly blocks 
for each day. 
3. Both a thermal and hydro generation plants are considered with the appropriate 
constraints for the type of unit, such as minimum/maximum outputs, ramp rates 
and cost structure. 
4. The particular characteristics of the Spanish market are utilised for the purposes 
of a case study implementation of the model under realistic assumptions. 
The outputs include estimates of expected bid prices and quantities, system hourly prices 
and generation schedules. 
1 In contrast to Cournot models in which suppliers assume output remains unchanged, Bertrand 
competition occurs when suppliers assume that their rivals will fix their prices. This assumption will 
tend to drive prices down toward MC. 
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Simulation algorithm: The algorithm consists of five modules: 
1. Initial offer- must be high as only decrements in the bid price are allowed at 
each revision. Includes no-load, start-up and variable costs, with start-up initially 
allocated to every hour and thereafter reduced depending on the actual dispatch. 
For a hydro plant, the initial offer is the same as the highest thermal plant offer. 
2. Clearing module- computes the spot clearing price, the highest price at which 
all demand is met. Technical constraints are internalised by generators and there-
fore not explicitly allowed for. 
3. Optimal strategic decisions - offers are chosen taking into account competi-
tors' offers. This module will be different for the coordinated and uncoordinated 
simulations. First quantities, then prices are modified based on information from 
the previous clearing process. Costs determine the lowest bound for the price bid. 
4. Convergence - determines whether profits can be improved through modifica-
tion. 
5. Results -- marginal prices, profits and scheduled productions are computed. 
The algorithm iteratively improves the profits of the generating units subject to their 
technical constraints until convergence is attained. At each iteration quantities are 
determined/modified through an optimisation routine after which prices can be modified 
through a fixed decrement if necessary. The results obtained at convergence reflect the 
optimal strategy for maximising profits subject to the technical constraints. Dynamic 
iterations represent updates of information received by participants. The resultant spot 
price for each hour is equal to the most expensive bid accepted among all the bids. 
Iterations are separate from the time frame of the model which is hourly in nature. 
The type of supply function used is described in Section 3.3, and the construction of 
optimal offers in Section 3.4 thereafter. 
An example is presented including 67 thermal units and 19 hydro units. The unco-
ordinated simulation (assumption of perfect competition) converged much faster than 
the coordinated (assumption of imperfect competition). The results of the example are 
different for price-taking and price-setting environments with regard to prices, profits 
and final dispatch. The price-setting environment leads to higher prices, especially for 
peak hours. In the price-setting environment, firms do reduce their production to avoid 
reductions in price, but end up with increased profits because the SMP escalates as a 
consequence of these actions. Differences are exacerbated in peak hours. During valley 
periods, competition is in fact greater, as units push prices down to avoid shut-downs, 
though prices still remain higher than for the corresponding coordinated simulation. 
Overall, firm profits are also greater in the coordinated simulation. 
A comparison is also shown between hydro units, which act as price-setters, and those 
units which offer at cost. The difference here is as noticeable in peak hours as it is in 
valleys, the hydro units simply meet "run-of-the-river" production. 
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Conclusions: COSMEE is a useful tool developed by the authors for analysing whole-
sale market behaviour when bids are simple with costs and constraints internalised. It 
demonstrates the effects of different strategies and goes beyond traditional production 
costing/unit commitment algorithms. Other strategies are in fact possible in reality and 
results for February 1998 show that real prices were equivalent to somewhere between 
coordinated and uncoordinated strategies, though closer to coordinated. Possible mod-
ifications include an extension to the model for a year's horizon with the associated 
strategy decisions. In terms of modelling objectives, the model is highly descriptive: 
it aims to determine the type of strategy adopted by participants given generator cost 
structures and internalised constraints and offer strategies. In so doing it also aims to 
capture the market structure and any conditions which may lead to pricing away from 
MC. In the case of the Spanish market, the simulation achieved values close to the 
historical outcomes. 
It is unclear from the paper whether it is market design or competitor strategy that 
is being compared, though it seems, at face-value, to imply that two different industry 
structure scenarios are being compared, with the price-setting structure giving rise to 
higher SMP's. 
3.2.3 System-wide participant behaviour 
Authors Wen and David [53] argue that deregulated markets are more akin to oligopoly, 
where participants can improve their profits through strategic bidding at the expense of 
social welfare, than to perfect competition. In this particular reference they present a 
method for building offering and bidding strategies for suppliers and large consumers in 
a pool-type market. They assume linear supply and demand functions are submitted by 
each participant and determine the coefficients in these functions to maximise benefits, 
given their expectations of how rivals will bid. Though deriving the optimal strategy for 
an individual Genco, the approach has the objective of identifying the potential for abuse 
of market power, and therefore the loopholes which may exist in the market structure. 
A brief overview (including criticism) of the literature on the strategic bidding problem 
is provided in this reference. This is one of few papers that integrates demand-side 
bidding into the market clearing process. Demand-side integration is made possible by 
allowing the large consumers to choose an appropriate (linear) demand function prior to 
the market being cleared. 
The following assumptions are made in this system-wide research in the field of partici-
pant behaviour: 
1. The market is a day-ahead one where 24 auctions are conducted and cleared si-
multaneously and separately, one for each hour. In this paper, only a one-period 
auction (e.g. for a single hour) is considered. 
2. The structure of the California electricity market including a single-part bid struc-
ture with a single energy price bid is assumed. All costs such as no-load, start-up, 
shut-down, and others are internalised within the offer . 
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3. Intertemporal constraints such as minimum up and down-times, maximum num-
bers of start-ups and shut-downs are not included in the study. Transmission 
constraints are also ignored. 
4. The effects of reserves are not examined as the reserves are served by a separate 
market in California anyway. 
The following formulation is described: 
1. n independent power suppliers and an elastic demand consisting of m large con-
sumers (in addition to an aggregate body of small consumers) who participate in 
demand-side bidding. 
2. Each par1 icipant in the market offers a linear supply/ demand function of the form 
described in Section 3.3 
3. It is implied in the formulation that each participant in the market has an influence 
on the price, and there are no price-takers. 
An optimal bidding strategy is derived for each supplier and large consumer as described 
in Section 3.4 and based on the supply /demand functions described in Section 3.3. The 
strategy used optimises the coefficients in the bidding functions given each participant 's 
personal mathematical conjectures of rivals' behaviour. 
Once the SO has received all the supply and demand functions from all participants, it 
determines the clearing price (which is an analytical function of the bidding coefficients, 
system load and demand elasticity - if the latter is present), and then determines the 
set of allocated outputs and demands. Those participants with allocation below the 
minimum are removed from the system. Those with allocations above their maximum 
are allocated this maximum, however their supply /demand functions are then ignored 
as a constraint in the SO's allocation problem, since they are no longer a marginal gen-
erator/consumer. Presumably these changes will affect the SMP and the allocations, 
though the authors do not elaborate on the associated consequences. If the bidding co-
efficients of these 'marginal' participants are ignored, they could be construed as being 
price-takers or baseload generators, and perhaps explains how the authors could (in-
directly) be allowing for price-taking in the market, though no obvious explanation is 
provided. 
Price-setting ability (for the Genco's) may be implicitly dependent on the (quadratic) 
cost functions assumed by each Genco, their estimation of rival supply coefficients and 
possible interaction with the estimates of the bids of the large consumers'. All the 
information about price-setting ability is therefore contained in the interaction of the 
participants' various parameterisations, which would in turn lead to a particular price-
formation. ThE' tweaking of assumptions in the model (such as the symmetry of infor-
mation) appears to be the scenario generator for examining the effects of market design 
and analysing participant behaviour. 
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3.2.4 The residual demand curve 
The ability to affect price and the presence of rival uncertainty are once again the main 
challenges in building the optimal offer strategy in a paper by Baillo et al. [4]. The 
type of market considered consists of 24 hourly uniform-price multiunit double auctions 
with sealed-bids. Transmission constraints are assumed to be not significant to simplify 
the analysis and the term 'double' , 'multi-unit', 'uniform price' and 'sealed-bid' were all 
defined in Section 2.1 [p. 18]. The model uses the idea of a 'residual demand curve' and 
considers longer-term strategic decisions as well as spot market strategies and forward 
contracts. The uncertainty arising from the spot market is represented by a probabilistic 
residual demand curve based on historical behaviour of the other participants, and the 
price arises from an expected value derived from historical outcomes. Reserves are 
not considered. The approach is normative: it aims to reach a trade off between effort 
dedicated to the spot market trade and the company's portfolio of longer term contracts. 
It also has prescriptive qualities in providing a tool for optimal offers given a probability 
distribution for the behaviour of other participants. Overall the model is comprehensive 
in its attention to detail on the operation of a particular Genco. A potential problem 
with the modelling of price-formation lies in their assumption of sufficient historical data 
detailing the behaviour of all participants. Obtaining sufficient data seems infeasible 
given the very recent introduction of competition in most markets, and the potential 
for the existence of pending and past changes in structure that have to be taken into 
account. 
3.2.5 Other treatments of the SMP 
The approach to price modelling in reference [11] is to treat the SMP, At , as a random 
variable that is approximately lognormally distributed. The authors derive a confidence 
interval for At using Normal tables at the desired level of confidence with the parameters 
of the lognormal distribution being determined from a time series forecasting procedure. 
The data used for the time series are the historical values up to and including the 
period 24 hours before the hour for which the forecast is required, however the type 
of time series model is not specified. Importantly, for comparison to other methods 
of price-forecasting, the price forecasts are conditioned on the historical time series of 
prices which are used to derive the parameters for the confidence interval. The price is 
used as the crucial input for a probabilistic self-scheduling profit-maximisation problem, 
which can be solved to provide a simple yet informed bidding rule. Such models have 
been developed to tackle the high price uncertainty faced by pool-market Genco's. This 
particular model is concerned with the instance of a price-taker (costs are formulated 
via a non-linear, non-convex function and a related set of operating constraints). More 
details on the supply function and optimal bidding strategy adopted by these authors 
are given in the next two sections. 
An optimisation routine matching supply and demand and minimising the total revealed 
cost of power delivery is used to determine the clearing price in [3]. Clearing may 
take place at locational nodes if they exist and must take into account transmission 
constraints. 
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There are also the various exogenous treatments of price that were detailed in Section 2.4 
of Chapter 2. 
3.2.6 Summary 
This section has examined some of the ways in which prices are formed in pools as the 
outputs of various modelling approaches, or as independent entities for which unique 
modelling techniques are sought. In the case of the former, various levels of detail can 
be incorporated into the modelling, depending on the express intentions of the modeller 
and the type of market they have chosen to model. Most of the models which are of 
descriptive value, treat the formation of the SMP in pool-type markets as a measure of 
the impact of market design rules (hence the type of supply function), or of the effects 
of system constraints and alternative cost scenarios, or even of the effects of derivatives 
such as forwarcl contracts. The more normative models will use the SMP in a model 
of price formation to determine an appropriate probability distribution upon which the 
participants can develop optimal strategies, though such models will be of descriptive 
value to individual participants who wish to behave rationally in a market. 
Some models include exceptional levels of detail with regard to the effects of financial 
contracts and derivatives, demand elasticity, technical constraints, intertemporal links 
and length of time horizon. Others do not attempt to capture every characteristic of 
the market, but tend to focus on certain issues in isolation, effectively ignoring the other 
factors' effects. 
There is a great tendency to use price formation as an indicator of the effectiveness 
of a competitive environment, as well as for examining differences between perfectly 
competitive and oligopoly-type markets. Approaches to price formation are classified as 
being either equilibrium-based, or non-equilibrium-based in nature. 
3.3 The Electricity Supply Function 
A supply function for offering capacity into a power pool is defined by the quantity(ies) 
of energy offered and their associated set of prices. In most markets the offers consist of 
a number of discrete blocks of energy which form a step function, sometimes also known 
as the offer stacks or tmnches for a particular supplier. These price-quantity pairs are 
represented by supply functions that can be used by market participants for offering 
generation into electricity markets, or as a theoretical basis for examining system-wide 
behaviour of suppliers. 
In a power pool, the supply functions of all the participants can be aggregated to form 
a market supply function which is matched to the system demand function for a par-
ticular period . An appropriate representation of each generating unit 's supply function 
is therefore crucial, both for the determination of the resultant pool price by the SO, 
and for the supplier in deciding on the optimal profit that it can achieve. The problem 
facing most generators is constructing a supply curve that maximises its profit for a 
time period given certain conditions (e.g. risk preferences, capacity limits and technical 
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constraints), exposure to price variability (through the presence of otherwise of two-way 
CFD's) and uncertainties (e.g. of demand and competitor behaviour). 
An important aspect that needs to be considered when deciding on an appropriate 
representation of a company's supply function is the price-setting ability of the company. 
A price-taker is a company that cannot readily offer enough power into the market to 
substantially affect the price and can be a small supplier in any market or a normal 
supplier in a perfectly competitive market. Conversely a price-setter is a company that 
can offer enough power into the market in order to play a significant role in the setting 
of the market price, and is either a normal supplier in an oligopoly or a relatively large 
supplier in a competitive market. Moreover, a company can be considered a price-setter 
if it operates marginal units (such as a peaking-type plant in periods of planned or 
unplanned surges in system demand), or if it is a baseload plant under a normal demand 
situation. The important thing to note here is that we are concerned with optimising the 
generator's profit function with respect to a price variable. From a modelling perspective, 
the price variable in the profit function of a price-setter will be endogenous to the supply 
function, whereas the price-taker will treat it as purely exogenous. 
The following subsections give examples of the types of supply functions that have been 
used by researchers to represent the offer curves of suppliers. Each supply function will 
have a corresponding objective profit function that will need to be optimised, depending 
on the aim of the model - which may be to aggregate the pool supply (e.g. by a SO) 
or maximise the profit of an individual supplier. Some of the unique functions will be 
discussed in detail, and others will be included for completeness. 
3.3.1 Single Offers 
Single offers are not supply 'curves' in the true sense. They represent the simplest type 
of offer that can be submitted for an auction in a single hour. They are characterised by 
a single price for a fixed volume of power much the same as the simplification adopted 
in the model-formulation in Chapter 5. Simple offers have been used in cases where the 
type of supply function is of minimal importance to the analysis. They are likely to be 
used for representing the supply functions of price-takers who offer on behalf of a single 
generating unit, and are able to internalise operating costs. 
3.3.2 Smooth supply functions 
A parameterised continuous supply function for the offer curve of the form 
s= {((p(t), q(t)), 0::; t ::; T} 
where the price and quantity - p(t) and q(t) respectively- are non-decreasing functions 
of t (the parameter defining the curve) is proposed and analysed by Anderson and 
Philpott [3]. The associated supply function here is S(p) if q(t) is equal to 0 for some 
value of t and p( ·) is strictly increasing. 
The type of supply curve described is a set of offer stacks/ tranches and therefore not 
continuous, though the individual components, p(t) and q(t), are continuous. In the 
75 
research article it is claimed that previous authors have proved that when assuming 
continuous supply functions in markets where offer curves are in fact step functions, 
there is an effect on the nature of the analysis. It is also demonstrated that if all players 
offer continuous curves, then a finite set of price-quantity pairs can be constructed to 
approximate the optimal strategy. The payoff from the discontinuous approximation 
is close to the one from the optimal continuous curve. The relevance to the existence 
of a supply-function equilibrium in a symmetric oligopoly and general convex costs is 
demonstrated. 
The aim is to find an optimal strategy in a market where competitor behaviour can be 
predicted using supply functions which are insensitive to system demand, and derive 
conditions when the optimality is in fact possible. Potential losses from approximating 
competitor supply functions can be estimated. The methodology is not able to solve the 
optimal supply function in the face of uncertain demand. 
3.3.3 Offer stacks 
A stack of prkes for quantities is specified and the price component of the price-quantity 
pair is chosen depending on an historically derived probability distribution. 
3.3.4 Piece-wise linear functions 
Bunn and Day [9], Day and Bunn [13] conjecture a piece-wise linear supply function for 
each equal-size bin i for a particular half-hour period in the following day, 
for prices ranging from lpi to 1J,Pi, a capacity of Ci allocated to the bin and a starting 
capacity for the bin of sci. The capacity and price ranges of this supply function are 
thus assumed to be discrete. While this assumption is realistic for capacity (e.g. for 
a generator who has several units which may be offered to the market), the price is in 
fact a continuous variable and discretisation is a modelling simplification that enables a 
discrete optimisation routine to be performed. 
The price, p is a function of the quantity q in each of the i = 1, . . . , N bins for this 
particular supplier. It ic; possible that bins do have zero capacity allocated to them, 
such that we have a vertical line (jump) extended over a particular bin's price range at 
a single point on the capacity axis. In this model it has been assumed that each firm in 
the pool has the same discretised price range, such that the offer of supply functions to 
the pool simply implies an allocation of generating quantities to the bins by each bidder. 
From the above it can be seen that pricing takes the form of allocating sets of generation 
to the desired price bins such that ci is allocated to each (equally-sized) price bin i. 
Moreover, different generators are assumed to have the same equal size. The more sets 
of capacity allocated to each bin, the flatter the linear slope of the section of the supply 
curve in a particular bin will be. With fewer sets, the curve becomes steeper until the case 
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Figure 3.1: A piece-wise linear supply function for a particular period in the day 
of zero sets where we have a jump in the supply function over that bin. The graphical 
representation of such a supply function model is a curve as shown in Figure 3.1. 
A day-ahead notification to the operator of (effectively) the number of capacity sets 
the company wishes to allocate to each of the fixed price bins takes place. This supply 
curve, together with a downward-sloping (possibly linear) demand curve - indicating 
a potential allowance for demand-side response to prices - allows the evaluation of 
system price, where the aggregated supply of M suppliers intersects this demand curve. 
In the model the evaluation involves a search for the marginal price bin, allocating the 
proportion of that bin's capacity to the relevant offering Gencos, and allocating the full 
remaining capacity of the lower bins to all suppliers who offered capacity in these ranges. 
The choice of supply function by each Genco does not represent an equilibrium approach, 
but rather one of forming conjectures of opponents actions and optimising their profits 
as a response. The task is made easier when the form of the supply function is less 
restrictive (with regard to symmetry of firm-size and in being a continuous function) . 
Profit from the pool is added to the income from the hedging contracts or financial swap 
arrangements, and this function is optimised over the 48 half-hour periods of the auction: 
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Mathematically, for company k, we optimise: 
48 
L9Ck,t · MCPt- C(gck,t)- MCPt · Xk.t 
t=l 
where the final term represents the variable part of the net income from a CFD/swap 
agreement and, 
MCPt 
gck.t 
C(gck,t) 
Xk,t 
Market clearing price at time t 
Total generating capacity for company k in time t 
Total cost of generating gck,t 
Contract volume for company k at time t 
(The term fPA,tXk,t, represents the fixed income received from the forward contract, 
where !Pk,t is the price received per unit contract volume, according to the forward 
agreement for company k at time t. It would have formed part of the original profit 
equation, but has been excluded as it is a constant in the optimisation routine.) 
The routine involves an exhaustive search of at most N · (N - 1) choices for the best 
bin in which tC> allocate the capacity at each iteration, in effect choosing to move each 
capacity set from its existing bin to the one which produces the biggest increase in profit. 
Though this routine appears to optimise the above objective function with respect to the 
gck,t's, it is actually modelling competition among the firms as sets are moved between 
bins. There is no strategic selection of quantity - only price is important. Also, we 
have a single auction rather than a repeated game. The result of the routine gives a 
baseline benchmark for competition assessment without looking at collusion. 
3.3.5 Linear supply functions 
An example of the use of a linear supply function for a supplier's (j's) marginal supply 
price is proposed in reference [53]. The general model is essentially descriptive of par-
ticipant behaviour, as the authors have stressed the importance of market structure and 
achieving fair competition in pool-type markets. 
The attempt at describing participant behaviour however, necessitated the establishment 
of a Monte Carlo method for solving the optimal offer/bid strategy for Genco's and 
large consumers. Consequently, the stochastic optimisation model is claimed to have 
normative qualities. The reality however, is that the model is probably more valuable 
in a descriptive sense by virtue of its over-parameterisation. A system-wide model (with 
multiple parameters) does not appear to transfer well into the solution of an individual 
participant's optimal strategy, as the goals are conflicting and many parameters are 
required to model the behaviour of rival firms. Perhaps the goals would conflict less, 
and the number of parameters would be justifiable, in a system with only a couple of large 
Genco's and consumers. In a simpler system, the descriptive and normative qualities 
would both be more valuable. The model of the supply function used is illustrated here 
and the Monte Carlo optimisation described in Section 3.4. The paper is valuable for 
its inclusion of demand-side bidding and demonstrating the impact of unsymmetrical 
information. 
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Their linear supply function is of the form 
where ~ is the active power output, and ( O:j, {3j) are the bidding coefficients for the j'th 
supplier which may follow some distribution e.g. 1 
The demand function (if required) for large consumer (l) is analogously defined, though 
it has a negative slope. The marginal demand price equals 
where Wt is the active power load, and ( </Jt, cpt) are the bidding coefficients which may 
follow some prespecified distribution. The remaining demand is treated as an aggregate 
load that may be assumed to be either elastic or inelastic to the resultant SMP. 
The clearing mechanism is such that the SO allocates values for all the Pi's and 'WI 's 
according to: 
1. the supply/demand coefficients submitted by each producer/large consumer and, 
2. their individual constraints and the total system demand. 
Transmission constraints are not considered in this analysis. The resultant SMP is the 
price that clears all demand under the formulation. The solution of the problem can be 
examined from the two viewpoints: 
1. from that of the SO, who allocates load to market participants based on received 
bidding coefficients and, 
2. from that of a particular supplier/large consumer trying to maximise their profits 
by simulating the behaviour of all the other participants, choosing their own profit-
maximising bidding coefficients, and thereby determining their expected SMP's 
and load allocations. 
It is worth noting here that none of the participants are explicitly treated as price-takers 
or price-setters. The resultant system clearing price the benefit measure under various 
scenarios of market structure. The actual price-formation for this research paper was 
described in Section 3.2 [p. 72]. 
The same authors extend their supply function analysis in a later paper [54] to allow bids 
for an entire 24 hour day. They use the same supply function described above with the 
1 The authors say that these coefficients are non-negative contradicting the use of a Normal distribution 
which implies that negative values are possible. Perhaps a lognormal distribution would have been more 
appropriate (although the approximation is adequate if the mean is more than three standard deviations 
above 0). 
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addition of an index for time, so that in effect, 24 linear supply functions are offered in 
the day-ahead market . The SMP will obviously now differ for each hour and will depend 
on the clearing process for the relevant hour. No demand functions are considered in 
the formulation, and loads are forecast for each hour by the SO and made known to 
all suppliers. The single-part linear supply function that is submitted for each hour 
internalises all of the unit start-up, no-load and other fixed or variable costs (including 
energy costs), and represents the tranches of energy offered for each price. As in the first 
paper, the authors demonstrate the methods by which the SO clears the market using 
the bidding coefficients of all the suppliers, as well as the methods by which individual 
suppliers should choose their optimal bidding coefficients. 
It is worth emphasising that a system-wide model of this kind has large array of para-
meters, and scepticism is appropriate when relying too heavily on the meaning of the 
actual outputs. Examples include the parameterisations of the distributions that are 
required both for and by each supplier. The number of parameters is substantial and 
leaves room for compounded errors of estimation in a model which aims to be complete. 
Using this model as a tool for assessing the appropriateness of a market design would be 
an onerous task especially from a computational perspective. Nevertheless it could be 
useful in a small market with similar structure to the California day-ahead market that 
is assumed in the paper. 
3.3.6 Offers based on cost functions 
In reference [25], offers submitted by generators are based on the coefficients of their 
individual quadratic cost functions. The resultant profit function is equal to 
maxf(S, >..) = >..S- (CS2 + BS +A) 
where S is the scheduled output of the generator, C, B, A are the cost coefficients, >.. is 
the spot price and S and >.. are explicit functions of K, S and >.. determined by optimal 
power flow methods. K is the generator's optimal bid chosen for C while keeping A and 
B constant. Given a set of K's, each determined for a particular generator, an optimal 
bid for the generator under analysis is then derived from the above equation using first 
and second-order conditions. The purpose of this model is detailed later in this chapter 
[p. 84]. 
3.3. 7 Two-tranche offers 
The type of supply function used in the COSMEE model of [39] is a two block offer, the 
first block being the minimum stable load, and the second being the controllable load 
from this lower value to the maximum possible power output. The price associated with 
the minimum Htable load has no lower bound, as units may wish to operate at a loss in 
order to avoid start-up, assuming their potential loss is less than the cost of start-up. 
Thermal units may be dispatched throughout the day, or only for peak periods, with the 
two different strategies resulting in different cost allocations. Thus units that operate 
the whole day have a lower bound equal to variable cost plus no-load cost, and units that 
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operate in peak hours have their lower bound equal to variable cost plus start-up cost. 
Start-up costs are allocated to dispatch hours (though other allocations are possible). 
Prices may decrease with each model iteration until the lower bound (which depends on 
cost data). 
A different consideration of the two-tranche function is demonstrated in [11] (seep. 73). 
Quantities are first chosen to maximise expected profits given the technical constraints 
of the production unit and the company's conjectures for the probability distribution 
of SMP's. In a separate routine, quantities are divided into the appropriate blocks 
and offers attached to these blocks using a confidence interval, resulting in the optimal 
bidding rule for the company in the day-ahead market. The type of hourly supply 
function is thus a two-tranche function with prices at either the lower or upper confidence 
intervals for the SMP forecast. The allocation of quantities to the two price bins depends 
on the optimal schedule of the generating company, which is in turn dependent on 
the price forecast distribution, the operational constraints, and the cost function. The 
construction of this supply function is described in more detail in Section 3.4. 
3.3.8 Summary 
In this section, the electricity supply function has been defined and a range of curve-
types have been shown to be used and implemented by various researchers. A few of 
the selected implementations have been described in detail. The type of offer curve 
will depend on the type of market and the associated rules. Certain curves have been 
specifically designed by researchers to model trading strategies; they have been designed 
according to each model's goals (e.g. determining the extent of market power or analysing 
Genco behaviour and quantifying pool benefits (or costs), or determining optimal offers). 
The actual construction of supply functions ranges from simple price offers for a fixed 
quantity of production, to linear functions with slope and intercepts determined for opti-
mal strategy, to continuous functions (which simplify reality), to realistic but intractable 
step/tranche functions, and to piece-wise linear functions for particular auction-types. 
Some of these functions have been adapted to similar demand functions in order to 
include demand-side bidding in a system-wide model. 
The type of supply functions directly influence the way in which prices are formed in 
power pools and auction markets. They can be used by researchers to investigate market 
equilibria, to determine optimal offer strategies for individual Genco's, or for quantifying 
pool benefits. Supply functions summarise the type of market design, so altering their 
form in a model of electricity markets can be of descriptive use, such that the impact 
of alternative scenarios of market designs can be assessed. Descriptive exploration has 
been accomplished with varying degrees of detail or simplicity, and with varying degrees 
of success. 
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3.4 Opthnal Bidding Strategy 
Many methods for addressing the strategic bidding problem have been reported on in the 
literature. Examples include dynamic programming, analytical formulation, heuristics, 
simple bidding models, and game theoretic/equilibrium approaches. Further methods 
include ordinal optimisation, Lagrangian relaxation, stochastic optimisation with Monte 
Carlo simulation and Markov decision processes. Evolutionary and artificial intelligence 
techniques such as genetic algorithms, genetic programming and finite state automata 
are all relevant in the framework of multi-round auction markets which are not very 
common. 
3.4.1 Considerations for an optimal strategy and an MCDM method 
He and Song [24] provide a good summary of the important factors that ought to be 
considered when deciding on an optimal offering strategy. The question of how generators 
can produce optimal offers is considered, taking into account cost-recovery, physical 
constraints, and market price fluctuation (i.e. competitor behaviour). Once again the 
special charactPristics of the energy commodity are highlighted, namely: 
• Non-storability. 
• Constraints - on the generator, system or network, as well as regulatory and 
commercial constraints. 
The consequence of these characteristics motivates the need for a sophisticated electricity 
auction market. Again, differences in the type of auction are documented between 
various countries and markets (see Section 2.1 in Chapter 2). 
Regardless of the type of pricing mechanism, effective bidding strategies must consider: 
1. Generator's physical, financial and commercial constraints. 
2. Fluctuating market prices. 
3. Competitor bidding decisions and potential coalitions. 
The actual decision-support system for offers which is proposed in this paper consists of 
three modules: 
1. A (LMP) simulator that creates LMP's on estimates of competitors' bids, fore-
casted demands and congestion information supplied by the SO. The LMP's feed 
into the second module. 
2. A self-scheduling unit commitment model. Here optimal offers are produced based 
on forecasts of spot prices, loads, transmission, and any other information posted 
by the SO, together with the generation units' specific operational constraints. 
The result is an aggregated offer curve submitted by each Genco on behalf of its 
units. 
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3. The multiple-criteria decision-making (MCDM) system. The MCDM model is 
actually a bicriteria system with the two criteria being the payoff from production 
and the percentage of market share relative to the entire system's forecasted load. 
The latter criterion is necessary since a greater percentage market share held by 
the Genco means that it is endowed with more market power in the market. 
A single-round bid with discriminatory pricing is assumed. The model allows individual 
Genco's to produce optimal day-ahead offers taking into account physical constraints and 
competitor offers, but not commercial constraints or coalitions. Demand-side bidding is 
not included but can be should the type of market necessitate it. 
The model has the following key features: 
1. The optimal offers take into account all costs, including start-up, shutdown and 
no-load, and the aggregated offer strategy of the competitors (other Genco's are ef-
fectively treated as a single competing firm in the model). Commercial constraints 
and potential coalitions are therefore not considered. 
2. A LMP simulator taking into account competitor behaviour and network security 
constraints. 
3. A MCDM method for finding the global optimal decision. 
The final decision process is as follows: 
1. Consider various scenarios of the competitors' offering strategies; 
2. Obtain the best decision with respect to each scenario i.e. generate basic loads 
for the time period in question, obtain j perturbations of these loads, then apply 
the LMP simulator at each node, taking note of the node of our generator ( k). 
Run the unit commitment module to get outputs and scheduling decisions for each 
set of LMP's and generation demands, then build the aggregated generation offer 
curve for each time period; 
3. Calculate the payoff and market share with respect to each decision and; 
4. Use MCDM to determine the best decision from all those derived. 
Results of a numerical example show that higher market share does not always mean 
higher payoff, confirming the need to keep it as separate criterion from profit. The 
priority for the two criteria will depend on the experience of the Genco, as well as its 
preferences. Simulated LMP's with associated probabilities reflect the system security 
constraint costs as well as rivals' offer strategies. The inclusion of MCDM techniques is 
a contribution of this paper to bidding decision methodology. Areas for further research 
are the inclusion of both commercial constraints and coalitions among Gencos' in the 
unit commitment model. 
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3.4.2 Bid (Offer) Sensitivity 
In reference [2i)]) a strategy for deriving the optimal offer for an individual generator in 
the auction market is derived. The strategy is based on the concept of bid sensitivities 
which can be defined as the first-order derivatives of nodal prices) generation outputs, 
unit profits and transmission line power (with respect to each unit 's offer). The derived 
offers are optimal with respect to profit, but also with respect to system constraints. 
The work here is in keeping with the current ideology in deregulated markets: 
maximising social welfare and minimising loopholes for exploitation of market 
power by participants through improved market management rules. 
The authors identify the following main factors affecting decision-making for bidding 
strategies of individual generators: 
• Forecast system demand . 
• Generation variable, start-up, n(}-load and other costs. 
• Other competitors' decisions (which represent the greatest degree of uncertainty) 
and how these decisions interact. 
• Contracts and derivatives. 
They then mention a plethora of optimisation techniques that have been employed by 
other researchprs in solving the bidding problem: mixed integer programming, dynamic 
programming, fuzzy numbers, ordinal optimisation, Benders partition algorithm, closed-
form ISO solutions with Lagrangian relaxation, genetic programming, Markov decision 
processes, intelligent negotiation agents, etc. In contrast to these methods, this paper 
employs an optimisation approach using bid sensitivities. 
Some of the assumptions made are: 
• The generator under consideration has basic knowledge of other competitors' bids. 
• Bidding strategies are based on multi-round bidding process. 
• Demand-side bidding is ignored. 
• The market is pool-based but with no bilateral contracts. 
Four types of hid sensitivities are derived: 
1. bid-price sensitivities, 
2. bid-output sensitivities, 
3. bid-profit sensitivities, 
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4. and bid-line flow sensitivities. 
The above sensitivities are invaluable to individual suppliers for choosing partners for 
potential coalition, and strategising to impair other rivals' benefits and for the market 
operator /regulator in preventing gaming among individual suppliers and thus mitigating 
the impact of their market power. 
The bid-sensitivities are used by the individual generator to optimise profit by choosing 
the optimal cost coefficient. The optimisation algorithm is applied in a multi-round 
bid, each generator maximising its profit in each round until a Nash Equilibrium is 
reached (i.e the equilibrium is valid if each competitor has an optimal strategy given 
other competitors have chosen equilibrium strategies.) 
The conclusions of this paper are that a liberalised market in fact reduces social welfare 
under the given assumptions. Bidding sensitivities have been identified as valuable 
information. Further work is needed on how to offer when participants engage in gaming 
and exercise market power (non-rational behaviour). Also the paper only considers a 
single period market without consideration of intertemporal constraints such as unit 
commitment. 
3.4.3 Optimal strategy through simulation and iterative equilibrium 
The type of offer optimisation used by Otero-Novas et al. [39] is different depending on 
whether units are price-takers (uncoordinated simulation) or price-setters (coordinated 
simulation): 
Price-takers: The quantities are chosen at each iteration are dependent on the SMP 
at the previous iteration through a mixed integer programming routine in which the 
total profits over all hours is maximised. The routine differs between thermal and hydro 
units, the latter opting for a more profitable 'peak-shaving' strategy. Subsequent to 
determination of quantities, price may be modified by a fixed decrement if it is above 
the SMP from the previous iteration and if the reduction does not transgress the lower 
bound imposed by costs; otherwise no modification of price takes place for the unit. 
Price-takers will strive for maximum production as they have no effect on the wholesale 
price. 
Price-setters: In an oligopoly, modification of prices is less simple as firms may accept 
lower production in order to raise the prices they receive. Here quantities are chosen 
so that the sum of each firm's production units' profits are optimised subject to similar 
constraints as above, but with the additional caveat that total production is at the 
optimum generation level (from a first order Cournot equilibrium). Firms who are fully 
dispatched make no modification to their offer price. Those who are not maintain the 
same price or reduce their prices, and therefore reduce the profits of other inframarginal 
competitors. The amount by which profits are adjusted will depend on the amount of 
dispatched production. 
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The model is simplified in that competition stranded costs and required national coal 
consumption me ignored. Nuclear units have to be considered as 'must run' and demand 
is fixed and inelastic for each hour. 
3.4.4 An optimal strategy for a price-taker 
An example of a framework for obtaining the optimal bidding strategy for a price-taker 
producer is described in [11]. The optimal strategy is achieved (in three steps) by 
specifying a probability density function (pdf) for the next day's hourly SMP's, then 
formulating a self-scheduling profit maximisation problem and solving it to obtain a 
simple yet informed bidding rule. A realistic case study is conducted and the results 
discussed. 
The study is conducted with the following contextual assumptions: 
1. The Genco under consideration is thermal production unit. 
2. The optimal strategy for single price-taking generator is required. 
3. A pool-based market which is not necessarily perfectly competitive. 
4. Market-clearing takes place one day in advance on an hourly basis. 
5. Producers (consumers) submit hourly supply (demand) curves consisting of 
tranches of energy at their corresponding prices. 
6. Generators offer all their power in one or several tranches at increasing prices 
(chosen through the profit-maximisation routine). 
7. An inherently high price-uncertainty - an implemented price-forecasting tool is 
used by generators for calculating the pdf's of the next-day's hourly SMP's. 
8. All generators who offer below or at the SMP receive that price for their energy, 
and all consumers whose bids are accepted pay this common amount. 
Given the lognormal distribution for price described in Section 3.2, the quantities to 
generate each hour are determined by maximising the expected profits (revenues less 
costs) subject to the operating constraints (power limits, ramp-rate constraints, mini-
mum up and down-time) and according to the expected SMP in each time period. The 
crucial assumption implied here is that the quantity chosen has no impact on the price 
distribution i.e. the generator is a price-taker. The maximisation problem is linear and 
mixed-integer and solved accordingly. No mention is made of offer prices up to this stage, 
only the optimum self-scheduling quantities have been chosen. A particular omission is 
with regard to the presence of any quantities of hedged sales that could influence the 
production decision. The authors have used the expected values of the At's (defined on 
p. 73) to avoid the use of a complicated price scenario approach. 
The profit achieved under the self-scheduled production for each hour becomes a random 
variable which is a simple linear transformation of At, namely Bt = AtP; - c; where 
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p; and c; are the optimal quantity and cost respectively, for each hour t. The means 
and variances of the Bt's are thus easily calculated. The variance of the daily profit 
will therefore be a covariance matrix containing off-diagonal elements that indicate the 
extent of the correlation between SMP's across various hours of the day. This argument 
relies on the actual SMP falling within the specified confidence interval. 
Using the quantities from the self-scheduling problem, a proposed offering strategy for 
each hour is derived as follows: 
1. If p; = 0 then the maximum output, P, is offered in a single tranche at the upper 
confidence limit for price. Specifying a level p; = 0 guarantees, with the specified 
level of confidence, that no power is accepted. 
2. If p; = P then a single tranche of power, P, is offered at the lower confidence limit 
for price. The price level then guarantees that all the power accepted with the 
chosen level of confidence. 
3. If p; is at some level between 0 and P then two blocks are offered: p; at the lower 
confidence limit and P- p; at the upper limit, guaranteeing that p; is accepted 
with the desired level of confidence. 
The method thus proposes that a supply function is submitted in such a manner that 
the desired level of output is achieved subject to the conjectures about the probability 
distribution of the SMP; it implies that we have a maximum of two blocks of energy. 
Should the market rules require more, the three cases above could be modified, though 
the authors do not suggest how the modification can be done. A non-convex cost curve 
is treated in the analysis, though a convex offer curve is required in reality. 
An actual case study for a particular trading day is demonstrated in which the above 
techniques are implemented and compared against the case where one has perfect knowl-
edge of the price outcomes. The difference in profits is negligible for the particular day, 
and the desired schedule becomes the actual one. Conclusions are therefore favourable for 
this case. No mention however, is made of the potential influence of hedging arrange-
ments or their effect on the company's strategy, albeit an important consideration in 
modern markets. No mention of any extension to the medium term is mentioned or con-
sidered. Although the authors derive the standard deviations of the prospective profits, 
they make no mention of the potential of these values to be integrated into a wider risk 
management strategy. 
3.4.5 A Monte Carlo approach 
In reference [53] a method is shown whereby the Genco can solve their stochastic profit-
maximising problem using a Monte Carlo approach. In this approach, the bidding co-
efficients of the other participants are treated as random variables from distributions 
determined through the statistical analysis of historical data. The result of the optimi-
sation problem will give the coefficients of the linear supply function that the participant 
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should submit 1n order to maximise profits. The profit function that must be maximised 
for the j'th supplier is 
F(a.1,{31) = RP1 - C1PJ 
where R is the SMP for the particular hour and CJ is the production cost coefficient. 
An analogous function is maximised if the participant is a large consumer, 
H(rh IPt) = Bt(Wi) - RWi 
where Bt(Wt) is the benefit function of the consumer. 
The optimisation algorithm is carried out by fixing the first coefficient (e.g. O'.j) and 
searching for the optimal value of the second coefficient (say {3j) using the golden section 
search method and subject to the sampled values of the other participants' coefficients 
and all constraints (except transmission) . This process is repeated for each iteration. 
The final value for the second coefficient is the average of the optimal values from each 
iteration. Similarly one could fix the second coefficient and search for the optimal value 
of the first. It is important to note that any chosen value for the second coefficient must 
be chosen within the scope imposed by the cost function to avoid offering a function 
that will result in a loss. The authors circumvent this issue in their numerical example 
by searching fc•r the second coefficient within a range determined with reference to the 
cost function coefficients. No explicit treatment for a general cost function is described 
in this formulation, other than the fact that the parameters for the pdf's of a.1 and f3J 
are chosen to reflect the underlying cost exposure. In the example, the cost function is 
quadratic, hence its first derivative is linear and can be compared with the linear supply 
function when obtaining the appropriate bounds for the coefficients. 
A numerical example with six generators and two large consumers with quadratic pro-
duction cost and demand benefit functions is given. Two experiments are performed: 
1. Symmetrical information. Since there is insufficient historical data to parame-
terise the pdf's of the bidding coefficients, parameters are chosen with reference to 
the quadratic cost function such that offers are submitted at 20% above the mar-
ginal cost function (i.e. 20% above the derivative of the quadratic cost functions ), 
and such that four standard deviations above and below the f..LJ 's is equivalent to 
15% above and below the MC. The correlation coefficient, PJ [see p. 79] is cho-
sen to be slightly negative to reflect that a supplier's decision of increasing one 
of the bidding coefficients will lead to their reducing the other coefficient (in a 
mature market) . A similar choice of parameters is performed for the pdf's of the 
large consumers. It is a system-wide simulation, so each participant determines 
their optimal supply /demand function through simulating their (randomly sam-
pled) rivals ' supply / demand functions. The outputs are each participants optimal 
bid coefficients. When given the coeffiecients, the SO determines the outputs for 
each supplier, demands for each consumer (including the aggregate one), and the 
resultant SMP which clears the market. 
2. Asymmetrical information. In this case, the experiment is conducted such that 
some participants make better estimates than others. Such a scenario is imitated 
by assuming that the second supplier overestimates his rivals' parameters. The 
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results show that their share of the market - and the resultant profit - decreases, 
and the SMP increases when compared to the scenario of symmetrical information. 
The large consumers' benefits are also reduced owing to the increased SMP. 
The above research therefore proves useful for providing a method for market partici-
pants to optimise their bids in an auction-type market, assuming they all submit linear 
supply /demand functions. It also demonstrates the effect of a participant having less 
accurate information on the benefits they can achieve and also on the social welfare 
of the system (i.e. the SMP). What has not been considered however, is the effect of 
derivatives markets on the bidding strategies. A further drawback of this exercise is 
that modelling the entire system from the point of view of each participant as well as 
that of the SO, is in reality a very complex and unwieldy task. The methods employed 
necessarily imply that levels of information are very high and that the market is mature. 
The methods do not propose strategies for small suppliers/large consumers who have no 
influence on the market; no explicit formulation is provided for the inclusion of price-
takers in the market. The SMP is directly determined from the bidding coefficients of 
all the participants and has an analytical solution. 
3.4.6 Day-ahead markets and marginal units 
Two different bidding schemes are suggested for each hour's offer in [54] and an overall 
offering strategy is then developed based on these two schemes. The two strategies are 
described using stochastic optimisation models and a genetic-algorithm-based method is 
described for developing an overall offer strategy for the day-ahead market. 
Maximum hourly benefit is the strategy used for offering in each of the 24 hours of 
the daily schedule. The coefficients o:rt) and py) [p. 79] are chosen to maximise 
Genco profits based on their expected outputs and the SMP (both are determined 
with an allowance for competitor behaviour) for each hour, as well as the cost func-
tion (which also depends on their expected output for the hour). The constraints 
are that expected outputs must be within the Genco's output limits. 
Minimum stable output is the alternative strategy used in the hours when the unit 
cannot be dispatched as recommended by maximum hourly benefit strategy above. 
In this strategy, a loss results and the coefficients are chosen such that the expected 
output will be as close as possible, or equal to, the minimum output for the hour. 
As in a previous paper [53], suppliers submit coefficients of their linear supply function, 
although in this case, one set for each hour of the day ahead is submitted, subject to 
expectations about how rivals will bid. Unlike in their previous paper, suppliers are now 
additionally required to make decisions on unit commitment before choosing their supply 
function coefficients. The problem is therefore two-fold and a genetic algorithm solves 
the unit's commitmentjdecommitment status in each hour and the offering strategies 
for those hours that the unit is in operation. 
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In solving for the optimal bidding coefficients, the maximum-hourly-benefit strategy 
is employed, and for all those hours in which no production is scheduled using this 
method, the minimum-stable-output method must be employed. Since it is a single-
part-bid market, the suppliers themselves must decide on unit commitment. The authors 
suggests a genetic algorithm for modelling this decision. The genetic algorithm takes into 
account the minimum up and down time, and the possibilities of 'banking' a unit (i.e. 
keeping it running without generating), or allowing it to cool down and then incurring 
associated start-up costs. 
A numerical example similar to the one in [53] is presented though falls short of doing 
the example with asymmetrical information. 
3.4. 7 Unknown demand 
A study of strategies for offering generation in a pool-type market when demand is 
unknown has been proposed in [3]. The optimal policy for a generator is derived hence 
giving insights into the type of behaviour that may be observed in an electricity market. 
A fundamental difference in the approach is that no probability distribution for demand 
is needed. The authors show that in the situation of uncertain but inelastic demand 
(e.g. in the short term in most markets), the optimal supply function response exists 
when: 
1. Marginal costs are non-decreasing for all generators. 
2. The combined offers of all the generators are log-concave when price is a function 
of quantity offered. 
The cost/supply functions need not be smooth. The key specifications of the analysis 
are: 
• A pool market with a central dispatch and pricing mechanism (as opposed to a 
decentralised, bilateral market such as the California one). 
• Two-way CFD's (defined on p. 49) are used to hedge exposure to the SMP, with 
the contracts being separate from the market mechanism. 
• Supply curves consists of (possibly discontinuous) non-decreasing offer tranches. 
• SMP is determined so as to satisfy demand at least possible cost (at the appropriate 
locational nodes if necessary) and taking into account transmission constraints. 
The SMP is thus determined to minimise the total revealed cost of power delivery. 
• An oligopoly market situation ~ in particular the authors consider a duopoly 
though they indicate one of the two players could be an amalgam representing the 
remaining contingent of market participants. 
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Assuming smooth supply functions, conditions are derived for when a single supply 
function represents the optimal response to offers by other participants over a range of 
demands. In practice, deriving the conditions would entail approximating the supply 
functions of the competitors. 
Bounds are derived for the revenue lost (relative to the case of exact supply functions) 
when the Genco uses approximations for both their own and their competitor's supply 
functions. The existence of symmetric supply function equilibria is also demonstrated. 
3.4.8 A marginal cost strategy 
Very often, a firm's minimum offer will be equal to its marginal cost, and in some cases 
it may be the most profitable. The idea is considered in the case of a price-taker in 
reference [43] where the supplier must maximise his expected profit, E(II) where 
and 
E(II) = ¢(pP9 - C9 (P9 )) + (1- ¢)(-Co) 
generation level 
cost of generation 
cost of restarting the unit after an unanticipated outage 
probability of selling output after bid acceptance 
market price 
profit 
Taking the first derivative of the above profit equation with respect to P9 and solving for 
p permits an analysis of whether offers are set above or below marginal costs (depending 
on the probability of actually being available to supply the market). The goals of this 
paper are to stress the importance of knowledge of MC's for developing an offer strategy. 
The same idea is implicit in many of the other approaches above. 
3.4.9 Summary 
It has been demonstrated that there are few treatments of the optimal offer strategy 
that are common among various researchers. Tools have been implemented from all but 
a few of the operations researcher's wares. Though appearing to tackle the question 
of how to achieve the optimal supply in a competitive market, much of the work actu-
ally uses the optimal strategy as a means of predicting Genco behaviour in response to 
competition from rival firms. Techniques used include advanced stochastic optimisation 
routines, Monte Carlo simulation, equilibrium models, consideration of multiple crite-
ria, mathematical analyses of algebraic supply functions, and genetic algorithms among 
others. 
The purposes of the optimisation are in accordance with those mentioned in Sections 3.2 
and 3.3 above. In title, many of the papers aim to solve the optimal offer strategy for 
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Genco's in pool-type markets, however the implication is often more subtle. There are 
two interrelated. analyses that often characterise research of this nature. In most cases 
the descriptive and normative models (most of the formulations exhibit qualities of both) 
lead to one or other prescriptive analysis. A brief description of the uses of normative 
and descriptive models follows. 
Normative models for market participants 
Normative models aim to solve the optimal offer strategy for a Genco under various 
market conditions, degrees of uncertainty, market designs and/or information scenarios. 
The models will aim to capture the uncertainties, and the cost scenario of the competitors 
together with their price-taking or price-setting ability. The outputs of such models will 
include one or more of the following, and may or may not include measures of robustness 
to scenarios that define the uncertainties: 
• optimal f.chedules for production. 
• offer prices and/or quantities. 
• quantitie'l of futures contracts to be purchased. 
• optimal portfolios of energy contracts. 
• distributwns of profit outcomes. 
Descriptive models of participant behaviour 
Descriptive models formulate optimal strategies in order to mimic the behaviour of 
participants acting in a profit-maximising manner, however the effects of their actions 
on price formation will be target items of interest. Such formulations may also be of 
normative value to individual participants, who wish to understand their market power 
and devise their strategies for trade and risk management accordingly. 
3.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has concentrated on that part of power system economics which relates 
directly to the trading strategies adopted by Genco's. In so doing, it has identified the 
three interrelated concepts of price formation, supply functions and optimal strategy. 
Nearly all of the literature that was sourced for this dissertation, and which analysed 
trading strategies (whatever the motivation for the analyses and the types of market 
were), dealt in some manner with these three concepts. The scope for additional consol-
idation of the research is somewhat limited due to the wealth of variety between market 
designs, research aims and techniques for analysis. 
Most researchers have engaged at least some coverage of system and technical constraints 
in their analyses of strategies, drawing on knowledge of systems previously researched 
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in the ' least-cost ' era of electricity production. However, they have had to drastically 
modify these approaches for the new market conditions. The main problem seems to be 
that information is no longer fully disclosed or available, and the Genco's are exposed 
to additional uncertainties and a greater diversity of risks, which were not previously 
encountered. Such uncertainties relate to: 
• System demand (and the fact that it may now be elastic) and the presence (or 
otherwise) of demand-side bidding. 
• Competitor behaviour and the ability of the rival firms to influence prices in con-
centrated markets. Competition is related to study of price uncertainty itself. 
• The existence (or otherwise) of derivatives and bilateral contracts and the addi-
tional uncertainties that accompany them. In the case of derivatives, the related 
strategic trading analyses are relatively young, and have mostly dealt with the 
simpler, fixed-volume swap contracts/ CFD's for hedging price. 
• A dynamic regulatory environment that is constantly under the watchful eye of 
national regulators and the researchers themselves, with frequent and drastic al-
terations in design always looming. 
• The relationships between risk and bidding strategies and between contract eval-
uation and scheduling of physical resources. 
• The vast array of modelling techniques have demonstrated the more subtle risk of 
excluding too much detail (e.g. by ignoring the effects of one or more of the four 
uncertainties above in the model assumptions), or incorporating too much detail 
at the expense of model simplicity, and attempting to 'over-model' . 
One of the problems encountered lies in the lack of consistency between approaches, and 
there appears to be no uniformly unique approach to systems thinking for electricity 
trade. Therefore while models have attempted to solve complex problems (e.g finding an 
optimal strategy), they seem to get bogged down in the intricacies of the market design 
and as a whole they demonstrate a lack of conviction in choosing from a wide range of 
mathematical tools. The result is a general lack of consensus on the most appropriate 
tools for modelling competitive electricity markets. An additional point is that models 
which appear to be solving the offer strategy problem, are often tools for analysing 
market power and comparing oligopolies with perfectly competitive markets. In their 
favour, they have succeeded in modelling price formation when comparing the historical 
realisations to the modelled ones, and developed the technique of supply function analysis 
and its links to other techniques. A direct simulation approach appears to be the most 
adept at handling adaptive and evolutionary learning though care should be taken not 
to try and model too much detail. 
In summary, the research in this chapter has proven useful for identifying the key char-
acteristics that ought to be considered when developing a model of generator behaviour. 
As far as possible, they are the characteristics that will be considered for the develop-
ment of the simulation model (and for the analyses that follow it) in the remainder of 
this dissertation. 
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Chapter 4 
The Eskom Trading Environment 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter briefly summarises the type of environment that exists in the context of 
the South African electricity market. Some of the history of the development of the 
market was obtained from publications of the National Energy Regulator (NER), though 
the summary of the workings of the Eskom Power Pool was obtained from days spent 
interacting with a trader and observing his actions on behalf of the Peaking cluster of 
Eskom's generator pool. Further information and a limited amount of data for one of 
the production units were provided by management of the cluster and by a corporate 
consultant who represents the Eskom Generation Production and Sales division. 
The current state of deregulation in South Africa and the Eskom Power Pool is described 
in order to provide a foundation for the model construction that commences in the next 
chapter. At the time of writing, and far as could be ascertained, there has been little to no 
research conducted which gives particular attention to the South African power market, 
although a wealth of such research could be sourced for other national markets. Examples 
include England and Wales, California, Scandinavia, Spanish and New Zealand among 
others. Though some of the research has a focus that is unique to a particular national 
electricity sector, the areas of enquiry and methods of investigation are universal, save 
for the specifics of market design, auction-type and level of deregulation. 
Firstly, the current state of restructuring of the South African power market is described, 
as well as the reasons for the changes (which echoes the motivation for changes in other 
countries). For political reasons the liberalisation has failed to gather as much momen-
tum as it has in more developed countries and some reasons for the delays are described 
in the next section. As a result, much of the development that has taken place in the de-
veloped markets with regard to energy derivatives trading has not yet emerged in South 
Africa, though the initial steps toward commoditisation of electricity have taken place. 
An illustration of this fact is that although there is some internal trading of CFD's, the 
trades of actual electricity derivatives are so far largely OTC. Moreover, as a developing 
country which is exempt from the Kyoto Protocol, South African thermal generators are 
not yet as concerned with emissions trading arrangements. Preoccupation with emis-
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sions restrictions indicates a foremost concern in many developed countries. The model 
formulation described in Chapter 5 does not therefore reflect such developments, though 
a model is envisaged that is amenable to such adaptation should the restructure that 
has been outlined by the NER progress as planned. 
In the third section, the Eskom Power Pool (EPP), its constituents, its structure and 
the current prevailing trading arrangements are described, and finally, a motivation for 
the choice of the market entity to be modelled is outlined in section 4.4. 
4.2 Restructuring of the South African Power Market 
The needs for restructuring of the South African electricity sector were outlined in the 
government's Energy White Paper released in December 1998. The motivations, broadly 
speaking, were as follows: 
• To introduce competition and therefore improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the electricity supply. 
• Increased access by potential consumers to affordable energy services and improved 
energy governance. 
• Attraction of foreign investment in the form of Independent Power Producers 
(IPP's) and stimulation of economic development. 
• Management of energy-related environmental impacts and securing of energy sup-
plies through diversity of primary energy sources. 
• Facilitation of black economic empowerment and strategic equity participation. 
The following ideas have characterised the changes undergone in the sector since Eskom's 
initial move away from its status as a fully state-owned enterprise: 
• The government policy was ultimately to establish a fully privatised electricity 
enterprise (amid a pronounced and current opposition to this ideology outlined 
below). 
• To date, corporatisation of Eskom has taken place with the formation of separate 
transmission, distribution and generation entities. The formation of the three 
entities is representative of the classic unbundling that has characterised most of 
the world's power markets. 
• Hierarchical unbundling has also taken place leading to the formation of indepen-
dent generating companies. 
• Privatisation of generators is also going ahead. 
• Up to now, indiscriminate access to the transmission grid continues. The grid 
remains a state-owned entity subject to operation by a separate company, the 
National Transmission Company (NTC). 
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• During the years 1996 to 1997 the Electricity Distribution Industry (EDI) was the 
focus of n~structure with the formation of six new Regional Electricity Distributors 
(RED's). 
• The NER controls and regulates the supply industry and licenses the generators. 
• The establishment of the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) has facilitated 
trading with other African countries. 
• As far as types of trading are concerned, there has been a pursuit of a combined 
wholesale and retail market for electricity. 
• Toward the end of 1999, Eskom commenced the changes by splitting its business 
into regulated (Eskom Holdings Limited) and non-regulated (Eskom Enterprises) 
business; the latter being responsible for business activities within and outside 
South Africa and the former converted to a public company with effect from July, 
2002. 
• Generation will continue to be part of Eskom for the present, but could be split into 
a number of subsidiaries with a holding company and privatisation partners could 
be brought on board. In 2003, power stations in Generation were paired together 
into seven clusters to prepare this sector for exposure to competition; flexibility was 
maintained in the arrangements to accommodate the various options in a changing 
supply industry. 
• Transmission takes responsibility for the grid (worldwide this is more often than not 
the case) and is regulated such that all players have access to it even if the electricity 
is purchased from IPP's or the SADC (South African Development Community) 
pool. 
• Distribution is to undergo the most radical change. The EDI is to be separated 
from Eskom and merged with the electricity departments of more than 400 mu-
nicipalities to form the RED's. These RED's will be subsidiaries of the holding 
company until they can become independent. Their responsibility is the distribu-
tion of electricity and the collection of revenue. 
• Eskom Enterprises is responsible for managing and developing all future Eskom 
subsidiaries whose business activities fall outside the three regulated activities. 
They will also be responsible for developing markets in the rest of Africa where 
Eskom will be able to sell its power utility expertise. 
Plans are therefore in place for the complete restructuring and liberalisation of the SA 
electricity indw:itry. The deadline set by the Minister of Public Enterprises for completion 
of the restructuring programme was originally set to 2004. As of September, 2004 these 
plans were under revision, the government's program to sell off Eskom assets has not 
gained sufficient momentum. In addition Eskom is currently building new generating 
plant to meet the ever-growing demand. The opposing ideology in response to the 
original plans argued that: 
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• The plans are socially infeasible as the goals of privatisation conflict with the 
government's (currently incomplete) plan of electricity provision to all rural and 
impoverished areas in the country. There will also be detrimental effects to the 
environment if full-scale privatisation takes place while coal is still the cheapest 
and most readily available fuel in the country. New independent power producers 
will have no incentive to utilise 'cleaner' forms of generating fuels. 
• Eskom currently has excess generating capacity (so-called "sunken assets") that 
are an obstacle to the implementation of a completely free market commoditisation 
of electricity. The counter-argument to this point is that existing plant is currently 
ageing, and the excess capacity is a form of contingency for that. In depth market 
research would be required to assess whether the excess capacity is more of a long 
term feature in the market. Even with this excess capacity, there are fears of 
imminent shortages in the years ahead as a result of the current rapid growth in 
demand. 
• Municipalities would potentially lose out on important revenue previously gener-
ated by electricity sales. 
• Economic instability and the tight monetary policy of the government will not 
attract the investment money of foreign IPP's. 
• The current nation-wide brain drain through the emigration of skilled professionals 
presents a lack of human resources to effectively control and manage the transition 
toward and the operation of a liberalised market. 
Figure 4.1 shows the structure of the South African Electricity Market since unbundling. 
4.3 The Eskom Power Pool 
In Figure 4.2 the structure of the South African Power Market is outlined. The EPP is 
the market in which the generating clusters currently participate. Of the total electricity 
generation in South Africa, Eskom generates 95.9%, Local Government 1% and the 
private sector 3.1%. Some 87.3% of national generation is coal-fired , 5.1% is nuclear, 
1.8% is hydro-electric, 4. 7% pumped storage, with the remaining 1.1% coming from gas 
turbines (approximate figures for the 2003 calendar year). 
Most of the national power trading happens in the above market. Each of the seven 
generation clusters submit offers for production of electricity on behalf of their individual 
generating units to the EPP. A generating unit refers to an individual power plant, and 
in the South African context refers to one of the following power plants (percentages 
based on output projection for 2001). The first two represent the so-called base-load 
generators: 
• Nine Coal-fired Power Stations- roughly 92.4% of the national output. 
• One Nuclear Power Station (Koeberg) - 6.4% of total output. 
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Electricity 
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Figure 4.1: The structure of the South African electricity sector 
• Hydro-electric - 0.4% of output 
• Pumped Storage Schemes - 0.8% of output 
The latter two represent the 'peaking' power stations. Also included in the peaking 'mix' 
are the gas-fired (fuel oil) generating units that were lumped with the coal-fired figure. 
Each of the clusters' activities in the market are governed by a trading mandate and 
the trading goals are determined with reference to performance contracts. The contracts 
do not only reflect the profit-making ability of the relevant cluster, but include other 
items such as adherence to maintenance scheduling (for the purpose of achieving plant 
longevity). 
Daily offers in the form of piece-wise-horizontal supply tranches (see Section 3.3) which 
give the price per MWh across possible ranges of output, and are offered on behalf of 
each generating unit by its parent cluster. Twenty-four of these (one for each hour) 
are submitted Yia an electronic system (known as POW!) by the deadline of 10:00 a.m. 
each day for the day's production hours commencing one day hence. These 'supply' 
functions are determined by traders acting on behalf of their cluster and take into account 
(broadly): 
• the unit's marginal cost. 
• the system-wide hourly demand/load forecast for the period. 
• objectives arising from the performance contracts. 
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Figure 4.2: The South African Electricity Market 
• an anticipation of competitor behaviour. 
100% of the power produced by the clusters is traded through the EPP, and the daily sales 
effectively balance the pre-purchase hedging mechanism that is in place with Generation 
Production and Sales who are still the effective owners of the generation assets. This 
situation represents a stage in the transition to fully privatised generation markets. 
The hedging mechanism is achieved through the sales of monthly forward contracts 
(specifically in the form of two way contracts-for-differences). The formulation of this 
type of contract was described in Chapter 2, though it is worth noting here that these are 
in fact forward contracts as opposed to futures contracts. The reason for the distinction 
is that the instruments are currently traded within the same company and no margins 
- in the form of collateral - are therefore required. 
The daily trading process has a diagrammatic representation shown in Figure 4.3. 
From the point of view of an individual cluster's trading activities, it is important to 
elaborate upon the following three essential items as they will govern the choices made 
by the active trader: 
Gross Margin: Sales minus Cost of Sales. Margin requirements are determined with 
reference to historic market performance, historic market prices, accurate forecasts 
of future market prices, long-term hedging practises, historic sales volumes and 
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Figure 4.3: The Trading Process 
revenue requirements. By the last point a percentage return on assets, as specified 
by performance contracts, is implied. 
SMP forecasts: Prices are forecast (as advised by the holding company) using the 
following base and phase shift Fourier model withE"' N(O, a 2 ): 
A possible extension to the above model allows for random shocks in the form of 
Poisson-distributed random variables. 
From the model, the Genco derives the hourly sales targets as well as daily, monthly 
and annual gross margins that it expects to achieve. In order to enhance their per-
formance. traders often conduct their own internal forecast based on any additional 
information at their disposal. Such information would include knowledge of the 
system, expected rival behaviour and historical SMP's. In practice, great emphasis 
is also placed on the outcome of the previous day's trade when selecting a strategy 
for the forthcoming hourly trades. 
Marginal Cost refers to the cost of purchasing the primary energy (e.g. coal, pumping 
costs, etc.) It also makes an allowance for the amount of potential (stored) energy 
in the form of inventories of primary and potential energy. Models (e.g. PMAC 
for pumped storage) are used to determine the value of the marginal costs which in 
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turn affect potential generation capacity and minimum selling price. It is notably 
a very important for determining the generator's position in the market. 
Settlement 
On receipt of all the offers for production of electricity, the Power Pool Operator (PPO) 
- on an hour-by-hour basis - aggregates all the supply tranches received for each 
generating unit in the system, and calculates the price that clears the total estimated 
hourly demand. The resultant market clearing price for each hour is known as the 
SMP. All generating units with offers at or below the SMP for each hour are contracted 
to produce the quantity offered for the particular hour and receive the SMP for each 
MWh that they produce. The clearing process determines the system's constrained 
schedule. Obviously the forecast demand for each hour is rarely equal to the actual 
load for that hour and a settlement mechanism operates within the pool to make up for 
any differences between forecast and actual output, as well as second-by-second system 
load regulation. This mechanism, in turn determines the unconstrained schedule. Other 
factors which arise from transmission system constraints and unexpected events (e.g. 
unplanned generator outages) will also affect the unconstrained schedule. In addition 
to its scheduling task, the PPO is also responsible for coordinating ancillary services, 
ensuring correct metering of output, and for transmission arrangements. At the time of 
discussion with the Eskom trader there was no demand-side bidding in the Eskom Power 
Pool that would have an affect on the settlement mechanism in the Pool. 
The successfully awarded contracts are made known to the Genco's electronically at 14:00 
on the day prior to trade and include information on the hourly volumes to produce, 
ancillary products and required reserves. The reserves markets comprise instantaneous, 
black-start, regulating, 10-minute and emergency reserves. 
Performance Assessment 
The delivery performance of each unit is assessed by the PPO with reference to the 
following items: 
• generator status - actual versus forecast (including load losses and generator 
trips). 
• behavioural characteristics of the generator (mill changes, ramping, etc.) 
• hourly adherence to load volumes. 
• second-by-second regulation. 
Post-Delivery 
In post-delivery, the PPO actions the following: 
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• Metering of availability, regulation and governance 
• Reconciliation of amounts over /under 
• Events and performance indicators 
• Daily settlements - governed by EPP rules, disputes resolved through an elec-
tronic system (Them is) 
• Monthly billing 
After the delivt!ry period, traders are able to compare their actual gross margin against 
their targets, offers for the following period are revised with respect to previous perfor-
mance. 
4.4 Study Specialisation 
The section justifies the choice of Peaking as an appropriate application, followed by a 
brief description of the workings of a pumped-storage scheme, and some remarks on how 
this specialisation fits into the greater scheme of the thesis . 
Justification 
The subject for this thesis was chosen to be the "Peaking" cluster of the Generation 
sector. Preliminary discussions with a representative from the Generation division of 
Eskom's head office were what motivated the need for research into the area of financial 
risk management within the division as a whole , and indeed within a South African 
context. For the purposes of a masters dissertation, examining the whole of Generation 
was deemed too large a task . It was therefore agreed that research would be confined 
to one of the seven generation clusters. Peaking was an obvious choice for the following 
reasons: 
1. Wider research interest due to variations in plant type. For example the types of 
generating plant which they operate are not only, say coal-fired or thermal units. 
2. The risk profile of peaking-type plants is more varied, and would, for example, be 
concerned with items such as weather variables. The model of a market participant 
is therefore endowed with a generality that would hopefully permit a reasonable 
adaptation to the study of a base-load generator. 
3. The proximity of the Peaking office and the current existence of managerial con-
tacts at that office, would allow the researcher to spend time in the trading en-
vironment there. In so doing, some insights could be gained as to the type of 
concerns faced by a trader in a market for electricity generation. There was also 
scope for the provision of hourly historical data by the cluster in respect of one of 
its generating units . The data was provided for research purposes. 
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In this thesis, we therefore proceed by focusing on the Peaking cluster while preserving as 
much generality as possible with regard to the model definitions. In so doing we envisage 
a representation which captmes the main characteristics of any type of participant in 
a market for electricity generation. The profile would be one that could ultimately be 
specialised for the particular characteristics of other market participants, and perhaps 
even serve to highlight important differences between the participants. Given the nature 
of existing research on system-wide modelling, it is hoped that by keeping the model for 
a single participant as general as possible, a formulation can be developed for many such 
participants (each with their own specific characteristics), and that each of these can be 
refined and amalgamated into a representation of a system describing the market as a 
whole. 
Pumped-Storage Generators 
Pumped-storage hydro is essentially a form of energy storage. When the scheme is not 
generating, it is either pumping water from the lower reservoir to the higher one, or 
simply standing idle until its energy is needed by the grid or pool. It has low running 
costs and quick start-up time, which makes it ideal for peaking-type production. When 
pumping, it may be responsible for increasing the capacity factor of the base-load units in 
the grid during off-peak periods or simply be viewed as a consumer along with other users 
of electricity. The unit essentially converts energy produced in periods of low system 
loads to (a reduced amount of energy) available for high period loads. The turbines 
are reversible in the sense that the same unit is used for pumping and for generating. 
Generating simply means allowing water from the higher reservoir through the turbine 
to the lower one. 
In summary, a pumped storage scheme is a generator of electricity in periods of peak 
demand or grid production deficit , and a consumer who purchases power at off-peak 
periods of low demand. The fact that it serves both as an instantaneous provider of 
power in demand surges or failure of other generators, and as a bulk user of power when 
output of baseload generation is pushed to its minimum in off-peak periods, makes the 
pumped storage generator a socially important entity in the power system. Although 
pumped storage is only responsible for only 0.8% of the national production of electricity, 
it plays a key role in stabilising the grid and avoiding power outages. Pumped storage 
generators have great leverage in the determination of the SMP's in peak periods. 
The Palmiet scheme additionally provides an ancillary service to the Department of 
Water Affairs, where water from their reservoirs is diverted between river systems during 
pumping or generation. 
The marginal costs of the scheme depend almost wholly on the cost of pumping the 
water from the lower reservoir to the higher one, together the efficiency of the turbine 
in pumping the water relative to the generation capacity of the pumped water. The 
treatment of costs in the simulation model of this thesis is described in more detail 
toward the end of the next chapter. Timing of production and pumping is of the utmost 
importance in the profitability of these types of units. However, the aim of the pending 
model is not to examine the optimal scheduling for the unit in isolation, but rather to 
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study how it copes with the operational and market uncertainties in the new environment 
of uncertain market conditions, energy prices and demands. As mentioned before, the 
specialisation is undertaken with a view to developing a generic model for all types of 
generating plaut. 
4.5 Final Remarks 
This chapter has provided details of the local conditions (and context) for the devel-
opment of the 3imulation model in the forthcoming chapter and the subsequent exper-
imentation in Chapter 6. The scientific importance of the specialisation has also been 
justified through the choice of a Eskom 'Peaking' unit. There are far-reaching social con-
sequences of understanding such units, owing to the vital role they play in the market 
(notwithstanding their extensive market power during peak demand) and in ensuring 
stability of the national grid. 
What follows in the next chapters is the development of a representation of a Peaking-
like unit - in particular a pumped storage scheme - as a single market participant 
exposed to exogenous system demands, prices and costs, and which acts in the market 
so as to maximise its potential profits from generating electricity and selling it via an 
auction mechanism into the Eskom Power Pool. The analysis will be simulation-based 
(as observed in many of the research papers to date) though it will soon become apparent 
that the approach is so mew hat different to those adopted in Chapter 3 and has many of 
its own unique merits. A further characteristic of the approach is that it is exploration-
based and adaptable, the latter being a desirable model characteristic for systems as 
dynamic as modern power markets. 
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Chapter 5 
Generic representation of an 
Eskom-like system 
The aim of this chapter is to develop an investigative simulation model for describing 
the reality of the Eskom trading environment, using the tools of systems thinking. In the 
light of the topics discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, a unique model is developed describing 
the particular strategic environment of a company trading in the Eskom Power Pool. 
A versatile model form is chosen in order to maintain sufficient generality and potential 
to ultimately tackle at least some of the vast range of issues discussed in those chapters. 
Rather than proposing an express goal for the model, it will be developed as a tool for 
adaptive learning, and where possible, modifications will be suggested that will enable a 
more practical implementation in order to achieve more specific goals, such as deciding 
on the optimal bidding strategy for the trader. This idea of 'learning through modelling' 
is indeed characteristic of many of the approaches adopted by other researchers. 
Rather than moving straight toward the proposition of a decision support system for 
a market participant, a model is developed to mimic the actions of a trading Genco. 
The model will enable a discovery of the environment in which the Genco operates 
and highlight the relative importance of both environmental (exogenous) and internal 
(endogenous) factors, as well as any significant interactions present among these factors. 
Firstly, the most important state variables in a market for electricity generation will be 
defined in a general sense, thus comprising the initial step away from reality and toward 
a generic model representation of a system. The actual trading environment is therefore 
described in terms of the state variables, classified as deterministic or stochastic, and 
endogenous or exogenous. A general simulation algorithm describing the participant's 
actions will then be described and will provide a platform for the next section. By this 
stage, a single participant in the generation market will have been represented in the 
most general sense. 
In Section 5.2 the next step toward the development of the model is taken and parametric 
definitions of the simulation variables are given. This step, in turn, is followed by an 
explanation of how the available data were incorporated into the model to represent the 
'actual' values of some of the simulation variables. 
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The penultimate Section 5.3 suggests some initial, simplified trading rules representing 
the trading de< isions of a Genco, then concludes with the final devised simulation algo-
rithm together with explanations and assumptions . The final model incorporates all of 
the defined variables, parameters and trading rules. Some initial parameter values are 
also suggested and motivated. Section 5.4 provides a short summary of the chapter. 
5.1 The Actual 'frading Environment 
5.1.1 State variables in a market for electricity generation 
The following definitions apply to the subsidiary of a single generating company, gener-
ically known a." a Genco. They therefore refer to the variables which the Genco - on 
behalf of its subsidiary unit - explicitly considers in its endeavour to undertake its daily 
operations and trading activities. From a trader's point of view, they are the variables 
most commonly considered as important in the literature. There are many other vari-
ables in the realm of unit commitment, scheduling and system constraints that have 
not been examined in the formulation of the model in this thesis. It is felt that these 
variables were more relevant for research into the power systems of the former monopoly 
industries. Rather than giving them explicit treatment (as many other researchers have 
attempted to do), this modelling approach opts for an implicit treatment of these con-
cepts that will become apparent in the formulation which follows, and in the analyses of 
Chapter 6. Unless otherwise stated, the following state variables take on values at each 
hour of a particular trading day. 
Actual Demand is the actual amount of electricity consumed by the system in a par-
ticular hour, and is only known once the hour is complete and system measurements 
have been recorded. 
Forecasted Demand usually comes from a system operator and is often made known 
publicly. The forecast is based on historical demand with possible inclusion of 
items such as expected weather events, and varies according to long term trends 
and/or cycles, season, day of the week, time of the day (all of which drive the 
actual demand) and random fluctuation. Genco's may conduct their own internal 
forecast of demand in addition to that provided by the System Operator (SO). 
Actual System Marginal Price (SMP) is determined via a clearing mechanism. In 
the clearing mechanism, the total of all aggregated volume offers from the Genco's 
which submit before the deadline, is set equal to the aggregate forecasted demand 
for the particular hour. The SMP is the minimal price at which the aggregate 
supply volume equals the aggregate demand volume. 
Forecasted SMP is based on an historical time series model supplied by the generation 
holding company (Eskom Generation Production and Sales in the South African 
context), though it could be calculated internally by a Genco, based on the ex-
pected outcome of a stochastic process. Refer to Chapters 2 and 3 for examples of 
these models. 
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Marginal cost (MC) (of primary energy) incorporating start-up and running costs 
and inventories of fuels e.g. coal, fuel oil (diesel) , gas or uranium reserves for a 
thermal generator and ; reservoir levels , river flow , damn levels for hydro/pumped 
storage generators. The MC is calculated for a particular generating hour via an 
internal forecast that will depend on exogenous factors such as fossil fuel prices, 
rainfall, evaporation, and wind speed (for a wind farm) . When calculating their 
marginal costs, generators will also have to take into account their efficiency: the 
heat rate in the case of a thermal generator and pumping efficiency in the case of 
a pumped storage scheme. 
Fixed costs are the fixed running costs of the plant. They are costs incurred regardless 
of whether any generation takes place, for example capital costs, plant maintenance 
and labour costs. An important element of the so-called fixed costs are those of 
maintaining the plant and are quite often known in advance from the maintenance 
schedule, however costs of restoration after an unplanned outages or plant failure 
will also have to be factored into the long term fixed cost. Generators quite often 
build their recovery of fixed costs into the return they aim for above their variable 
costs. As they are largely fixed items, we could still treat them as hourly variables 
by dividing the total costs incurred over a year by the number of hours in the year . 
A perhaps better approach would be to treat all profits as contributions to the 
fixed running costs of a plant. 
Profit Margin is the amount determined at the end of each generating hour , or in 
practice after the market 's final settlement mechanism has been completed, and 
after the net revenues or losses from the hedging positions have been taken into 
account. Traditionally, 
Profit = Total Revenue - Total Cost 
The effect of interest earned on cash flows is ignored for the purposes of this 
dissertation. 
Offer curve is the set of price-quantity pairs. It is the crucial decision variable in the 
trading process and is determined with reference to profit requirements (e.g. via 
performance contracts), availability, previous day's bidding strategy and expected 
competitor behaviour. The trader decides how much to offer and at what price 
level. This decision depend on his expectations of SMP's, MC's, system demand 
and competitor behaviour. The trader's decision comprises both unit commitment 
and strategic bidding. It is common for a unit to have fixed batches of volume 
available per hour (depending of course on the type of unit we are dealing with). 
Thus the decision will consist of a two-part process: 
1. The "When" of the decision: Is it profitable to generate at all in a particular 
hour? If so, 
2. The "How much" element: At what prices should the batches of power be 
made available? 
More details on optimal bids are given in Section 3.4 
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Other Genco offers (bids) are effectively imposed on a particular Genco via the SMP 
market-clearing mechanism (unless the company concerned can knowingly influ-
ence the SMP outcome through its own actions in the market). Other companies' 
bids are only known in retrospect , though a Genco would wish to have advance 
insights into how their competitors will offer before they submit their own bids. 
They could 'guess' competitor offers from past behaviour and expected deviations, 
or simply treat forecasted SMP as a single exogenous variable summarising the 
aggregate actions of all competitors. The interpretation of competitors' offers will 
depend on the price-taking (or price-setting) capability of the company. A more 
in-depth discussion of supply functions is given in Section 3.3. 
Production unit status is the actual state of the units at the end of the previous 
generating hour. It may be "generating", "not generating" or "unavailable" (owing 
to planned or unplanned outages). If "generating", then at what output? Planned 
outages make the unit unavailable; unplanned outages may follow some parametric 
distribution, and can effectively occur at any time in the pending hour. With most 
thermal units , this status will influence the amount of start-up/ shut-down costs 
to be incmred in the following hour if the company decides to commit/decommit 
their unit for the hour and if their offer is then accepted/declined. 
Hedged positions may be in place where contracts for generation have been pre-sold 
for a fixed price. There may also be existing positions in derivatives contracts to 
which th(' unit may be a party for the particular hour. Such positions will also 
affect the trading decision for that hour. It may be that a decision ought to be 
taken to initiate derivative contracts for future periods. 
Having defined the eleven key state variables of a realistic market from the perspective 
of a single Genco, the specifics of the stochastic simulation model can now be defined 
along with the relevant simulation parameters. 
5.1.2 Time structure 
Firstly, we need to define the time-step for the simulation and the time-frame for the 
investigation. 
Increment 
An hourly increment is the most appropriate for a short to medium term investigation 
horizon. In the EPP, offers for all 24 hours of the following day are submitted prior to 
a predetermined. cut-off time (unlike the 48 half-hourly periods in the E&W market) . 
Moreover, all of the major measurements for demand (in MWh) , SMP (in units of 
currency per MWh) and MC (per MWh) are calculated hourly. The hour is therefore 
the obvious choice for the lowest-level, indivisible, discrete time increment. 
108 
Endogenous Exogenous 
Forecasted SMP Actual SMP 
Forecasted Demand Actual Demand 
Forecasted MC Actual MC 
Offer Curve Other Genco Offer Curves 
Fixed Costs 
Production Unit status 
Profit Margin 
Table 5.1: Endogenous and exogenous state variables 
Horizon 
The time-frame for an initial investigation is initially chosen as one year, so that we could 
for example have an investigation horizon ofT= 365 x 24 = 8760 individual production 
periods. At the outset of the investigation, this choice is clearly arbitrary and can easily 
be amended according to the purpose of the simulation. The intended approach will be 
to measure the performance of a trader over a specified period (such as a month or year) 
under various scenarios rather than adopting the single period (hourly or daily) analyses 
of many researchers as noted in Chapter 3. 
5.1.3 Classification 
Now that the temporal context of the simulation has been stated, we can now classify 
the state variables for a generic Genco in the EPP system. 
Endogenous and Exogenous variables 
Endogenous state variables, in context of the formulation, are those which depend on 
the activities of the Genco under study. To an extent they are 'controllable' by the 
company. In contrast the exogenous state variables are those externally imposed on the 
Genco, having their own fundamental drivers that determine their outcomes. Through 
the actions of the Genco in the market, personal perceptions of the exogenous variables 
are created, resulting in some of the endogenous variables. The classification in this 
regard is given in Table 5.1 In some cases the classification is not well defined e.g. 
"production unit status" could be exogenous in the case of a peaking-type plant where 
a sudden commitment of plant may be required, or an active unit shut down. 
Deterministic and Stochastic variables 
From a generation cluster's perspective, state variables may be viewed as either deter-
ministic or stochastic. Some of the stochastic variables may be truly deterministic (e .g. 
if we were studying the entire system of Genco's and knew what offers they had sub-
mitted we would know exactly what the SMP would be), however from the perspective 
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Deterministic Stochastic 
Forecasted SMP Actual SMP 
Forecasted Demand Actual Demand 
Forecasted MC Actual MC 
Offer Curve Other Genco Offer Curves 
Fixed Costs 
Production Unit status 
Profit Margin 
Table 5.2: Deterministic and stochastic state variables 
of an individual generator they are imposed as stochastic variables. In simpler terms, 
in this context stochastic simply means unknown to the Genco at the time of decision-
making (e.g. Actual SMP is endogenous to the system as a whole and stochastic from 
the perspective of a price-taking Genco). See Table 5.2 for the classification. 
5.1.4 Trading Algorithm 
A generic hourly trading process is enumerated in the steps below which provide a broad 
overview of the actual hourly trading process. The corresponding simulation algorithm 
will be given in Section 5.3 . 
1. Read forecast values of demand (from SO), SMP's (from internal forecasts), 
marginal cost (estimates) and unit availability. 
2. Estimate rival Genco offers and take into account the Genco-of-interest's required 
profit margins (if unit is available) while evaluating the previous day's performance 
for the corresponding hour. Examine the current hedged position and any other 
derivative positions that are affected by our actions, or take out hedging arrange-
ments if possible and if deemed necessary. 
3. Calculate the offer price(s) and associated capacity(ies) that maximise expected 
profits allowing for these conjectures and submit offers to the SO. 
4. SO determines the SMP by aggregating all the offers from the Genco's to form a 
system supply function, and recording the price at which the total demand forecast 
for the hour intersects this supply function. Contracts for generation for each hour 
are then allocated to the winning Genco's which have offers lower than (or at) the 
SMP. The allocation is the mechanism through which the market is cleared. 
5. Genco generates the amount contracted for the hour (if any). 
6. Calculate actual profits or losses from quantity generated, SMP and actual MC 
incurred. Accumulate profits made or losses incurred to the end of the investigation 
period then evaluate and assess performance. 
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Note: 
• We shall, for the purposes of the simulation, assume that the trades and clearing 
mechanism for each hour occur immediately prior to the real-time period . lu 
practice, a day-ahead market exists where trades for each of the 24 hours occur 
in advance and all at once on the preceding day. The formulation above therefore 
implies an initial simplification. 
• The above algorithm specifically ignores the effects of ancillary serves and reserves 
markets (both of which are often subject to a separate treatment from that of the 
main market anyway). 
• The algorithm could be modified to incorporate the employment of simple hedging 
contracts and their effects on the decisions and profit margins. Such contracts 
could effectively lock into a fixed price for generation prior to the clearing process, 
though the quantities and other terms of such contracts would have to be specified. 
The above has shown the general context for systems thinking for a generation market 
such as the EPP. The context may be refined in many ways to achieve a desired represen-
tation. The actual formulation that now follows represents a particular instance of such 
a refinement . It was necessary to define the general context above as a basis for future 
model development or as part of a possible proposal for a commercial implementation. 
5.2 Variable Definitions and Model Parameterisation 
In this section we describe a particular formulation of the model to simulate the opera-
tions of the trading environment described above. There are many simplifications and 
choices that will be made, and they will be governed by the limitations on the level of 
detail provided by the managers of the Eskom Peaking Cluster as described in Chapter 4. 
The simplifications and choices will be explained during the course of the formulation 
that follows. 
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5.2.1 Variable definitions: 
N Thf~ number of simulation iterations. 
t Hour of generation, t = 0, 1, 2, ... , T. Here, T is the investigation 
horizon which we can arbitrarily choose as one year. 1 
Da the natural logarithm (log) of actual system demand which is the total 
power load required by consumers from the pool for each hour. 
Df log(Forecasted system demand) = Da+ forecasting error. 
Ca log(Actual variable MC (Marginal Cost)); incurred per MWh of gen-
eration. 
Cf log(Forecasted variable MC) = Ca+ forecasting error. 
Sa log(SMP); determined by the SO after the offer deadline. 
Sf log(Forecasted SMP) =Sa+ forecasting error. 
F the fixed cost incurred by a generator, regardless of whether or not 
the unit is contracted (as described earlier, they will henceforth be 
assumed to be zero, and the profits treated as contributions to fixed 
costs). 
y the marginal offer price that the trader calculates with reference to 
his conjectures/forecasts. For a unit that has more than one bin of 
capacity, y is a vector of cumulative offer prices. 
g the capacity associated with each price offered. It indicates the max-
imum (or fixed) quantity the unit is willing to generate at each price. 
For a unit that offers a set of cumulative prices, g is a vector of asso-
ciated cumulative volumes per hour. 
P the actual profit made in each time period 
Therefore 
P={ g X exp(Sa)- g X exp(Ca) 0 if offer accepted if no offer made or offer not accepted 
5.2.2 Parametric definitions of variables 
The Actuals: 
Actual system demand: The logarithm of demand, Da(t), is modelled as follows: 
Da(t) = 11f + 1f 
where 
Mf JLD + df + hf + mf 
"ff rrtf!-1 + (1 - p)8t 
so that actual demand is given by exp(Da(t)). In this formulation, 
1 All variables from Da down are explicit functions oft though the functionality has been dropped for 
ease of presentation. 
112 
11D = annual mean log demand 
df = effect on log demand attributed to the day j = 1, ... , 7 
of the week 
hf = effect on log demand attributed to hourly k = 1, ... , 24 
variation 
effect on log demand attributed to inter- l = 1, ... , 12 
month variation (seasonal effect) 
The indexes j, k and l refer to the day, hour and month implied by t and, 
7 24 12 
I: df = I: hf = I: df = o. 
j=l k=l 1=1 
It can be seen that the actual demand consists of a deterministic component rep-
resented by 11f's, and a stochastic component, denoted by the rf's. 
11f is an explicit function of time, allowing for trends, cycles and seasons - though 
an actual history of hourly values, read from a database could be used instead. 
In the case of the latter, one is assuming that the data capture all the temporal 
characteristics of the demand variable's behaviour. However, for the remainder 
of the model development, we shall be confined to the use of the additive effects 
model described above. 
The form of rf, which models the unexplained bumps and shocks that occur in 
reality, is initially chosen to be an autoregressive time series process. A simpler 
alternative would be to assume that the rf's are zero and the Actuals therefore 
have no stochasticity (i.e. utilising an historical record of realised values). Such 
a deterministic model would deliver little insight into the relationships between 
the parameters of interest. The stochasticity is an essential part of the modelling 
process. Assuming an autoregressive process of order 1, a smoothing parameter, 
p and process variance u~ results in the exponential smoothing process for the 
stochastic errors represented by rf. 
Actual SMP: The logarithm of hourly system prices is modelled in exactly the same 
manner as system demand: 
where 
11f 118 + dff + h~ + mf 
rf Prf-1 + (1 - p)bt 
so that actual SMP is given by exp(Sa(t)). In this formulation 
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f.Ls = annual mean SMP 
ds = effect on SMP attributed to the day of the j = 1, . .. , 7 
J 
week 
h~ = effect on SMP attributed to hourly variation k = 1, .. . , 24 
mf = effect on SMP attributed to between-month l = 1, ... , 12 
variation (seasonal effect) 
bt rv N(O, a;) (independently of those of 1P). 
Once again we have 
7 24 12 
2: df = 2: h~ = 2: df = o. 
j = l k=l 1= 1 
Actual Marginal Cost: for a generic generator, the model for Ca(t) will depend on 
the particular costing model used by the generator, which depends on the type of 
generating unit. 
For a thPrmal generator whose MC depends directly on the price of the primary 
energy commodity, we could model the logarithm of the hourly cost in a manner 
analogous to SMP and Demand. In the case of a fuel or coal-fired generator, the 
cost would be modelled as a function of the underlying diesel or coal acquisition 
prices resulting in a similarly structured parameterisation as that of ILP and f.Lr 
and with: 
However. in the specialisation that follows, the model is directed toward a pumped 
storage scheme. The underlying costs will therefore be a function of the SMP values 
in the hours when the trader chooses to pump to the upper reservoir (effectively 
supplying the potential for generation in later periods) . This functionality will 
depend on the pumping efficiency of the scheme and the commitment decision 
for the number of hours for pumping and for production. The reasons for the 
specialisation were described in Chapter 4. 
The treatment of the cost variable is very important and leads us into the realm 
of cost function analysis. The particular treatment used in the simulation will be 
detailed in the simulation algorithm in the next section. 
Trader conjectures 
In contrast to the above parameterisations for the Actuals, we simulate the trader's 
conjectures as follows: 
DJ(t) = Da(t) + ED 
SJ(t) = Sa(t) + ES 
where ED rv N((D, a'b) 
where ES rv N((s,a~) 
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and for a thermal generator, 
(The actual treatment of C f ( t) is different for a pumped storage scheme and attention 
is drawn to the simulation algorithm of the next section for the treatment of C1(t) and 
Ca(t) .) 
The above conjectures imply that the trader can estimate the true values of the system 
variables with levels of bias and precision that indicate his proficiency and knowledge of 
the system, and the quality and quantity of the information at his disposal. By choosing 
values for ~D and ~s other than zero, we are saying the trader has a biased forecast 
of the system variables. Similarly we can control his 'forecasting precision' by setting 
various levels for OD and as. 
5.2.3 The Data 
Eskom Peaking Cluster were able to supply some representative data for one of their 
pumped storage units. Included in the spreadsheet were the variable values for each 
hour in 2003. i.e. hourly SMP, National Load, Quantity Bid for Pumping, Actual 
Quantity Pumped, Actual Generation, Dam Level and MC. From these figures it could 
be ascertained that the efficiency of the scheme was approximately 76%. Efficiency is 
calculated by dividing the total power generated for the year by the total power used 
for pumping. Unfortunately they were unable to supply a record of their offers made. A 
record of the historical offers would have enabled a quantitative discovery of the offering 
strategy which they employed over the year, over and above the somewhat incomplete 
qualitative explanation that was given in Chapter 4 
The fixed effects models were fitted for Demand and SMP using (natural logarithms of) 
the true hourly values for 2003 to obtain the seasonality factors defined earlier on. The 
factors are shown in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 and were calculated using a Visual Basic routine 
in Microsoft Excel. 
Table 5.3 gives the factors for the model, 
J.Lf = f..LD + hf + df/ + mf, 
while Table 5.4 shows the factors for the model, 
J.Lf = f..Ls + hJ + d~ + mf. 
It can be seen even from these crude models that the effects are as we expect them to 
be for hours of the day, days of the week and months of the year, and with a reasonable 
amount of similarity in sign and size between demand and SMP effects. As expected, 
the loads and prices are greater in winter months. There are morning/evening peaks and 
the load is greater on weekdays than weekends (when other factors considered equal). 
With regard to MC's, the data are representative of a pumped storage scheme, and 
a glance over the figures suggests that pumping generally takes place in the six lowest 
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Hourly Effects Daily Effects Monthly Effects 
Hour j hlf Day k df Month l mf 
00:00 1 -0.104 Monday 1 0.007 January 1 -0.066 
01:00 2 -0.139 Tuesday 2 0.032 February 2 -0.030 
02:00 3 -0.156 Wednesday 3 0.032 March 3 -0.032 
03:00 4 -0.165 Thursday 4 0.030 April 4 -0.046 
04:00 5 -0.164 Friday 5 0.021 May 5 0.002 
05:00 6 -0.145 Saturday 6 -0.036 June 6 0.042 
06:00 7 -0.084 Sunday 7 -0.086 July 7 0.055 
07:00 8 0.004 August 8 0.032 
08:00 9 0.053 September 9 0.010 
09:00 10 0.085 October 10 0.032 
10:00 11 0.084 November 11 0.026 
11:00 12 0.084 December 12 -0.024 
12:00 13 0.076 
13:00 14 0.063 
14:00 15 0.042 
15:00 16 0.030 
16:00 17 0.029 
17:00 18 0.033 
18:00 19 0.060 
19:00 20 0.110 
20:00 21 0.130 
21:00 22 0.097 
22:00 23 0.025 
23:00 I 24 -0.046 
I Total: 1 o.ooo 1 1 o.ooo 1 1 o.ooo 1 
1-LD w&S calculated to be 10.095, equating to an overall average hourly 
demand of exp(10.095) = 24, 222MWh. 
Table 5.3: Fixed effects factors for log system demand 
SMP hours oft he day, usually from around 23:00 to 05:00 in order to keep their pumping 
costs as low as possible. Once again, had we been dealing with another type of plant, the 
modelling strategy would be to obtain price (and volume) data on the energy commodity 
consumed by a particular plant and information on its heat rote (or energy conversion 
efficiency). Ca and Cf are specified as being different. For other types of generator, the 
MC's may be known (and fixed) in advance of the trading hour. For example, a thermal 
generator may have hedged their purchase of primary energy or simply know the energy 
value of their inventory. 
The stochastic terms for the Actuals (i.e. the 'Yt 's) will be added to the fitted determin-
istic values during the simulation routine. 
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Hourly Effects Daily Effects Monthly Effects 
Hour j h1 Day k dZ Month l mf 
00:00 1 -0.557 Monday 1 0.026 January 1 0.021 
01:00 2 -0.614 1\1esday 2 0.095 February 2 0.277 
02:00 3 -0.651 Wednesday 3 0.080 March 3 0.303 
03:00 4 -0.665 Thursday 4 0.078 April 4 0.061 
04:00 5 -0.595 Friday 5 0.085 May 5 -0.079 
05:00 6 -0.289 Saturday 6 -0.090 June 6 -0.214 
06:00 7 0.102 Sunday 7 -0.272 July 7 -0.300 
07:00 8 0.191 August 8 -0.175 
08:00 9 0.408 September 9 -0.165 
09:00 10 0.288 October 10 0.072 
10:00 11 0.387 November 11 0.229 
11:00 12 0.493 December 12 -0.031 
12:00 13 0.326 
13:00 14 0.121 
14:00 15 0.022 
15:00 16 0.027 
16:00 17 0.007 
17:00 18 -0.028 
18:00 19 0.675 
19:00 20 0.789 
20:00 21 0.370 
21:00 22 -0.057 
22:00 23 -0.277 
23:00 24 -0.473 
I Total: I 1 o.ooo 1 1 o.ooo 1 1 o.ooo 
f-Ls was calculated to be 4.364, equating to an overall average hourly 
pool price of exp(4.364) = R78.57. 
Table 5.4: Fixed effects factors for log SMP 
5.3 The Simulation Model 
This section explains the trading rules used in the simulation and defines the parameters 
of a detailed algorithm for the case of a Genco which is able to exert a specified amount 
of influence on the realised SMP for each hour. The simulated decision process reflects 
reality where there is a daily, rather than hourly decision period, allowing the Genco to 
schedule their offers for the entire day in advance of the clearing mechanism. At the 
time of market clearing, once all Genco's have submitted their offers, the true values of 
the actual system variables become known. 
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5.3.1 Decision rules 
The next important component of the simulation is the decision rule of the trader. In 
this instance w·~ construct a two-fold rule, defining 
1. when to trade: this essentially governs the unit commitment question. 
2. what quantities and associated price levels are to be offered in the periods when a 
commitment is made: in essence this is the supply function we submit to the SO. 
Clearly both of these elements will be functionally dependent on the trader's conjectures 
as modelled above. 
Note: Two important simplifications will be made with regard to the supply 
function from this point on. 
• The supply function,y is a scalar and there is no decision to be made on quantity. 
Only one price is offered for a single block of output i.e. g is fixed. We are assuming 
the generating unit has a fixed capacity available and when contracted generates 
this full capacity. This assumption is reasonable for the single production unit in 
this model since tranches/blocks are more representative of a cluster of units that 
wish to offer their owned units at cumulative rates. In the latter case y would have 
been be a vector of prices. 
• FUrther justification for a fixed capacity is that price is a variable which is function-
ally dependent on quantity (e.g. it may be linear and a choice of quantity would 
be associated with a particular price.) This approach is vindicated by references 
in Chapter 3 which postulate that even when there is a more complex supply func-
tion, the choice of supply function is simply a choice of either price or quantity, 
but not both. A fixed capacity has been assumed here. FUrthermore, in reality 
not all of the capacity agreed in the trade will actually be generated owing to 
real-time fluctuations in demand and system constraints, and some capacity may 
be contracted in other markets such as reserves and ancillary services. A more 
detailed discussion on this matter has been given in Section 3.3. 
The following trading rules are thus proposed: 
1. An two-part simple, initial rule governing when to trade would be a combination 
of: 
(a) 
Dt(t) > d 
whE·re d is a constant with a value in the range of possible demand values 
and, 
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(b) 
where f is a constant between, say 0 and 2. 
It is clearly possible to increase the complexity of this rule, but it is a reasonable 
one in the early stages of the modelling process. We can justify this assumption 
in the context of a Peaking unit that only comes into the market when it is felt 
that reasonable profits can be made at the margins of peak demand, AND when 
expected SMP's are at a sufficient level relative to expected MC. One would expect, 
for example, to benefit from the higher price levels associated with higher levels 
of system demand at the 'peaks' without wanting to commit when SMP's are 
expected to be too low relative to expected MC's. 
2. The second stage of the trading rule is deciding on an appropriate price, y(t) , 
at which to offer the unit's capacity, g. For simplicity we currently assume the 
available output from the generating plant is fixed and contracted in its entirety 
in the event of a successful bid. 
A flexible initial rule for this variable is to assume an offer of 
This rule restricts the offer to being above the expected MC and below the expected 
SMP. Clearly one could build in greater complexity here by building in a required 
return on marginal cost, and a possible recovery of fixed and capital costs into our 
offer, say 
y(t) = CJ(I + r) 
where r is the required return on MC. The formula merely demonstrates a possibil-
ity; given the relevance of price-formation it is preferable to propose an offer price 
which in a modelling context allows us to explore the consequences of offering our 
capacity at a price close to our expected MC, or at a price closer to our expected 
SMP. So, in keeping with the logical choices for offer prices, we define the offer 
price as follows: 
y(t) = { ~ · exp(SJ(t)) + (1- p) · exp(C1(t)) if sf ( t) 2: c f ( t) 
otherwise 
where p E [0; I] in effect defines the policy to be adopted. A value of p close to 0 
indicates a trading policy of making offers near to marginal cost and a value close 
to 1 indicates a policy of making offers near the conjectured SMP. 
For the pumped storage scheme, C f is a function of the expected prices in the hours 
selected by the trader for pumping (such as the average of the six lowest divided 
by the efficiency, e) and Ca will depend on the realised prices in those hours. It is 
important to note that the performance of the trader will depend significantly on 
the selection of pumping and generating hours he/she makes. 
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Explanations and assumptions 
In order to clarify some of the modelling choices , the following points need to be made: 
1. The trading operation of a single generating unit is considered, though typically 
a cluster (or Genco) trades on behalf of each of its subsidiary generators with an 
objective that is aggregated over all of them. 
2. We are examining an hourly trading process in which offers are (theoretically) 
made at the beginning of each hour. Settlement of transactions and performance 
assessments are effectively carried out at the end of each hour. In reality, 24 hourly 
offers are submitted all at once, and a day in advance of the actual trading hours. 
The settlement and assessment take place at some point after the actual production 
day is completed. 
3. We have simplified the model by restricting the decision process to one of deciding 
on an appropriate offer price given exogenous system demand, SMP and MC. We 
are assuming the unit has a fixed capacity specified by g, and when contracted, all 
of this available capacity is in fact generated. In practice, a set of price-quantity 
pairs is submitted to the SO, representing generating unit's supply function. The 
latter realistically assumes that the capacity which the unit is prepared to offer 
into the market is allocated to a set of bins, the prices increasing incrementally 
with each bin. Also, capacity - as opposed to demand - is the true determinant 
of price in the supply function sense. 
4. By taking the natural logarithms of SMP and Demand we are effectively assuming 
that any stochasticity that is present is multiplicative, and hence that the errors 
in the forecasted variables (the 'forecast accuracies') are proportional. Additive 
errors could be assumed if we were to use the original antilogarithmic values rather 
than the logarithmic transforms. 
5. The forecasted values, Sf and D f represent the trader's conjectures about what 
their actual values will be. In the modelling process we can control the extent of 
accuracy with which we endow the trader. In the definition above, we have propor-
tional errors (c:'s) with error biases characterised by their sampling distributions' 
means (the es) and variances ( 0"2 's). 
6. The incidence and effects of planned or unplanned outages on the generating unit's 
strategy have been ignored, though it is possible to factor in a schedule of planned 
outages, and add a Poisson-type variable to the market clearing process to allow 
for unplanned down-times and unscheduled maintenance costs. 
7. We have ignored the effect of price-hedging mechanisms (e.g. two-way CFD's) and 
derivative positions on the offer price decision. This assumption could be amended 
by adding a hedge term to the profit functions and amending the decision process 
for y. The effect of the "Production Unit Status" variable on the trading decision 
has also been ignored. The assumption is therefore a further simplification of 
reality and essentially a part of the unit commitment problem faced by Genco's 
in the actual market. In the day-ahead market we thus assume that the unit is 
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available in any hour and there are no restrictions on length of production period 
or on numbers of start-ups and shut-downs. 
8. The generating unit has thus-far been assumed to be a price-taker in the market , 
i.e. our choice for y(t) has no effect on the realised value of Sa. The 'price-taker' 
assumption will be modified in the simulation algorithm where we define a modified 
SMP in hour t , 
S~(t) = {Jy(t) + (1- {J) exp(Sa(t)) 
where {J then represents the propensity of the Genco to influence price ({J = 0 
implies no such influence and {J = 1 would mean that the actual SMP is equal to 
y(t) , their offer price). 
9. The stochastic errors bt's) are independently sampled for SMP and demand. They 
are generated and sampled independently though this independence is not obvious 
due to the same parametric definition having been used. Moreover, independence 
has been identified as an area for further exploration in this model, as one could 
incorporate a correlation structure between the two variables (three if we included 
costs), resulting in a multivariate autoregressive process for the stochastic errors. 
10. Following on from the point above, one notes that the stochastic errors ( 8t 's), share 
a common, though independently sampled, normal distribution, N(O, a .. ?) . The 
implied stochastic variability is therefore the same for demand as it is for SMP 
in the current formulation. An alternative formulation would have either a pair 
of unique normal variates, or a correlated sampling distribution for the stochastic 
errors leading to a dependency similar that described in the previous point. For 
the remainder of the dissertation however, a-y will contains all the information on 
the global stochasticity of the model. 
5.3.2 Parameters 
The following table summarises the simulation parameters and their basic definit ions: 
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Parameter Description 
number of simulation iterations 
investigation horizon (days) 
the fixed running costs 
fixed capacity offered and generated (MWh) 
smoothing parameter for Actuals ' stochasticity 
standard deviation of stochasticity in Actuals 
estimation bias for log demand 
estimation bias for log SMP 
precision for estimate of log demand 
precision for estimate of log SMP 
number of hours for pumping and generation 
demand threshold for offer strategy (MWh) 
relative proportion of Sf to C f for offer strategy 
proportion of [CJ , St ] above Ct for offer price 
the efficiency parameter for a pumped-storage scheme 
The influence parameter for the price-setter simulation 
5.3.3 The Price-setter Simulation Algorithm 
An abbreviated and simplified simulation algorithm is outlined here in nine generic steps. 
1. For a particular simulation, set N, T, ~D, ~s, as, aD, p, a-y, e, g , d, j, p, e, f3 and h. 
The parameters define the exogenous context and decision rules being simulated. 
2. Calculate the deterministic components of Da(t) and Sa(t) for all hours t = 1 to 
24 x T i.•~. determine J.J.f and J.J.f for all t. 
3. For each iteration, i = 1, . .. , N: 
(a) Set 1f? and 16 equal to 0. 
(b) Set SumP(O), SumO(O) and SumA(O) equal to zero where SumP(d), 
SumO(d) and SumA(d) are the respective accumulated profits, offers made 
and offers accepted at the end of day d. 
4. For each day, d = 1 toT in each iteration, call the DAILY TRADING MODULE: 
5. DAILY TRADING MODULE: 
(a) Generate hourly stochastic noise factors 
For j = 1 to 24 
'Yf+24(d-l) = nf-_1+24(d- l) + (1 - p)N(O, a-y 2) 
'Yf+24(d-I) = nf-1+24(d-I) + (1- p)N(O, a-y 2) 
(Note, the N(O, a-y 2 ) 's are independent for Da and Sa) 
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(b) Calculate hourly forecasts of demand and SMP 
Dt(j + 24(d- 1)) = ~-tf-1+24(d- 1) + 'Yf-1+24(d-1) +ED 
St(j + 24(d- 1)) = 1-LI-I+24(d-I) + 'Yf-I+24(d-I) + cs 
(c) Sort the arrays of Dt and Sf by values of Sf from largest to smallest 
and read in the ordered values 
(d) Calculate forecasted and actual MC (MGt and MGa) by averaging 
the h smallest values of exp(SJ )/e and exp(Sa)/e respectively. 
(e) Calculate the number of possible offers according to strategy rules: 
For remaining 'non-pumping' hours: If Dt(j) > d and St(j) > f x MC then 
offer(j) = 1 
Else: offer(j) = 0 
countoffer(j) = countoffer(j- 1) + offer(j) 
Next j 
(f) Submit offers for the relevant hours (up to h): 
For all 'non-pumping' hours: If countoffer(24) ::::; h then SUBMIT OFFER 
when offer(j) = 1 
Elseif countoffer(24) > h Then set s =hth largest of the (Sf (j)) and SUBMIT 
OFFER when St(j) ~ s 
SUBMIT OFFER: y(j) = MGt+ p(exp(SJ(j))- MGt) 
Next j SumO( d) = min[countoffer(24), h] 
(g) Calculate "influenced" SMP's taking into account the influence of 
y(j): 
For all 'non-pumping' hours: When offer(j) = 1 
S~(j) = {Jy(j) + (1- fJ) exp(Sa(j)) 
Next j 
(h) Market clearing module: If offer accepted, calculate profit and ac-
cumulate. 
For all 'non-pumping' hours: 
If y(j) ::::; s~ (j) then acc(j) = 1. 
P(j) = (S~(j)- MGa) x g 
Else acc(j) = 0 and P(j) = 0 
SumA(j) = SumA(j- 1) + acc(j) 
SumP(j) = SumP(j- 1) + P(j) 
Next j 
SumA(d) = SumA(24) and SumP(d) = SumP(24) 
6. Accumulate the SumP(d)'s, SumO(d)'s and SumA(d)'s toT. 
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7. After the last time period in each iteration, store the cumulative profits, offers made 
and offers accepted over the investigation horizon, namely SumP(T), SumO(T) 
and SumA.(T) . 
8. Calculate maxima, minima, averages and standard deviations of the SumP(T) 's, 
SumO(T) 's and SumA(T) 's at the end of each experiment. 
9. Change ~J), ~s, us, uo, p, u"f, e, g, d, f, p, e, (3 and h according to the experimental 
design and repeat the simulation, summarising the results after each experiment. 
A diagram of the trading algorithm is given in Figure 5.1 and the Visual Basic code is 
included in the Appendix. 
A note on the output 
For each iteration, the values stored are the profits accumulated to the end of the time 
horizon, the number of offers that were accepted, and the number of offers made for 
the same horizon. All of these 'response' variables will be kept should an analysis of the 
number of offers made or accepted be required, or perhaps even an analysis of the nature 
of the relationship between the responses, given their obvious positive (though imperfect) 
correlation. The program will output the means, standard deviations, maxima and 
minima of the three response variables for each simulation experiment that is undertaken. 
5.3.4 Summary of Model Formulation 
Parameter Values 
The following table again summarises the simulation parameters (with shortened defi-
nitions) and gives some initial values that were used in some preliminary test runs of 
the algorithm. The parameters will be classified in more detail before the results and 
analyses of Chapter 6: 
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Parameter1 Description Initial Values 
N number of simulation iterations 100 
T investigation horizon (days) 365 
F the fixed running costs 0 
g fixed capacity offered and generated (MWh) 100 
p smoothing parameter for Actuals' stochasticity 0.3 
(J"'Y standard deviation of stochasticity in Actuals 0.15 
~D estimation bias for log demand 0 
~s estimation bias for log SMP 0 
O"D precision for estimate of log demand 0.1 
O"S precision for estimate of log SMP 0.1 
h number of hours for pumping (and for generation) 10 
d demand threshold for offer strategy (MWh) 20,000 
f relative proportion of Sf to C f for offer strategy 1 
p proportion of [CJ, St] above Ct for ofler price 0.5 
e the efficiency parameter for a pumped-storage scheme 0.76 
(3 the price-influence parameter 0.2 
Justification 
1. A value for N of 100 was chosen since the frequency distribution of profit outcomes 
in some test runs appeared sufficiently smooth at this level. Higher values were not 
justified for the amount of extra processing time required, and lower values tended 
to lead to more random outcomes across profit bins in the plotted histograms. 
2. The horizon, T was set to one year's worth of hours (8,760) in order to capture 
the deterministic variation of the three Actuals over an entire year (2003 in this 
instance) . Shortening this horizon may have distorted the profit outcomes by 
biasing the model to a shorter period of the year, though simulation running time 
is potentially long for a full year horizon. 
3. The value for F was kept at zero as explained earlier. For actual implementation, 
further data would be required from Eskom Peaking Cluster. 
4. The notion of fixed capacity (g = lOOMWh) is an obvious model simplification as 
explained earlier in this chapter. In practice, it is possible to simultaneously vary 
(by submitting a step-like supply function) both price and quantity when offering 
production for a particular hour. We are therefore now assuming that this unit is 
only capable of generating a constant 100 Megawatts in an hour, and that when 
contracted it does in fact generate this amount. The has the potential to be varied. 
Some of the literature (e.g. [9, 13, 34, 50]) supports such a simplification in the 
sense that an offer is merely an allocation of capacity to fixed price bins, such that 
the offer involves the choice of one variable's value (i.e. price or quantity) rather 
than a selection of two (In the case of a linear supply function, it is only required 
1Values for parameters p to {3 will be varied depending on the run number in the experimental plans 
in Chapter 6. 
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to choose one of the coefficients of the linear equation [52, 53]) . A further separate 
model modification would be to permit the amount actually generated to have 
a random outcome, introducing uncertainty with regard to the amount actually 
required by the system operator in real time. Such a modification would have to 
be made without regard to reserves markets and ancillary services which would 
complicate the model formulation and detract from its current exploratory goals. 
5. The smoothing parameter p is given an initial value of 0.3 allowing a 'moderately 
large' amount of smoothing. 
6. The stochastic uncertainty, a, is given an initial value of 0.15 (~ 0.1/(1- p)) which 
is equivalent to an error of approximately 20% (see table 6.2 on 137 in Chapter 6) . 
7. The forecasting biases, ~D and ~s have been set equal to 0 and could, for example, 
be varied for an investigation into trader proficiency. 
5.3.5 Some Important Issues 
Under the headings that follow points that follow, some light is shed on some important 
attributes of the simulation model, clarifying some of the issues that may not be obvious 
from the point-by-point algorithm in subsection 5.3.3. 
Fixed Costs 
Fixed costs, F have been removed from the model; all profits generated can be assumed 
to be contributions to fixed costs. 
Marginal Costs 
We could have set CJ(t) = Ca(t) + cc if we wished to include add an additional level 
of trader uncertainty with respect to the pumping efficiency parameter, e (or any other 
variations on the theme of cost function analysis). In general, the formulated treatment 
of costs is by no means a true reflection of reality, though it does provoke insight and has 
the potential to be modified with further cooperation from Eskom Peaking. Demand-side 
bidding may (at the time of writing) have already been implemented for the purchase of 
off-peak pumping power and would in effect alter the formulation substantially were it 
to be commercially adapted. 
Pumping/generating hours 
The choice for h in the initial runs the number of pumping hours (and hence the max-
imum number of generating hours) is somewhat arbitrary. Empirical evidence suggests 
that the scheme pumps for roughly 40% of the hours of the year and generates for the 
same proportion (obviously in non-coinciding time periods). The evidence equates to 
roughly 10 hours of pumping and 10 hours of generating each day. It is rare for the 
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scheme to pump less than 6 hours a day with the bulk of pumping happening in the 
six lowest demand periods of the day. Further insights could be achieved by treating 
the parameter h as a daily decision variable whereby the trader may decide each day 
what the optimal number of hours to generate/pump should be for that day. Indeed the 
alternative treatment is true of the other decision variables as well. The choice would be 
functionally dependent on the forecasted values of SMP and Demand as before. Clearly 
h would be an obvious decision variable in a profit optimality routine, given the values 
of the exogenous factors. 
As an alternative to the above, a more complex optimisation routine could be employed. 
Such a routine would necessitate specific research on the pumped-storage scheme unit 
commitment problem which is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Clearly this point 
opens up debate on the choice of MC as being equal to the average of the pumping 
costs incurred that day. In reality the MC is not necessarily constant throughout the 
day, though it could be assumed to be so for trading a day in advance as occurs in 
practice. Eskom Peaking uses the 'PMAC' model to determine the potential value of 
stored energy in the reservoir and hence its marginal cost for generation for the following 
day. In the simulation it is however assumed the costs are incurred on the same day as 
production, and based on the SMP forecasts for that day. 
Pumping costs incurred on days on which there is less than h hours generation are not 
carried over to the following period in the form of excess storage - a fact that is also 
related to unit commitment, production planning and scheduling ideas. 
An additional complication which may arise is the (realistic) inclusion of demand-side 
bidding for the pumping hours. We are presently assuming that the Genco's trader takes 
a decision to pump for a fixed number of hours, h regardless of what the SMP forecasts 
are in the lowest hours, i.e. he/she purchases megawatts in the h lowest hours at 'all 
costs'. A possible modification to the model would be to implement a pumping strategy 
in a similar vein to that for generating, in which the trader submits a bid to purchase 
megawatts for pumping if system demand and forecast SMP's are below prespecified 
thresholds. This implementation would, in turn, determine the unit's availability for 
generating in the remaining hours. 
Price influence 
The price influence, (3, equals 0 if the Genco is a price-taker and 1 if it has complete 
control over the price level. For 'peaking'-type units which may generate at any time of 
the day, a more realistic approach would be, for example, to allow (3 to be a function 
of Da(t) such that it may have a greater influence on price when demand is at much 
higher levels i.e. when it is the marginal production unit. Initially it seems prudent to 
use a constant low value of (3, such as 0.2, and examine the effects on profits and offers 
accepted by varying this parameter. 
We are assuming that when we include a price-influence parameter there is negligible (or 
no) effect on the underlying deterministic structure of Sa as such an effect would create 
an illogical loop in the program (see also [51, p. 654]). The purpose of including the 
model of price-influence as described is to enable exploratory investigation. As such we 
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are able to mimic the propensity of the Genco to sway the SMP in the direction of the 
price they offer for a particular hour. It must be stressed that we are not attempting to 
model deliberate action by the Genco to influence the SMP. The price influence model 
is introduced only to explore sensitivity to this potential effect. 
A further avenue of enquiry would be to consider a hybrid of price-taking and price-
setting where {3 takes on a zero value when the Genco is unlikely to be able to affect 
the price and values close to unity when it has almost complete control. For such a 
proposition, {3 would be a function of the actual demand, Da in the relevant hour. The 
practical motivation for such a consideration would be that in periods of low demand 
(ignoring reserves markets), the pumped storage unit is essentially a price-taker (or is 
fact pumping during those periods). In periods of high demand the Genco would have 
a greater influence on the price and may even price themselves out of contention. 
Demand 
In reality, the role of the demand variable may be somewhat more involved than that 
implied by the decision rule of when to trade. Genco's in real markets are more inclined 
to consider their potential market share, as well as their competitors' and consumers' 
responses to their actions in the market, than simply use their forecast of demand as a 
means for determining a simple threshold for entering the market. For a more realistic 
integration of the demand variable, it would be necessary to invoke a more in-depth study 
of local market. The role of demand expounded here is preliminary in nature, however 
it does make sense for the case of a generic producer of peaking-period electricity. 
5.4 Summary 
In this chapter, a simulation routine to mimic the trading activities of a pumped storage 
generator has been developed upon the foundations of a more general Genco entity. The 
reasons for the specialisation are data-related. The simplifications of reality and all the 
assumptions have been defined and explained along with some suggestions of possible 
modifications to the both the general model and the specialised one. The simulation 
parameters have been outlined and an algorithm described which is a precursor to the 
experiments and subsequent analyses of the next chapter. 
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No 
Yes 
Output parameter values, 
pro!Hs, acceptances and offers. 
Calculate and output summary 
statistics. 
zero at time 0. 
Reset accumulated 
pro!Hs, offers and 
acceptances. 
d=1 
Calculate hou~y stochastic errors. 
Forecast demands and SMP's. 
Sort by SMP forecasts 
Calculate forecast and actual MC. 
Choose pumping hours. 
Choose offer hours. 
Submn offers. 
Calculate 'Influenced' p~ces. 
MARKET CLEARING MODULE: 
Check lor acceptances. 
Calculate pro!Hs. 
Accumulate prolns, offers and 
acceptances. 
Yes No 
No 
Figure 5.1: The price-setter simulation algorithm 
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Chapter 6 
Results and Observations 
The results and analyses of a set of simulation runs based on the model formulation 
of Chapter 5 are presented in this chapter. Firstly, the definitions and meanings of 
the model factors (parameters) will be given as a reminder to the reader, along with a 
classification for them that will enable an interpretation of the outputs of the simulation 
experiments. Ill addition, the first part of this chapter will include a discussion of these 
factors as modd inputs (including a table of factor levels), followed by the experimental 
design for the metasimulation, and ending with the tabular references to the outputs of 
the metasimulation. 
In the second ~ection, we proceed with the analysis of the primary benefit measure, 
Mean Profit, by giving the ANOVA table for first and second order interactions, the 
mean profits for each of the main factor levels and a discussion of the significant factors 
and interactions. Section 6.3 proceeds in a similar fashion, by qualifying the results of 
Section 6.2 with an analysis of the secondary benefit measure, Mean Acceptances. A 
concluding discussion on the results is given at the end of this chapter in Section 6.4. 
6.1 The Experimental Design 
At this juncture, the reader is reminded that the model of Chapter 5 has been refined 
in such a way as to illustrate and analyse the strategic behaviour of a generic pumped-
storage unit trading in the Eskom Power Pool. The justification for the use of this type 
of unit was given in the final subsection of Chapter 4 and from hereon it will be treated 
as a nominal client for the analysis; the adaptability of the formulation to any other 
type of generating plant is once again highlighted as a being plausible for reformulation 
of the model. 
Although somE' real price and demand data were used for the model's construction, the 
results themselves have no realistic meaning and are more useful for their interpretative 
and investigative qualities. The merits of the model as a tool for learning in a competitive 
market system is the ultimate aim of the exploration. In the terminology of French [18], 
the type of modelling that has been undertaken is descriptive, and results are analysed 
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using the normative technique of experimental design. The end result is therefore a 
prescriptive analysis of the behaviour of a trading Genco under various scenarios and 
strategies. The model is built with the ultimate intention of prescribing normative 
behaviour, such as how to achieve the optimal profit and/or minimise risk exposures. 
Realistic implementation (in either a descriptive or normative context) may only take 
place once the model has been demonstrated to a client Genco and revised in the light 
of their feedback and additional data input. A full implementation is likely to require 
further model-refinement and adaptation, in conjunction with the extensive cooperation 
of a particular Genco client. 
To illustrate this final point, in reality the Genco would vary their actions on a daily basis, 
continually reforming their strategies and ideas. The model, on the other hand, assumes 
a particular configuration of the strategy and the exogenous parameters throughout 
each investigation horizon. This process is repeated many times, each time with a 
configuration of strategy and exogenous factors dictated by the experimental design. 
The prescriptive part of the process arises when we introduce the experimental design, 
the results of which inform us which strategies are good and/or robust to the external 
factors, which are represented by the exogenous factors in Table 6.1 below. In this way 
(and others) the model is a descriptive one. It is also exploratory in a modelling sense, 
and could lead to refinements of our perceptions about the way both the system and the 
model behave. 
6.1.1 The Parameters 
Table 6.1 summarises the parameter definitions and classification for ease of reference 
throughout this chapter. For more detailed definitions the reader is referred back to 
Chapter 5. 
A particular set of values for the endogenous parameters defines the participant's 
strategy for each simulation run. The exogenous parameters give the environmental 
characteristics for each run: some of which are fixed throughout all runs, some are specific 
to a participant and others provide a context or scenario under which each experiment 
takes place. 
Endogenous parameters 
The endogenous parameters are fixed for the period of each simulation run so as to 
impose a particular strategy over the investigation horizon. In reality these parameters 
could be the particular strategy adopted by a trader and could ostensibly be varied for 
each daily trade. The simulation runs attempt to capture the effects of a particular 
strategy (combination of factor values) adopted over a length of time, and under various 
(exogenous scenarios). 
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I Parameter II Description 
Endogenous - strategy 
h number of hours for pumping (and for generation) 
d demand threshold for offer strategy (MWh) 
f relative proportion of S 1 to C 1 for offer strategy 
p proportion of [C 1, S 1] above C 1 for offer price 
Exogenous - fixed 
N number of simulation iterations 
T investigation horizon (days) 
g fixed capacity offered and generated 
Exogenous - proficiency 
~D estimation bias for demand 
~s estimation bias for SMP 
UD precision for estimate of demand 
us precision for estimate of SMP 
Exogenous- contextual 
(3 the price-influence parameter 
e the efficiency parameter for a pumped-storage scheme 
p smoothing parameter for Actuals' stochasticity 
U-y standard deviation of stochasticity in Actuals 
Table 6.1: Summary of parameter classification and definitions 
h number of hours for both pumping and generation; part of the offer strategy, it 
specifies the available daily generating capacity (refer to p. 126). 
d demand threshold for offer strategy in megawatt hours; used to decide when 
(i.e in which hours) it is appropriate to submit an offer (p. 118). 
f relative proportion of 81 to C1 for offer strategy; used in conjunction with d to 
decide when (with respect to expected costs and prices) to submit an offer to 
the pool (p. 118). 
p proportion of [C 1, S 1] above C 1 for offer price; determines the level at which 
the trader pitches his offers in relation to his expected costs and the expected 
system price (p. 119). 
From some experimental runs performed before the main metasimulation of this chapter, 
it was noted that the mean profit decreases monotonically with respect to d, f and p. 
Parameter h however gave an optimal profit value at a value between 1 and 12, and the 
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value at which this optimum was found depended on the scenario dictated by all of the 
other factors. Indirectly, d, f and h are essentially factors through which the modeller 
can control the availability and daily capacity of the generating unit according to the 
following decision criteria: 
1. Parameter d ensures that the Genco only enters the market when the forecast of 
system demand is above this threshold. 
2. The required profit margin is determined by parameter f. Increasing this factor 
will ensure that offers are only made in periods when the forecast of SMP is a 
specified proportion greater than the forecast of marginal cost. 
3. The daily availability is controlled by h (refer to Section 5.3.5), which essentially 
places an upper bound on the number of offers made, but also dictates the number 
of hours for pumping. The criteria for choosing this factor is somewhat complex 
for a number of reasons. The Genco will select the hours with the lowest expected 
SMP's for pumping, and the ones with the highest expected SMP's will be for 
generating. Having offered h hours with the expectation that all the offers will be 
accepted, the marginal cost estimate is then based on an average of the h lowest 
forecast SMP hours (divided by the efficiency, e); actual MC's will conversely 
depend on the average of the h actual SMP's in the hours (also divided by e). The 
construction of the MC variable is therefore somewhat artificial, but adequate for 
modelling purposes. The averaging was necessary because realistically the unit's 
marginal costs will depend on the actual SMP's for a number of hours which 
is equal to the accepted number of generating hours. The variable MCa, from 
the simulation algorithm of Chapter 5, is therefore an approximation to the actual 
marginal cost. As previously mentioned, research into the unit commitment choices 
of a pumped storage scheme would be necessary for a more realistic representation 
of the costs, however this model is illustrative and designed to represent a generic 
generating unit rather than a pumped storage one. 
Offer optimality is simplified in this model to choosing an optimal price, rather than 
both a price and a quantity, or even a set of prices and quantities. One of the aims 
of the model is to determine if there is an optimal value for parameter p that results 
in an optimal profit. Simultaneous optimisation of all of the endogenous parameters of 
this model is equivalent to finding the optimal supply function, the reason being that 
parameters d, f and h determine the amount of capacity offered in the daily market. In 
effect the goal is equivalent to the aims of the (often complex) stochastic optimisation 
routines described in Chapter 3. Both the approach of this model and those of Chapter 3 
essentially amount to the choice of an optimal supply curve for a trading Genco. 
Exogenous parameters 
(a) Fixed Parameters 
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N The number of simulation iterations. A value of 100 gives a stable frequency 
distribution of outcomes without requiring an unreasonable length for run-time. 
The entire experiment of 210- 3 = 128 runs was completed in approximately six 
hours on an Intel Celeron 1.7Ghz (128MB RAM) and T = 31. 
T The investigation horizon (days). Ideally, given an entire year's worth of data, 
a simulation over an equivalent period would be the useful in order to capture 
the seasonality inherent in the variables. Preliminary runs demonstrated that 
a full run was infeasible due to the amount of processing time required for 
a run of one year, and given that the imminent size of the design was large. 
There was also the desire to avoid confounding preventing the design from being 
below a particular resolution. It was therefore decided to initially perform the 
experiment with a horizon of 31 days to mitigate the amount of processing time 
required.1 
g Fixed capacity offered and generated in a particular time period. The model 
is as yet insufficiently complex to incorporate a full-scale investigation of the 
optimal supply function. Consequently the inclusion of variable quantity offered 
is a subject for further investigation. A nominal value of 100 is used throughout 
(no particular units are implied). 
(b) Trader Proficiency The trader proficiency parameters are specific to an individ-
ual trader acting on behalf of the generating unit. In a modelling sense they can be used 
to control various scenarios of trader expertise and information availability. 
f.v the estimation bias for system demand; indicates the tendency of a trader to 
over or under-estimate the true value of this variable (defined for generality but 
set to zero in all simulation runs repeated here - variations will be reserved 
for further future exploration). 
f.s the estimation bias for the SMP; (same comments as for f.v). 
uv precision for estimate of demand, reflecting the ability of a trader to forecast 
demand accurately. 
us precision for estimate of SMP, reflecting the ability of a trader to forecast SMP 
accurately. 
(c) Contextual The contextual parameters define the context under which the trader 
operates. Factors p and u"Y (refer to p. 112) describe the inherent variability of the 
system, the stochasticity of the underlying variables attributed to natural fluctuations 
1 A comparison run with a full year's run (T = 365) has subsequently been done and the results were 
consistent with those of this time horizon with T = 31. The presented analyses, however were based on 
the numerical results of the shorter run. 
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beyond the control or influence of the Genco. They are essential to the simulation and 
reflect the extent to which we cannot perfectly mimic reality. They are environmental 
factors which allow us to impose various scenarios with respect to the levels of uncertainty 
in a stochastic simulation model. Factors e and f3 (see pages 119 and 121 respectively) 
will also be specific to a particular production unit - the former allows a modeller to 
control the extent to which the unit is responsible for the final price, and the latter is 
a lumped parameter which permits experimentation with the macro-level attributes of 
the Genco's cost function for this particular production unit. 
f3 the influence parameter for the price-setter simulation. 
p the smoothing parameter for Actuals' stochasticity. 
U-y standard deviation of stochasticity in Actuals. 
e the efficiency parameter for a pumped-storage scheme; effectively determines 
the cost curve of the unit. In practice this parameter is fixed, however in order 
to investigate the effects of changes in the cost function for the production unit, 
it was decided to include it in the design. Costs - as defined in the previ-
ous chapter - depend on the SMP's in the pumping hours and the pumping 
efficiency. 
6.1.2 Modelling Aims 
The initial aim of the simulation model is broadly consistent with many others found in 
the literature: 
We explore the effects of various scenarios on the benefits accrued to a trading 
generator and identify those factors (and their combinations) which have a 
measured effect on the benefits. In so doing we hope to identify: 
1. the most important parameters and the significance of any interactions 
between them 
2. the most optimal strategies under various scenarios 
3. the robustness of strategies to various scenarios 
4. the suitability of this kind of model to address the issues presented in 
this thesis 
The aims of this model are also exploratory as described earlier in this section. 
Initially in Section 6.2 we will define 'benefits' as the overall profit gained over the 
simulation period. Later it will be worthwhile to investigate the dependency of the 
other two 'benefit' measures - offers made and offers accepted - on the simulation 
parameters as such an investigation would help qualify some of the effects on the primary 
variable of interest, namely profit. 
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In this dissertation we analyse the qualifying effects of the offers accepted on profit in 
Section 6.3. An investigation of the qualifying effects of offers made is left for future 
analysis using the existing results. Additionally, it would be of interest to explore the 
relationship between these benefit measures. For example, we could be achieving equiv-
alent number of offers accepted for two different parameter sets, yet the profit on one 
set could differ from the other. Such analyses would be useful for investigating the prof-
itability of trades conditional on the offers being successful. Alternatively we can have 
fewer offers accepted (thus fewer hours spent generating) and suffer little or no reduc-
tion in profits. The ideas here present avenues for further experimentation and research 
(and will actually be undertaken to an extent in Section 6.3 where some interesting in-
sights will be revealed, however the potential for additional analysis using the current 
set of results is substantial.) Of paramount importance is a critical examination of the 
suitability of the model to provide a robust method of strategic analysis, including its 
versatility, simplicity, and ease of implementation. These ideas will be discussed in the 
concluding chapter of this thesis. Firstly however, the design and results of the main 
simulation experiment of this dissertation will be presented. 
6.1.3 The Simulation Runs 
In this subsection we give the particular set of parameter values used in the experimental 
design and analysis. 
Table 6.2 was used to select appropriate values for uv, us and u"Y. The table allows us 
to choose values for our precision parameters under the lognormal model such that if X 
is lognormally distributed with median m, and Y = ln X is normally distributed with 
mean Jl. = ln m and variance u2 then, 
Z= Y-Jl. rvN(0,1) 
(7 
and 
Pr [ 15 ~ ~ < } ] = Pr [ln 15 ~ Y - Jl. ~ - ln 15] 
= Pr [~15 ~ Z ~ - ~15 ] . 
The above probability can be set equal to 0.95 to derive values for u for any desired 
accuracy, 15. For example, we could choose a forecasting accuracy of 20% (the fifth row 
of the table) and be 95% sure that our forecast will be between 80% and 125% of the 
actual value. In the case of stochasticity of the Actuals, u"Y, we divide the u-value by 
1 - p to get a correspondingly equivalent measure of stochasticity. 
A 2<10- 3) fractional factorial experiment was designed with the parameter values of 
Table 6.3. These values were selected intuitively based on plausible values for the system 
variables, and after having performed several preliminary, trial-and-error 'test' runs. It 
was intended that these values cover a sufficiently broad range for a 2-level design, 
and they were selected in such a manner as to facilitate reasonable interpretation and 
analysis of the results. They are by no means the only possible set of values that could 
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Table 6.2: Table of precision and volatility values 
Approximate Nominal 
8 1/8 choice for forecasting 
us or ern accuracy 
0.99 1.01 0.00 1% 
0.95 1.05 0.02 5% 
0.90 1.11 0.05 10% 
0.85 1.18 0.08 15% 
0.80 1.25 0.11 20% 
0.75 1.33 0.14 25% 
0.70 1.43 0.18 30% 
0.60 1.67 0.26 40% 
0.50 2.00 0.35 50% 
0.40 2.50 0.46 60% 
0.30 3.33 0.61 70% 
0.10 10 1.17 90% 
0.01 100 2.35 99% 
have been used. Given extra time for experimentation with alternative parameter sets, 
the robustness of the results analysed in Sections 6.3 and 6.4 could have been revealed. 
Additional experimentation of this sort, is left for future experimentation with the model. 
Table 6.3: Parameter values for 2(l0-3) design 
Factor Low Value High Value 
f3 0.20 0.80 
fr-y 0.12 0.29 
h 6 10 
ern 0.11 0.26 
us 0.11 0.26 
d 22000 28000 
f 0.9 1.8 
p 0.1 0.9 
e 0.6 0.9 
p 0.1 0.3 
A fractional design with zero replications was chosen to moderate the amount of process-
ing time required for the metasimulation. The experiment was designed in STATISTICA, 
reducing the full design by a factor of eight to mitigate the amount of processing time. 
The number of runs required was therefore 27 = 128. The exact configuration of runs 
was chosen such that each of the two levels of each parameter occurs 64 times, and with 
each other factor a common number of 32 times. The incomplete block of 128 runs is 
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chosen by invoking a particular set of runs that confines the confounding (aliasing) of 
factors to terms of higher order than the factors of interest (i.e. to higher than second 
order). STATISTICA was employed to produce a design in which no first order effects 
were confounded with each other, or with any of the second order or higher effects, and 
such that no second order effects were confounded with each other or with any higher 
order effects. In such a design, higher order interactions are presumed to be negligible 
and the main and second order effects are uniquely estimable. By virtue of having chosen 
an astute design, the effects are also independent. The resolution of this design is V. 
The design and the generators of the fraction alias arrangements are reported in Ta-
ble A.1 of the appendix while the mean profits, offers and acceptances from each of the 
128 experimental runs are given in Table A.2. A discussion and analysis of the results 
follows in the next section. 
6.2 Analysis of Mean Profits 
What follows is a factor-by-factor discussion of the first order effects on the mean profit 
achieved over the investigation horizon. The discussion, in turn, is followed by evidence 
of some interactive effects and their significance. The ANOVA results for the analysis, 
with Mean Profit as the dependent variable, are given in Table 6.4. The table was 
abbreviated to include all ten of the main effects, and only interaction effects that were 
statistically significant up to a level of 10% (with one greater for illustration). Degrees 
of freedom (DF) for all effects equal 1, so the Sum of Squares equal the Mean Square 
Errors (MSE's) and have been omitted from the table. 
Parameters us, p and p were the only main effects not significant at the 1% level. The 
first eight interaction effects shown in the table were significant at the 1% level with 
a further two significant at the 5% level. The discussions will therefore only be given 
for the eight most significant interactions. It is interesting to note at this juncture that 
although us and p had no significant first-order effect on the mean profit, there were 
several interactions with these factors that were important. 
A note on 'significance' 
In a strict statistical sense, there is an issue of multiple comparisons when discussing 
levels of significance as above. When looking at multiple factors' significance, a much 
lower statistical significance level would usually be required to render the individual 
factors significant than if we were only concerned with that individual factor. However, 
in simulation modelling this is of less importance, because the factors are (in a sense) 
imaginary, and are unique to the system described by the model. The actual level of 
significance is therefore less consequential than the magnitude of the factor's parametric 
effect on the response variable of interest. 
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Factor Effect MSE F-value p-value 
d -245439 1.90E+12 333.2 0.00 
(3 -232287 1.70E+12 298.5 0.00 
e 217626 1.50E+12 262 0.00 
f -129004 5.30E+11 92.1 0.00 
av -111273 4.00E+11 68.5 0.00 
h -104427 3.50E+11 60.3 0.00 
a"' 82891 2.20E+11 38 0.00 
p -26506 2.24E+10 3.9 0.05 
as 5428 9.43E+08 0.2 0.68 
p -3429 3.76E+08 0.1 0.79 
(Jxp 171761 9.40E+11 163.2 0.00 
(Jxd 77680 1.90E+11 33.4 0.00 
dxe -71518 1.60E+11 28.3 0.00 
(3 x e -58010 1.10E+11 18.6 0.00 
as x d 49900 7.97E+10 13.8 0.00 
(Jxf 45752 6.70E+10 11.6 0.00 
av xp -43388 6.02E+10 10.4 0.00 
av x d 39800 5.07E+10 8.8 0.00 
dxf 33222 3.53E+10 6.1 0.02 
a7 x h -31812 3.23E+10 5.6 0.02 
av x f 31165 3.10E+10 5.4 0.02 
(Jxh 26801 2.30E+10 4 0.05 
(3 x a7 -26203 2.20E+10 3.8 0.05 
a7 x p -25741 2.12E+10 3.7 0.06 
av x e -24533 1.92E+10 3.3 0.07 
a7 x f -22794 1.67E+10 2.9 0.09 
a7 x d 19536 1.22E+10 2.1 0.15 
I Error I I 5.78E+9 I DF: I 72 
Table 6.4: Abbreviated ANOVA table for analysis of Profits 
6.2.1 Main Effects 
Table 6.5 shows the means of the main effects (profits) for ten parameters in the design 
for the low and high value of each of the parameters in turn (non-significant ones have 
been included for illustrative purposes). The figures in brackets show the standard errors 
(SE's) of the means. 
All of the main effects will be discussed in order of significance, while paying particular 
attention to the classification and definitions given at the beginning of this chapter. 
Increasing d and f or reducing h simply means that the trader will submit fewer offers 
in each trading day, and for the most part, effectively exclude the Genco from possible 
trades and reduce the numbers of actual transactions. That is not to say that profit 
will suffer a corresponding decrease in value, since a smaller number of (less profitable) 
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Mean Profit 
Factor Low Value High Value Change 
(SE) (SE) 
d 482853 237415 -51% 
(36642) (20577) 
(3 476277 243990 -49% 
(35702) (23266) 
e 251321 468947 87% 
(23863) (36039) 
f 424636 295632 -30% 
(35349) (29369) 
()D 415771 304497 -27% 
(35577) (29667) 
h 412347 307920 -25% 
(34602) (30989) 
()"( 318688 401580 26% 
(32988) (33188) 
p 373387 346881 -7% 
(33478) (33434) 
()s 357420 362848 2% 
(35081) (31831) 
p 361848 358420 -1% 
(37967) (28330) 
Table 6.5: Mean profit outcomes for the main effects 
trades will not necessarily reduce the bottom line profit (it may even result in a higher 
profit if some of the trades made losses). Reducing h could even have a desirable effect 
on profit if actual SMP's in the selected pumping hours are higher. The desirable effect 
would be a consequence of increasing the resultant cost to the Genco. 
Demand threshold: d 
Increasing d merely serves to exclude the Genco from potential trades, leading to reduced 
number of offers made and therefore lower overall profit. It was conjectured in the 
preliminary formulation of the model that an optimal d would be found such that under 
particular parameterisations, we could achieve a higher bottom line by offering in periods 
of higher demand when SMP's are correspondingly higher. The initial conjecture could 
not be vindicated by the model. A possible generalisation of the model which would 
lead to a non-monotonic dependency on d would be to reformulate it according to the 
following question: "If we are constrained to generate for a prespecified number of hours 
(e.g. one per clay), what would be the appropriate demand level at which the trader 
ought to enter the market?" In this way the modeller could identify ways that the 
Genco could benefit from any inherent correlation structure between demand and price. 
Alternatively, as mentioned in Chapter 5, we could introduce a correlation structure 
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between the stochastic errors (a-y's) for the Actuals (Da and Sa) and determine whether 
the trader is then able to benefit by exploiting this correlation structure. In this model , 
however, the stochastic errors were independently sampled. In summary, increasing 
d reduces the number of offers made and thus the number of acceptances and profits 
achieved . 
Price influence: {3 
In the context of this model, increasing the influence of the Genco brings the final 
SMP closer to the offer price, reducing the profitability of any accepted offers (since 
offer prices are always less than expected SMP, and therefore generally less than actual 
SMP), and thus reducing the final profit outcome. It will be seen in the next section 
that {3 has no effect on the number of acceptances under the existing parameterisation; 
the reduction in profits is purely attributable to the reduced final SMP's received in the 
market clearing mechanism. In a situation where MC's were higher than SMP's with the 
trader offering above MC, there may be scope for reduced acceptances. Generalisation 
of the model could again be achieved through a modified value for e (i.e. an alternative 
cost curve). Since the trader always offers between forecast MC and forecast SMP, the 
final SMP will be pushed lower when {3 is positive. Another interesting generalisation 
would be to permit the trader to offer above expected SMP (i.e. p > 1) and observe the 
differences attributed to /3-values under this scenario. A simplification of the model to 
{3 = 0 would allow the focus of the strategic analysis to be on a price-taking Genco in a 
purely competitive market. 
Pumping efficiency: e 
The greater the efficiency, the lower the cost to the Genco of producing electricity and 
the greater their overall profits. This parameter is a key one in the model, as it says 
a great deal about the Genco's cost function. When their costs are lower, the trader 
will automatically submit offer prices that are lower (all things equal), being constrained 
to an interval of [C f, Sf] for the offer. Also, the lower the costs, the smaller the cost 
threshold will be and the more times the trader will choose to enter the market on 
the basis of cost. The inclusion of demand-side bidding would also alter the model 
formulation in such a way that the Genco's costs would depend on its success in bidding 
for pumping energy, and would result in a completely different cost function. The model 
could easily be adapted to such a scenario. 
Cost threshold: f 
Similarly to d above, increasing the value of the cost threshold also results in lower overall 
profits, once again suggesting that a Genco should always enter the market, regardless 
of how high their marginal cost is expected to be. The result may be a consequence of 
the costs for this unit (a pumped storage scheme) being quite low, and the potential for 
losses negligible under the current scenarios and formulation. We might generalise here 
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by considering smaller values for e or even vary it in a non-linear manner (by way of a 
3-level instead of 2-level design) and end up with profits that are non-monotone with 
respect to the cost threshold . 
Parameter f is distinct from din the sense that it constrains the unit's capacity in terms 
of costs, rather than its availability in hours as per system demand fluctuations. As we 
are representing a pumped storage scheme, costs will depend directly on the SMP's in 
the hours selected for pumping. It may be found that for another type of generating 
plant (with costs which depend on prices of primary fuels such as coal), the correlation 
with prices would be weaker, and we could achieve results that are non-monotone with 
respect to f. Having two levels for this factor is tantamount to a linear cost function 
(assuming the forecast of MC is constant). The discussion here leads us into the realm of 
generator cost functions which is not explored now, however the interaction with other 
cost parameters such as e will still be discussed. In this formulation, increasing f reduces 
the number of offers made and thus the number of acceptances and revenue received. 
Demand precision: CJ D 
In preliminary runs, this parameter was only significant for particular values of d and, 
as expected, there was a decrease in the profit margin for a reduction in precision. For a 
given value of d, a reduction in precision causes the Genco's strategy to be misguided as 
their expectations of the true values of demand are incorrect more of the time. They will 
consequently -- in the case of lognormal variable values - be forced not to enter the 
market for a greater proportion of available trading hours, since more of their expected 
demand values will be greater than the threshold, d. Examining Table 6.2, one observes 
that the (implied) confidence interval is more asymmetrically skewed to the left (i.e. 
negatively skewed) for higher values of CJD, so the tendency to overestimate the demand 
will be greater than the tendency to underestimate it. The effect of increasing CJD has a 
similar effect to increasing d, therefore validating the model in the sense that a poorer 
information set (or a less proficient trader) will reduce the Genco's profitability. 
Pumping/generating hours: h 
For a change in level from 6 to 10 hours, a decrease in profit arose amounting to 7%. 
There are several plausible explanations for the decrease. At first glance, the outcome 
appears strange, because by granting the trader more hours to trade in, one would expect 
higher profits to accrue to the Genco. An explanation lies in two related arguments: 
1. A value of 10 surpasses the optimum number of hours for achieving the maximum 
profit with respect to h; generating in too many hours results in greater overall 
costs (through higher SMP's in particular pumping hours). 
2. The Genco has exceeded the scheme's limits with respect to efficiency, so an al-
ternative (higher) pair of values for e in the formulation would have the opposite 
effect and result in increased profit. 
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Preliminary runs had in fact indicated that under the current formulatiou , there was an 
optimal level of h (a value between 6 and 12) that maximised the profits received. (A 
limit of 12 implies that the unit is required to pump for the equivalent number of hours 
for which it generates in any given day. The equivalence of pumping and generating 
hours allows the storage levels of the upper reservoir to be maintained, and obviously 
the unit cannot generate while pumping.) 
An interesting area of exploration here would be to find how the optimal number of 
hours varies under alternative scenarios defined by particular configurations of the other 
parameters (for example e). A normative formulation could also be developed to de-
termine exactly which hours of the day are the most profitable to generate (and pump) 
lll. 
The model has even further potential for generalisation with respect to h: it could be 
redefined as an independent variable with daily variations due to scheduled (or unsched-
uled) maintenance, or other similar production constraints imposed upon the trader. In 
a realistic application, such modifications would depend on the actual scenarios experi-
enced by a trader, and on the aim of the model. 
Actuals' stochasticity: a"~ 
An overall increase in profits of 26% is observed when increasing this factor from 0.12 
to 0.29. Increasing the stochasticity of the underlying demand and SMP, essentially 
increases the 'optionality' that the Genco has with respect to strategy. Increased sto-
chasticity (especially in the underlying SMP's) gives the trader the opportunity to benefit 
from a wider range of expected SMP's (especially on the upside due to the lognormal 
model, and increased negative skewness resulting from higher volatility). SMP's will 
also have a wider range in pumping hours where the Genco can benefit from the ex-
tended range of downside SMP values. Consequently the Genco enters the market more 
frequently as trades become more profitable, simultaneously benefiting from lower costs 
and higher prices. The effect is analogous to the effect of volatility on an option price 
in a derivatives market. When variability of the underlying variables is high, there is 
more opportunity for making money through exercising the 'option' to trade. A similar 
argument will apply to the effect of stochasticity on demand (more actual and fore-
casted demand values on the upside combined with a constant threshold, d). With this 
model it is not possible to identify to which of the stochasticities (demand or price) the 
improvement in profits should be attributed. 
Actuals' smoothing parameter: p 
Increasing the amount of exponential smoothing in the stochastic process for the Ac-
tuals has a moderately significant impact (slight reduction), however this factor is of 
little interest as none of its interactions with other factors were important other than 
moderately significant interaction with a"' (which is expected due to the construction of 
the AR(1) process [refer top. 112]). When pis higher there is a greater level of corre-
lation between errors, an overall reduction in 'randomness' and thus a reduction in the 
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previously described 'optionality' in the generic market. The greater the randomness, 
the higher the profits achievable. Further experimentation here may not reveal much, 
unless the AR( L) process was extended to something more complex, though it would be 
prudent to test an alternative set of values for p to confirm this supposition. 
SMP precision: as 
Little change is observed in the profit when reducing the price-forecasting accuracy. The 
small change i:-. contrary to the modeller's conjectures, as one would expect a poorer 
information set and lower forecasting proficiency (higher as) would decrease profits. In 
fact, a small (possibly spurious) increase of 2% is observed. 
Increasing as to 0.26 will on average result in an absolute over-estimation of SMP's 
(again owing to the lognormal model). Forecasts of costs and SMP's will be higher, 
shifting the interval [CJ, StJ to the right. The Genco will now only enter the market 
at higher cost thresholds and offer their energy at correspondingly higher prices. In 
any event, the actual costs and SMP's will be the same (besides a small increase due 
to price-influence) and thus lower than the estimates and the profitability will remain 
largely unchanged. 
The initial conjecture was that having a greater forecasting precision for the SMP's 
allows the Genco to more accurately allocate hours to pumping in the most profitable 
manner. By increasing as the cost forecast becomes less accurate so the Genco should 
choose to pump in hours when the SMP is higher than expected (effectively failing to 
choose the lowest price hours in which to pump and highest SMP hours in which to 
generate). Strangely, for this metasimulation, the factor was not significant, nor did it 
even produce the conjectured effect. As in the case of parameter p (described below), it 
is likely that more significant effects are at play which have smothered the primary effect 
of as, and for more extreme values for the levels of this factor, it may have turned out to 
be statistically significant. On closer examination, and given the price-setting context of 
this model, the misallocation of both pumping and generating hours, is made up for by 
the higher prices offered, higher resultant actual SMP's, and the increased profit (and 
the fact that price-influence is not exerted on the SMP's in the pumping hours). 
To summarise: overestimating the SMP's in generating hours simply inflates the market 
prices without resulting in a loss to the Genco. 1 This point prompts an investigation 
where SMP's are analysed as an explicit output. A trivial modification to the algorithm 
could output the resultant SMP's and would prove useful for cursory examination by a 
regulator or system operator who wished to measure the extent of market power impact 
on social welfare. 
There are also interactions with this factor which are important. A plausible explanation 
is that parameter pis currently too close to the extremes of its values in this formulation, 
such that its effect smothers that of as in conjunction with stochastic variation. A 
worthwhile check would be to re-run the experiment at values for p of say 0.3 and 
1 Recall from the simulation algorithm in Figure 5.1 that prices are 'influenced' as soon as an offer is 
submitted by the Genco. 
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0.7 to confirm the explanation, or under fixed values for O"s and 0""1. Alternatively we 
could examine higher order (3-way interactive) effects in a design of higher resolution. 
Another possibility would be to choose more extreme value for the levels of O"S and note 
any changes in p-values. 
Offer price parameter: p 
The initial conjecture with respect to this parameter would be that by offering energy 
at prices closer to forecasted SMP's (i.e. when p = 0.9) would serve to increase our offer 
price and reduce the likelihood of the offer being accepted (as it will be pitched at a 
value nearer to the SMP). The Genco should be better off offering near their forecast 
MC (i.e. p = 0.1) especially if it is a price-taker. 
In preliminary runs, p was not a significant parameter at lower values, only becoming 
important when offer prices were close to the realised SMP's. It is peculiar that this 
factor does not appear to be statistically significant - actually it is the least significant 
of all the factors. In preliminary runs there were circumstances when it was significant 
(and in fact monotone in a manner consistent with d and f), however the effect seems 
to be smothered by other factors. The fact that there are interactions with p that are 
important suggest that there may be some underlying third order effects. The results 
shown in the next section demonstrate that an increase in p clearly results in a reduced 
number of offers accepted. The reason for this anomaly lies in the interaction f3 x p 
described below. In summary, any change in offers accepted as a result of increasing the 
offer price, is counterbalanced by an opposing increase in profits. The counterbalancing 
is due to the SMP (received after a successful offer) being elevated since parameter f3 is 
greater than 0. 
Since we are modelling in a price-setting realm, the resultant SMP's are weighted toward 
whatever offers prices this Genco makes, and- as for O"S above - the supposition could 
be confirmed through a comparative analysis of SMP's under price-taking ({3 = 0) and 
price-setting ({3 > 0) scenarios. 
6.2.2 Interactions 
The eight most significant interactions will be discussed in the order of their significance. 
Of these interaction terms, the first of the two interacting effects is to be considered the 
primary effect, and the second the qualifying effect of interest. The x-axis in each graph 
therefore represents the differences due to primary effects and the shaded/coloured bars 
highlight the differences due to qualifying effect. 
Qualifying effects were defined intuitively. Where possible, the primary effect is exoge-
nous and the qualifying effect is strategic. In this fashion we can explain the results 
of the model in terms of how to construct a trading strategy under different scenarios. 
Where both factors are exogenous, the primary factor was chosen as the one least likely 
to be under the control of the Genco in reality. Clearly in many instances it would 
have been possible to reverse the order of the variables and interpret the results in an 
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alternative manner, though this action would conflict with a favourable attribute of this 
model, namely its simplicity. 
The {3 x p interaction 
lnterac:tlon t.twMn 'IF and 'p' 
fJ 
Figure 6.1: Bar graph of mean profit: interaction between {3 and p 
The {3x p interaction was the most pronounced of the interactions in terms of significance, 
and is very important from the point of view of analysing competitive markets as it 
substantiates much of the research outlined in Section 3.2. One should note that the 
effect of offering closer to forecast SMP (p = 0.9) is to reduce profit when the Genco has 
less price influence, and to increase profit when price influence is greater. In other words, 
when the Genco exerts influence over the-pl"ice ({3 = 0.8, offering closer to their expected 
SMP will in fact increase their profits. The increase happens due to their influence which 
inflates the actual market SMP which they then receive for energy generated. The result 
was confirmed in a preliminary run with values of (0.1, 0.5) and (0.3, 0.6) for {3 and p 
respectively. 
The analogy confirmed here is that it pays to offer higher prices to the pool when endowed 
with greater control over the price. 
The {3 x d interaction 
When price influence is lower ({3 = 0.2), the resultant SMP's are also less controllable, 
so the absolute loss in profit when increasing d is greater than when influence is high. 
Factor dis more influential on profit when {3 is lower. 
Constraining capacity with respect to demand reduces profit whether exerting little or 
large control over the price. When price outcome is further from the value offered, the 
Genco should be wary of withholding capacity because the reduction in profits will be 
substantial. In reality, the level of influence is very likely to be a function of the system 
demand for a pumped storage scheme (a natural pri~setter in peak periods), and they 
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Interaction between '/f' and 'd' 
OOOOOO r-------------------~ 
Figure 6.2: Bar graph of mean profit: interaction between f3 and d 
could exert a greater influence at high demand levels. In this case it would be beneficial 
for the Genco to constrain their capacity as they would then be able to achieve profits 
at whatever price they set: in effect they could exert their market power. This fact, 
however cannot be vindicated by the current model and certainly presents a possibility 
for further research. 
The d x e interaction 
Interaction between 'd' and 'e' 
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Figure 6.3: Bar graph of mean profit: interaction between d and e 
We observe a reduction in profits of around 174000 at high cost levels (e = 0.6) and 
around 317000 at low cost levels (e=0.8) when constraining with respect to d. The 
reduction is easily explained, because at lower cost levels, there is more profit at stake 
when reducing availability in terms of system demand. One would need to consider 
the three-way interactions between e, f and din order to examine the overall effect of 
reduced capacity on the bottom line. A design of greater resolution would be necessary to 
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confirm that, as interactions of third order would be confounded with other interactions 
at the current design resolution. 
Increasing parameters d and I restricts available capacity. Decreasing e also restricts 
capacity (through higher costs), and both d and I are individually highly significant. 
In terms of model design, factor e's effects are more universal. To summarise this 
interaction: demand threshold has a higher impact at lower cost levels than at higher 
ones. 
The /3 x e interaction 
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Figure 6.4: Bar graph of mean profit: interaction between /3 and e 
This interaction between the contextual (/3) and participant-specific (e) parameters is 
important. A reduction in costs (i.e. an increase in e) results in increased profit, however 
the increase is around 50% for both price-setting levels. So shifting the cost curve 
downwards (and thus widening the interval between expected SMP's and costs) enables 
the trader to submit offers as successfully whether the Genco can control prices or not. 
The reduction in ca:Jt is perhaps stronger than the difference as a consequence of price-
control. 
A reduction in costs (e = 0.8) leads to increased profits, though the increase is more 
profound when the Genco has less say in the final SMP. The profundity is a result of the 
lowering of offer price as explained in the subsection on e above, and the consequence 
that they will be lowering the SMP they receive for production. Obviously the reduction 
in profit is greater when a higher level of influence on price is commanded by the Genco. 
In summary, this interaction reveals that the cost curve of the Genco has more influence 
on the profit outcome when their price influence is lower than when it is higher. 
The us x d interaction 
When the trader can more accurately forecast prices (us = 0.11), the Genco suffers a 
greater absolute reduction in profits under constrained capacity when price forecasts are 
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Figure 6.5: Bar graph of mean profit: interaction between us and d 
inaccurate. The large reduction is contrary to our expectations, as accurate price infor-
mation should lead to a more informed decision on when to offer (since the highest and 
lowest price hours can be more accurately allocated to generating and pumping respec-
tively). The results of the simulation indicate that the Genco suffers a larger reduction 
in profits withholding capacity (with respect to d) under good price information than 
withholding it under poor information. The results seem to indicate that they should in 
fact be cautious about entering the market when price conjectures are accurate, as they 
potentially stand to lose if they participate in the market. 
An alternative view of this interaction is that by withholding capacity under good price 
conjectures, the Genco misses out on the trades which are more profitable (due to a better 
allocation of pumping and generating hours). It is interesting that the profit outcome 
under the 'poor-prie&-information/high-demand-threshold' scenario is in fact better than 
the 'good-prie&-informationfhigh-demand-threshold' scenario. An explanation lies in the 
fact that there is an average increase in realised SMP values as explained in the subsection 
on us above. To summarise - for the values of factors used in this experiment -
price information is crucial when deciding which hours to withhold from the possibility 
of trading. Price information was only unimportant - for the particular parametric 
configuration of this experiment - when viewed as a main effect in isolation from other 
parameters. 
A condensed explanation of this interaction is that demand threshold is more influential 
under good price information than under poor price information (i.e d has less of an 
effect on profit when the tendency to over-forecast prices is greater - in absolute terms 
- than the tendency to underestimate prices) . 
The f3 x I interaction 
The effect of I is slightly more pronounced under low price influence than under high 
price influence. 
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Figure 6.6: Bar graph of mean profit: interaction between /3 and f 
Trading under constrained costs (! = 1.8) is more detrimental when price influence is 
lower as expected (given the monotonicity of profit with respect to/). When /3 = 0.8, 
the Genco can reap back some of the loss in trades by setting higher system prices. 
The result here is a similar to the interaction between /3 and d, however capacity is now 
constrained by costs rather than by system demand leve1s. Increasing the cost threshold 
means that the trader should only submit an offer when the expected SMP's in potential 
generating hours are expected to be much higher than the cost estimates (assuming the 
level of h allows the trader this freedom). Thus, the final price received for accepted 
trades is higher. 
In conjunction with the /3 x d interaction, this effect confirms that the effect of with-
holding capacity is greater when price influence is lower than when it is higher. 
The uv x p interaction 
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Figure 6.7: Bar graph of mean profit: interaction between uv and p 
150 
Offering closer to the expected SMP results in larger profits when infonnation on system 
demand is good, and smaller profits arise when offering close to expected SMP under 
poor information on system demand. 
A trader who has more precise ideas about demand will be able to enhance the Genco's 
profits by offering production closer to the forecast of SMP, than a trader who is less 
able to accurately forecast demand (especially when the Genco's level of price influence 
is positive). At the outset, one would not have expected this interaction to have arisen at 
all, however when av is large, demand forecast is less accurate, and the strateg:y in the 
market is less controlled {see main effect of aD) . It is reassuring that such insights are 
vindicated by the model and may well be of use in reality for explaining the importance 
of applying a more controlled trading strategy. 
The aD x d interaction 
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Figure 6.8: Bar graph of mean profit: interaction between av and d 
In a more controlled situation with lower av, the Genco stands to lose a great deal 
more by excluding their unit from the market with respect to the demand threshold. 
When greater information about the system variables is available, more offers should 
be encouraged as opposed to market abstinence. It is interesting to compare this result 
with that of as and d where higher profits were achieved with constrained demand under 
poorer rather than better price infonnation. An explanation lies in the inflationary effect 
of price-influence on the final price outcome. 
Increasing the threshold has a slightly greater effect under good system demand infor-
mation than under poor system demand information. 
6.2.3 Interpretation 
In the discussions of the previous section, we have described the observed effects of each 
of the parameters and significant interactions. Referring back to the classification of 
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Section 6.1, we have analysed the effects of the endogenous parameters, and the three 
groups of exogenous factors. The interpretation of these results will be further sub-
stantiated when the acceptances are analysed in the next section, however the following 
insights have already become apparent. 
Endogenous parameters 
The endogenous factors have told us about the trading strategy: circumstances have 
been suggested or outlined in each case under which an optimal trading strategy with 
respect to number of hours (h), demand threshold (d) and cost threshold (!) may be 
found. The initial analysis has not (as initially conjectured) divulged an approach for 
attaining the optimal offer price level (through p), because altering the offer price did 
not significantly impact on the Genco profits under the current parameterisation. It has, 
however been discovered that profits are highly dependent on the interaction of the offer 
price parameter with the ability of the Genco to set prices, and it has been confirmed 
that price-settErs should offer closer to their price forecast, and price-takers closer to 
their estimated costs. The revelation here is encouraging, as the model has achieved 
this discovery with relative simplicity when compared to the price formation methods of 
Section 3.2. 
Contextual parameters 
Regarding contextual parameters it has been confirmed that extra stochasticity (higher 
O"-y) improves the firm's profitability under the current formulation. Positive price influ-
ence (/3 > 0) reduces profits, because on average the trader will offer below the expected 
SMP, therefore reducing actual realised SMP values. It would be worth experimenting 
with levels of f3 closer to zero to reveal additional insights, as a value of 0.8 is probably 
unrealistically high. Improved efficiency results in larger overall profits, as expected, and 
has further implications owing to the interactions of e with d and e with /3. 
Areas of exploration can be identified for the model's general stochasticity, O"-y- Such 
exploration is possible in four ways (refer to p. 121): 
1. Utilising a. model for stochastic errors other than a lognormal/multiplicative one, 
as the en ors may tend to skew the variables toward the upside (to be confirmed 
with more in-depth analysis of empirical data of the variables). 
2. Introducing two distinct price and demand stochasticities (or even adding a cost 
stochastic ity). 
3. Introducing a correlation structure between price and demand 
stochastic ity. 
4. Changing the AR(1) model to a more complex representation of stochastic volatil-
ity, and perhaps more in the vain of the stochastic volatility models of Chapter 2. 
(This last modification is more essential for the price stochasticity than for the 
stochastic ity of demand.) 
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The model has therefore produced the desired consequences of, and therefore been val-
idated by the higher optionality. However, the results have also identified the need for 
a more specialised formulation of stochasticity in order to gain further insights into the 
appropriateness and robustness of strategies. 
Proficiency parameters 
The results from reduced SMP precision (as) did not produce the expected effect of 
correspondingly reduced profits. It is believed that its significance was smothered by 
other significant parameters under the current formulation and the effects of the lognor-
mal assumptions counterbalanced to produce no apparent difference in profit. Reduced 
precision under a price-influence scenario tended to inflate SMP's such that greater rev-
enues were achieved despite the losses arising from offers being pitched in the wrong 
hours. 
Parameter aD produced the expected effect of reducing profits due to less informed 
withholding of capacity with respect to demand. Interestingly its interactions with two 
other strategy parameters (p and d) were also important and highlighted some interesting 
relationships between parameters, achieving one of the model's specified intentions. 
The potential deficiency of the lognormal model for forecasting of prices and demand 
was also highlighted. The distribution of forecasts is asymmetrically skewed (to the left), 
especially when the a-values are higher. The effect carries through to the interpretation 
of parameter a, above. In summary there is a potential argument for the introduction 
of additive errors (for both forecasting and stochasticity) in (at least) parts of the model 
formulation. 
The levels of p used did not reveal any startling results, however much of what has 
been said about the stochasticity applies to this parameter too, especially with regard to 
revision of the models for stochasticity. The analyses of forecasting biases ( ~D and ~s) 
have been left for further study, however in the light of the revelations provided by other 
parameters, including them in the experiment is likely to produce some informative 
results, and may preclude the need for an alternative (non-lognormal) model for the 
forecasting accuracy. For example, introducing levels of negative bias could mitigate 
the effect of the tendency to forecast values for system and demand which are too high 
due to the lognormal effect. Such modifications could lead to the implementation of a 
prescriptive performance and assessment model for traders and/or information quality. 
The results and insights of the analysis of the primary dependent variable will be qualified 
in the next section, which concentrates on the analysis of mean acceptances. This 
analysis of the secondary dependent variable will be conducted in the light of the insights 
revealed in the current section. 
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6.3 Analysis of Mean Acceptances 
Before confirmmg the practical significance of the effects on mean profit , one needs 
to clarify whether variations in profit as a result of parameter changes are dependent 
on changes in the numbers of accepted offers, and to determine which (if any) of the 
factor changes induce changes in profits without corresponding changes in the number 
of acceptances. The results are also important as they reveal another important facet 
of the research in Chapter 3, namely the probability of acceptance. 1 For this section 
we shall now examine an analysis of results with 'mean acceptances' as the dependent 
variable. 
The ANOVA table for offers accepted is shown in Table 6.6. Degrees of freedom (DF) 
for all effects equal 1, so the Sum of Squares equal the MSE's and have been omitted 
from the table. It can be seen that factors as, p and (J have no significant impact at the 
5% level on thE' numbers of offers accepted, at least for this particular configuration of 
factor levels. Parameter h was significant at the 5% level with the others all significant 
at the 1% level. Moreover, (J has been replaced by p as one of the most significant effects 
when comparing profits to acceptances. 
6.3.1 Main effects 
Table 6.7 shows the means of the main effects for the factorial design. The low value 
and high value for each of the parameters in turn are shown (non-significant ones have 
been included for illustrative purposes). The figures in brackets show the standard errors 
(SE's) of the means. 
The results of all of the main effects will now be discussed in order of significance.2 
Cost threshold: f 
The reduction in offers accepted is commensurate with the reduction in profits observed 
in Section 6.2. Increasing the cost threshold for entering the market, reduces the number 
of offers made by the trader and excludes the Genco from potential (profitable) trades. 
The situation would be different if the cost structure was such that trades would result 
in losses. There is scope here for testing alternative values of e in the model (or even 
having a cost structure independent from the SMP's) that could result in non-monotone 
effects with respect to f . The percentage reduction in acceptances (55%) is greater 
than that of profits (33%) suggesting that successful trades at the higher thresholds are 
more profitable than the ones at lower cost thresholds, and is what would be realistically 
expected. For future runs, a reduction in the differential between factor levels would be 
prudent for f, so as to eliminate some of the smothering of other effects. 
1 A complete analysis of probability of acceptance would require an associated analysis of the third 
dependent variable, offers made. The analysis of acceptance probability has already been identified for 
potential future studies. 
2 Note that the same comments regarding statistical significance that were discussed on p.l38 apply 
here too. 
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Factor Effect MSE F-value p-value 
f -68 .5 150253 453.1 0.000 
p -56.8 103068 310.8 0.000 
d -56 .1 100633 303.4 0.000 
e 31.3 31408 94.7 0.000 
CT'Y 9.7 3014 9.1 0.004 
CTD -7.9 2010 6.1 0.016 
h -6 .7 1451 4.4 0.040 
crs 5.4 938 2.8 0.097 
p -2.9 262 0.8 0.377 
(J -0.4 6 0.0 0.896 
d x p 19.9 12615 38.0 0.000 
hxf -19 .5 12116 36.5 0.000 
dxf 15.4 7582 22.9 0.000 
fxp 15.0 7217 21.8 0.000 
crs x d 12.5 5004 15.1 0.000 
fxe 11.2 4002 12.1 0.001 
hxd -11.1 3973 12.0 0.001 
CTD X p -10.2 3317 10.0 0.002 
d x e -9 .2 2702 8.1 0.006 
CT'Y X d 8.7 2406 7.3 0.009 
pxe -7.9 2015 6.1 0.016 
CTD X f 7.7 1896 5.7 0.019 
(J X CT'Y 5.0 795 2.4 0.126 
Error I 331.6 1 DF: I 72 
Table 6.6: Abbreviated ANOVA table for analysis of Acceptances 
Offer price parameter: p 
The drastic reduction observed here is very important for the analysis, especially since 
this parameter was not statistically important for the profit . Pitching offers close to 
SMP will reduce the number of acceptances by almost half without the commensurate 
reduction in profit, suggesting that though the Genco has half of its offers accepted when 
p = 0.9, the ones that are accepted must be significantly more profitable to make up 
for the lost trades. A likely explanation for this apparent anomaly lies in the fact that 
price-influence, (3, is positive and the actions of the Genco in the pool will sway the 
SMP's in the direction of the their (higher) offers. The explanation could be confirmed 
with a repeat of the metasimulation with (J = 0. If confirmed, it would illustrate the 
importance of the Genco's ability to affect the price in the market under this model. 
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Demand threshold: d 
A similar percentage reduction in profits to that of acceptances has resulted from the 
increased demand threshold (approximately 50%). By constraining capacity with respect 
to demand, the Genco is excluded from all trades, both profitable and unprofitable 
ones. The samP argument as the one in Section 6.2 applies for an investigation into the 
optimality of d 
Pumping efficiency: e 
A significant ir.crease in acceptances of 41% takes place when the cost function of the 
Genco is set at a lower level with e = 0.8. Percentage-wise, the increase in profits is more 
than double this value, confirming that any additional trades will also be more profitable 
ones when costs are lower. The importance of the cost variable in the model is therefore 
emphasised, evtm if merely suggests the need for a more accurate representation (which 
could be achieved with the collaboration of the Genco concerned). The differential 
between the experimental values of e could also be reduced in future experiments so as 
to avoid smothnring of importance of the other parameters, since the absolute effects are 
Mean Acceptances 
Factor Low Value High Value Change 
(SE) (SE) 
f 125 56 -55% 
(7.4) (5.3) 
p 119 62 -48% 
(8.4) (5.0) 
d 119 62 -48% 
(8.4) (5.0) 
e 75 106 41% 
(7.3) (7.7) 
a"' 86 95 10% 
(8.1) (7.3) 
aD 94 87 -7% 
(7.9) (7.6) 
h 94 87 -7% 
(6.5) (8.8) 
as 88 93 6% 
(8.1) (7.4) 
p 92 89 -3% 
(7.6) (7.9) 
f3 91 90 -1% 
(7.9) (7.6) 
Table 6.7: Mean acceptances outcomes for the main effects 
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quite large. 
Actuals' stochasticity: IJ"~ 
A 10% increase in acceptances arose when the stochasticity was greater, a direct result of 
the optionality described in the previous section. However it is more the profitability of 
the trades which increases (by 26%), than the number of successful offers ( 10% increase). 
Demand precision: IJD 
The 7% reduction in acceptances is less consequential than the reduction in profits as a 
result of poorer demand forecasts, suggesting that the trades lost as a result of poorer 
demand may in fact be the more profitable ones. As a result of the lognormal model, the 
strategy will be one of not entering the market more often, when IJD is higher, and may 
be confirmed with an analysis of offers made. The evidence here is the first result that 
the model has provided that indicates towards trades at higher demand thresholds being 
more profitable (and that there is a correlation between SMP and demand which may 
be stronger at higher levels of both, and may be confirmed by examining the correlation 
between SMP and demand outputs). The evidence is important as it gives insights into 
the development of a strategy for 'peaking-type' plants. 
Pumping/generating hours: h 
Similar magnitudes of reductions in profits and acceptances were observed for an increase 
in h as for the increase in IJD. Accepted offers is subject to a reduction of 7%. Further 
interpretation is not really viable without investigating the non-monotonicity of this 
parameter in greater detail (as described in the previous section). A useful insight at 
first glance however, is that the trades in the extra hours lead to lower profitability 
overall, and the Genco is better off selecting from a smaller number of hours in the day 
(under the current cost and price-infi uence scenarios). 
SMP precision: IJS 
Here a similar (seemingly spurious) increase in acceptances (as for profits arose) and any 
smothering effects mentioned apply to both acceptances and profits. 
Actuals' smoothing parameter: p 
The smoothing parameter was not statistically significant, though similar explanations 
for the effects of p on profits in Section 6.2 are likely to hold here too. 
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Price influence: {3 
Importantly, {3 is not nearly as relevant for this analysis, nor are its interactions with the 
other factors, greatly contrasting with the results of Section 6.2. The lack of importance 
tells us that for levels of price influence between 0 and 1, there is no effect on the 
probability of acceptance that can be attributed to the adjustment of the SMP (given 
the fact that trader has decided to enter the market). Any reduction in profit noted 
in the previous section can therefore be purely attributed to the lowering of the SMP's 
and resultant revenues due to price influence. The effect holds true since the SMP's are 
significantly higher than the costs for this unit (by virtue of efficiency and hourly SMP 
differentials) and the trader offers capacity below the expected SMP. So price influence 
appears to reduce the value of profit without affecting the probability of offers being 
accepted, demonstrating a desirable feature of the model that could be further exploited 
by varying the cost functions through altering e. The change in costs would have to be 
such that there is a potential for losses to be made, when offers are rejected due to the 
Genco's price influence (e.g. if costs were higher in relation to the SMP's, fewer offers 
would be accepted). 
6.3.2 Interactions 
Interactions between most of the endogenous strategy parameters were statistically sig-
nificant in the analysis of acceptances, a result that is contrary to the analysis of mean 
profit where {3 was the dominant parameter among the interactive effects. Essentially we 
are now permitted to analyse the interactions of the remaining nine parameters without 
having to consider the effect of price-influence (under the assumption that there are no 
significant third or higher order effects with {3 that are significant). The six most signif-
icant interactions are now discussed in order of their statistical significance. A further 
four were also statistically significant at the 1% level, however the actual magnitudes of 
the interactions were marginal, and therefore not worthy of detailed discussion. 
The d x p interaction 
When capacity is constrained by imposing a high demand threshold, offering closer to 
the expected SMP will not lead to such a drastic a reduction in the number of accepted 
offers as when capacity is not constrained. A trader who has lower volume constraints 
with respect to offerable capacity should take care not to offer too close to the SMP so 
as to avoid reductions in the number of offers accepted. One who has greater volume 
constraints need not be too concerned about bidding closer to expected SMP, other 
things being equal. 
The acceptances are more robust to changes in the offer price under constrained capacity 
than under unconstrained capacity. 
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Figure 6.9: Bar graph of mean acceptaneffi: interaction between d and p 
The h x I interaction 
The reduction in the number of acceptaneffi is greater in magnitude when increasing the 
cost threshold at h = 10 than when increasing it at h = 6. The greater reduction is likely 
to occur becaUBe a trader who has additional hours in which to trade, is probably faced 
with a greater number high cost trades, so imposing additional cost constraints redueffi 
the number of offers made and hence the number of acceptances. The choice is easier 
when there are fewer hours (with lower costs for pumping and higher potential SMP's in 
generating hours). The fact could be confirmed through an analysis of the offers made. 
Interestingly, increasing h from 6 to 10 also resulted in higher numbers accepted at lower 
levels of I even though as a main effect it resulted in an overall reduction. The higher 
numbers of acceptances did not carry through to the profit outcome possibly because 
there were other considerations {e.g. more profitable trades from fewer hours) that 
held more weight in that analysis. This type of result can offer valuable insights into 
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Figure 6.10: Bar graph of mean acceptaneffi: interaction between hand I 
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an analysis of the optimal offer strategy by indicating the optimal number of hours to 
enter the market under differing capacity scenarios. Even more profound is that making 
more hours available resulted in an overall reduction in accepted offers (consistently with 
profits as well), suggesting an optimum h at some value less than 10. An experiment 
with (up to 12) levels of h under stationary scenarios for other factors could be used in 
a search for an optimum number of hours. 
The d x f interaction 
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Figure 6.11: Bar graph of mean acceptances: interaction between d and f 
Modifying the coat threshold is more influential at lower d than at higher d. 
Although increases in both of these factors individually serve to constrain capacity, it is 
interesting to observe that increasing d leads to a much larger reduction in acceptances 
when f is low, though if dis low, at say 22000 MWh, then moving from f = 0.9 to f = 1.8 
has an exacerbated effect. In a sense the withholding capacity with respect to demand 
and coat tends to result in a compounded effect. When one of the parameters is high -
and the strategy is already constrained - then an increase in the other parameter will 
have a more pronounced reduction than it would have had the first one been low. 
The f x p inter action 
Offering at prices closer to the expected SMP seems to exacerbate the reduction in 
acceptances when f is higher, and is an expected result, since constraining capacity 
with respect to coat necessarily implies that more offers will be closer to the actual 
SMP's and consequently have a greater chance of being rejected. Further exploration 
would be required to determine if this decrease in probability of acceptance is justified 
by an increase in profits when both f and/or p are higher. 
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The as x d interaction 
The effect is consistent with that of profits in Section 6.2 suggesting that this interaction 
reduces acceptances and hence profits in a. corresponding manner. We find that a. greater 
reduction in acceptances occurs when precision is greater and we increase the demand 
threshold {refer to the explanation in Section 6.2) . 
The e x I interaction 
At lower levels of e (higher CMt function), an increase in I resulted in a more drastic 
reduction in the numbers of offers accepted than a.t higher levels of e {lower cost function), 
and is an effect which was not picked up in the analysis of profit, probably owing to the 
smothering effect of price influence. Given higher costs we would submit fewer offers and 
lnta action batween 'Gil' lnl'd' 
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Figure 6.13: Bar graph of mean acceptances: interaction between as a.nd d 
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Figure 6.14: Bar graph of mean acceptances: interaction between e and f 
therefore have fewer acceptances. Once again, this latter hypothesis could potentially 
be confirmed by means of an analysis where offers made is the dependent variable. 
6.3.3 Interpretation 
Profit dependency 
The existence of five scenarios has been revealed by virtue of the analyses of this section, 
where results of Table 6.5 have to a large degree been qualified by those of Table 6.7: 
1. There are circumstances under which the changes in observed profit are in fact due 
to a commensurate change in the number of offers accepted (e.g. with parameters 
d, as and p). 
2. Situations also exist where the change in acceptances is compounded by a corre--
sponding change in profitability (e, a7 , h, aD) and; 
3. The (hard-to-identify) situations where a change in observed acceptances is asso-
ciated with an opposite change in profitability (!) . 
4. Scenarios where changes in profits are independent from any changes in acceptances 
(p, (3). 
5. Although they are not manifested in the main effects in the present parameterisa-
tion, there are likely to be instances when changes in profits are a consequence of 
a change in profitability of trades rather than a change in the number of accepted 
offers. There are particular interactions which allude to such an effect and could 
be confirmed by experimenting with alternative configurations of the parameters. 
In summary, the mean profit can be explained by variations in the number of acceptances, 
and the imposed scenarios will determine the nature of the dependency. The most 
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important qualifying effect, regarding the swapping of p for f3 as the important parameter 
in the analyses of the two dependent variables, has already been discussed in the analysis 
of profits in Section 6.2. 
Non-qualifying effects 
The analysis of acceptances as a dependent variable in its own right provides model 
validation, and highlights some of the interactions between the parameters. 
Examining the parameters individually: 
• Parameter p has the most significant impact on the number of acceptances, so 
offering closer to expected SMP will reduce the chance of the offer being accepted 
(as conjectured). 
• Results for e are also intuitive: lower cost levels will allow the Genco to pitch offers 
which have a greater probability of being accepted. 
• Increased stochasticity ( a"Y) enhances optionality resulting in a larger number of 
successful offers. 
• Parameters p and as have no significant effect on acceptances for their current 
levels (as for profit). 
• Increases in hand av both serve to reduce the number of acceptances (for rea..<;ons 
identified in the analysis of profits). 
• Price influence (/3) has no impact on the number of successful offers, and provides 
a favourable model feature in the sense that it can mimic a Genco which is able 
to control price without adversely affecting the likelihood that their offers are 
successful (and without necessarily implying that the accepted offers are more 
profitable). 
Most of the strategy parameter interactions were significant, revealing some otherwise 
unknown relationships between them. For example: 
• the effects of same-sign changes in d and f tend to exacerbate each other (as is the 
case with f and p) . 
• increasing the cost threshold, f has a more drastic effect when more hours are 
made available for pumping and generation (i.e h = 10) than with fewer hours; 
also, more acceptances are achieved at this level of h under a low cost threshold, 
and fewer under a higher cost threshold. 
• The interaction between parameters d and as is consistent with that in the analysis 
of profits. 
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Analysing the acceptances has certainly revealed a great deal more about the relative 
importance of the parameters. Many of the insights from the analysis of profits carries 
through to the acceptances and additional relationships between the strategy parameters 
have been identified in the individual descriptions. An obvious follow-up to this section 
would be to analyse the offers made. The analysis would enable a quantification of the 
probability of acceptance by giving a sample space from which the number of successful 
offers is observed under various proficiency, context, and strategy scenarios. Such an 
analysis is again outlined as an option for further research. 
6.4 Conclusions 
This final section details the success (or otherwise) of the model as a tool for thinking 
in the strategic decision support of a Genco. 
A valuable tool for thinking 
The model has proved useful in providing a medium for confirming, and/or disput-
ing, intuitive beliefs about the behaviour of the system, and assessing its response and 
robustness in the wake of changing scenarios. It is also a useful platform for progres-
sive development of an actual strategic decision support model, having a fundamentally 
simple yet ver:--atile formulation (especially when compared to the high level stochastic 
simulation models of Chapters 2 and 3). Moreover the initial formulation has already 
been of use in identifying its own potential flaws and enabled suggestions of how to 
overcome thesE: flaws. 
Having decided on a parameterisation, the relative importance of the parameters can 
be examined through repeated outcomes under various strategic scenarios. Also, the 
inter-dependencies between these parameters can be examined through the analysis of 
the experimental design, and more of the subtle and unexpected effects can be identified. 
The initial conjecture when developing the model was that the parameters themselves 
would be of the most interest. The success of the modelling process in fact lies more 
in the interaction terms, and in the comparison between the effects on the two different 
benefit measures (for example the insights relating to price influence and offer prices). 
No doubt, further insights could be gained from a more formal examination of the 
relationships between the dependent variables themselves. 
The results are presented in simple tables and graphs that are open to easy interpretation 
by both the mcodeller and the client Genco. Importantly, we have succeeded in mimicking 
the actions of a trader in a daily auction in a pool-type market for electricity. 
The model has also been implemented with little data, and relatively little assistance 
from the client. The limited assistance favoured objectivity and encouraged a versatile, 
adaptable formulation, although a greater level of client cooperation would be required 
for the model to be implementable in reality. 
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A view to implementation 
The 2-level design itself has obviously not been able to suggest optimality for the strategy 
parameters, but is a worthwhile experiment for providing an initial understanding of 
the relationships between parameters, and interpreting the model's functionality and 
attributes. The modelling approach is logical because optimisation can proceed now 
that the model has been understood and validated by its outputs. 
The foundation has now been laid for further experimentation by way of: 
• additional 2-level runs with additional parameters and/ or alternative parameter 
values. 
• 3-level factorial designs. 
• designs of higher resolution. 
• optimality runs for the strategy parameters. 
• development of alternative models for stochasticity and/ or forecasting precision. 
• output of additional dependent and exogenous variables, and their subsequent 
analysis. 
• combinations of one or more of the above. 
The choice of which of the above point to implement will depend on the level of co-
operation with a real Genco, and their strategic support requirements or modelling 
aims. The modifications will also depend on the quantity and quality of the available 
data. Having fulfilled the data criteria, the model may then be enhanced and refined 
with a view toward realistic implementation. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
This final chapter of the dissertation draws together the two main streams of this project, 
namely the concepts presented in the literature, and the development of a model under 
local conditions. It also summarises the ideas of this dissertation with a concluding 
account of the discoveries gleaned from Chapters 2 to 6. With these summaries, an 
integrated view of the subject will have then been achieved. Mathematical modelling in 
electricity markets is motivated in the light of the literature survey, the local conditions, 
and by the analyses of the outputs, as well as by the attributes of the unique simulation 
model which was developed for this thesis. 
The outline of this chapter is as follows: 
Section 7.1 summarises the literature surveyed in Chapters 2 and 3, describing the 
fundamental motivation for research into electricity markets. Within the summary we 
highlight some of the modelling approaches and their uses. 
In Section 7.2. the local context is summarised and the model formulation is given a 
brief overview. The relevance of the literature survey to the local context will also be 
quantified. 
An overview of the analyses and findings of the simulation model follows, with a view to 
motivating the approach within a greater mathematical modelling context. The relative 
advantages and disadvantages of the model as a decision support tool will also be given. 
The overview and discussions of the model are the focus of Section 7.3. 
The final section concludes with some recommendations for future descriptive and nor-
mative studies using the model with appropriate adaptations. Potential modifications 
to the adopted approach are described, and we conclude with some final remarks on the 
thesis. 
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7.1 Literature Survey 
7.1.1 Modelling activities in electricity markets 
Some of the general challenges arising from deregulation were revealed in the literature 
survey of Chapter 2. It is clear from this survey that electricity companies, regulators and 
decision support scientists have been shaken by the unprecedented wave of deregulation 
that has taken place in the power industry. 
Companies, in particular Genco's, have been faced with solving their generation-dispatch 
and unit commitment problems in conjunction with the influences of market forces. In 
the words of Baillo et al. [4], Genco's are now "forced to prepare and submit daily offers to 
an electricity market .. . " . Performance success and business viability now depend on the 
bottom-line profits the companies are able to achieve. One of the primary consequences 
of the introduction of competition into the production and sale of electricity, has been 
the development of risk management tools in response to the increased uncertainties 
which now plague participants. Ironically, ownership of portfolios of these tools has 
itself led to an additional need for strategic decision support. Such support is required 
for the day-to-day operations in the spot and forward markets (including reserves and 
ancillary markets), as well as for intermediate to long term strategic support for trading 
and production activities, financial contracting, and managing portfolios of contracts 
and instruments. 
Regulators and system operators are also faced with increased challenges. The latter 
have to ensure the safe and reliable dispatch of generation plant in conjunction with 
the daily auction, and the former are faced with the challenge of ensuring that the 
transition to competition proceeds fairly, and that the market is suitably structured so 
that participants are not able to exert untoward levels of market power. The ultimate 
responsibility of the regulators is to ensure that the intended social welfare criteria of 
deregulation are achieved, as measured by the quality of supply received, and prices 
paid, by the end-user consumers. 
Researchers are endowed with the task of assisting both companies and regulators in 
achieving their goals through strategic decision support. Types of assistance range from 
normative or descriptive models and/or normative or descriptive analyses. The combi-
nation of model and analysis ultimately leads to the prescriptive analyses presented to 
the client. Researchers' challenges also include the selection of appropriate modelling 
and analytical tools from a wealth of those developed by power systems engineers, op-
erations researchers, and specialists in financial engineering. The difficulty of model 
selection is played out in a situation where individual national markets have very unique 
structures, varying levels of deregulation, different sources and degrees of uncertainty, 
and a wide range of principal needs that must be addressed by various players in the 
industry. Simulation - in various forms and levels of complexity - seems to be the 
fundamental method of enquiry, particularly with regard to the descriptive modelling 
approaches adopted by researchers. 
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7.1.2 Electricity Markets 
Chapter 2 demnnstrated the existence of a variety of modelling activities, all of which 
arise from the recent liberalisation of traditional monopoly markets; particularly those 
for electrical pc•wer. The study of electricity economics has developed into a subject in 
its own right. The reasons for the separate development are the nature of the commodity, 
the modern world's insatiable thirst for electrical energy, and a substantial dependence 
on its uninterrupted supply. 
Some of the common terminology that one would expect to find in a textbook on the 
subject of electricity markets was introduced in Chapter 2. Electricity pools and auctions 
were defined, explaining their attributes and giving examples of variations in structure 
between and within markets. 
Simulation techniques in the form of scenario analysis, system dynamics, and commer-
cially implemeuted integrative modelling software are the main tools that have been 
identified for the strategic decision support of market players. 
The topic of risk management in power markets was addressed somewhat generally with 
a few detailed examples included for illustrating concepts. However, it was apparent 
that risk management is also a very large subject on its own. An awareness of the types 
of risks as well as their assessment, quantification and management, are all crucial to the 
development of any model of electricity trade, especially for the market participants, and 
the researchers who support them. Models, particularly those for individual participants, 
should be developed with a view to ultimately devising a decision support structure for 
tackling risk management issues. Such developments are in addition to the (currently) 
more pressing need for decision support in daily trading activities, which is characterised 
by the search for optimal trading and production scheduling strategies. 
The electricity spot price has proven to be a difficult variable to model accurately. It has 
been found by many researchers, and across various markets, to exhibit some interesting 
characteristics. The special mathematical features of the spot price variable, such as 
mean reversion. seasonality (stochastic volatility) and jumps make it difficult to handle 
in a modelling context. It is a key input or output variable in nearly all of the models of 
the literature [see subsection 7.1.3 on electricity prices below], including the price model 
of this thesis. The importance of the spot price lies in assessing levels of competition, 
in making the best strategy choices in the short, intermediate and long term, and in 
pricing derivatives and managing risks. 
The special features of the electricity commodity, such as its non-storability and knife-
edge balance of supply and demand, have led to tertiary markets which are unique in 
comparison to those of equities, interest rates and other commodities. In particular, 
derivatives are generally more complex in design, liquidity is limited, and risk man-
agement and instrument valuation present an even greater challenge. Some advanced 
analytical techniques have been developed by experts in derivative pricing and risk man-
agement, and futures-based pricing has become standard. Most of the methods for 
electricity derivative pricing and risk management tend toward simulation and numer-
ical methods so that the inherent complexities may be effectively captured. It seems 
that the study and development of tertiary electricity markets has almost superseded 
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the commoditisatioh process itself - probably as a result of the sudden unprecedented 
levels of uncertainty that have arisen, and the need to manage this uncertainty. 
7.1.3 Generator Trading Strategies 
Chapter 3 motivated the need for modelling and analysis of generator trading strategies. 
Within the discipline of trading strategies, there are three main concerns that much of 
the research tends to address. The concerns addressed are - with a variety of motives 
for both modelling and analysis - the notions of price formation, supply functions, and 
optimal offer strategies, all of which may be used in some way to capture the strategic 
behaviour of market participants. 
Electricity Prices 
Electricity prices are the key variable in any strategic decision support undertaken in 
electricity markets, and the unique characteristics of the variable emphasise the impor-
tance of choosing the appropriate modelling technique. Generally, prices (usually the 
SMP's of LMP's) are modelled as either endogenous or exogenous variables. 
The exogenous approach tends to focus on developing a parameterised mathematical 
model of the price in order to forecast future values for short to long term valuation of 
generation assets, and as an input into derivative contract pricing and risk management 
tools. The approach is of more immediate relevance for price-taking Genco's, who wish 
to capture the uncertainty with respect to rival behaviour through the electricity price, 
and who use the SMP forecast as a key determinant of their hourly, optimal-profit, 
trading strategy. 
The endogenous approach treats the electricity price as a key output in a system-wide 
model of a pool-type market. Broadly the approaches used are either equilibrium-based 
or non-equilibrium based. The actions of various market players, mainly generators -
and to a certain degree in some research, the large consumers - which are in competition 
for high profit trades, are captured via various modelling approaches. The intersection 
of the aggregate supply function with the aggregate demand forecast gives the resultant 
price. Such models are useful for regulatory and system-design support, for deciding on 
an appropriate market structure and identifying instances of unwanted market power 
and concentration. The models are also used by price-setting Genco's to analyse their 
strategic behaviour while capturing the behaviour of other market participants. Endoge-
nous price formation is often characterised by simulation and game-theoretic modelling 
approaches. 
The approach adopted in the model of this dissertation was largely endogenous, however 
the fixed effects model employed here was then modified to capture and investigate the 
effect a price-setting Genco has on the ultimate price outcome, and on their own profits 
and probabilities of acceptance. 
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Supply functions 
The key method of modelling the individual actions of Genco's - and in some of the 
literature, consumers' actions - in the daily power auctions is through supply functions. 
Supply functions represent Gencos' offering strategies and may have a number of mathe-
matical constructs, though essentially they contain the information about the quantities 
of electricity offered to the pool and the associated prices for these quantities. The 
function is therefore determined with reference to underlying cost functions of suppliers, 
as well as expt~cted prices, demands and system constraints. The simplest type is a 
single price for a fixed quantity of electricity, and is the type used in the model of this 
dissertation. 
Other research has described and developed continuous functions, piece-wise linear func-
tions, and the step/tranche functions which are most indicative of reality but are math-
ematically intrC~.ctable . 
The 'steps' in the step function are a natural way of representing the various units 
owned by a Genco, and the cumulative prices for offering these units into the power 
pool. Other types of supply functions are defined according to the specifics of market 
rules, or in accordance with modifications imposed by a modeller, or both. In models 
describing the impact of market design, supply functions are one of the key ways in which 
the factor governing this design may be controlled within the exploratory analyses . 
Demand functwns which represent the behaviour of consumers in the electricity mar-
ket (where demand-side bidding has been introduced) can be designed in an analogous 
manner to thar, of supply functions. 
Optimal Offering Strategies 
Closely related to the issue of supply functions, representations of the optimal strategies 
for participant'3 are also important for describing their behaviour, and indeed for deter-
mining the actual supply functions submitted by Genco's. Optimal strategies can be 
applied in a normative context for individual Gencos, or in a more descriptive manner 
when analysing the behaviour of other participants - either from the point of view of 
one competitor or from that of the system operator or regulator. 
Many strategies have been proposed with some often complex optimisation routines 
employed to solve for the optimal supply function. The procedure varies greatly with 
regard to the degree of complexity and the number of factors taken into account. Some 
of the variables are system demand, SMP, marginal cost, competitor behaviour, previ-
ous periods' strategies, derivative positions, and technical or system constraints, among 
others. 
Strategies also vary depending on whether markets are perfectly competitive or oligopoly 
in nature, whether an individual participant is a price-taker or price-setter, and whether 
the strategy horizon is short, intermediate or long term. 
The approach in the model of this dissertation has been to use an exploratory model 
where the Genco offers a fixed capacity at a price which is some level in the interval 
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between the MC and SMP forecasts. The model is devised with the ultimate inten-
tion of finding the optimal offer price level. A fundamental difference that exists in 
the description of offer strategy in Chapter 5's model, is the development of a para-
meterised decision process, which examines the expectations of the key variables, and 
where decisions are invoked on various threshold values of the forecasted variables. 
7.1.4 Research - fundamental needs and unsolved problems 
The fundamental needs for decision support tools by market participants can be classified 
according to the types of models that can be found in the literature. 
Normative models have been developed for finding the optimal offer strategy, production 
schedules or the optimal risk-aware portfolio of power contracts and derivatives. 
Descriptive models are more common and can be either system-wide or Genco-specific. 
They are used for examining the effects of strategies, market design, information, un-
certainty, type of supply functions and type of cost functions on particular dependent 
outcomes. The outcomes may include price-formation, offer strategy, competitor behav-
iour, and social welfare. Less subtly, there are models that price derivatives and measure 
various risk exposures. 
One of the apparent difficulties encountered is the lack of consensus among researchers 
as to exactly which type of approach is the most appropriate for treating uncertainties, 
e.g. those relating to prices. Indeed, the model of this dissertation is also unique. A 
major challenge relates to the design of a sufficiently competitive market, amid historical 
and proposed reforms, and taking an active role in suggesting alternatives. 
Pricing of the complex derivative instruments traded in advanced electricity markets 
has come along way, drawing on the most complex of the methods developed by re-
searchers in other tertiary markets. Without a substantive reliance on an underlying 
forward market, many of the suggested pricing techniques are of little use for instru-
ments which are based on the electricity spot price. Risk management has generally 
lagged in development, and techniques are slow in being adapted; possibly due to the 
ongoing development and adjustment to the market structures, and the general lack of 
liquidity for risk management tools. 
7.2 Local Context and Model Formulation 
7.2.1 The Notional Client 
Chapter 4 described the local context under which the issues arising from the literature 
survey were examined. The Eskom Peaking Cluster of the EPP was an obvious choice 
as a notional client for the development of the simulation model. The South African 
market had not fully deregulated at the time of writing owing to various political obsta-
cles, although unbundling had already taken place and the generation sector had been 
divided into notional clusters in preparation for full-scale competition. The sector was 
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not yet fully competitive as sales through the pool at the spot price were still being 
hedged through forward contracts with the holding company. The hedging was not 
taken into account in the model, as it was construed as being a temporary feature, and 
the model's aim was to focus on a fully competitive situation, from the perspective of a 
single Genco/cluster, with the possibility of including it at a later stage. 
Different types of generating plant will have correspondingly different strategies, and the 
pumped storage unit was the obvious choice given the data which was made available. 
Additionally, there are important social implications for understanding the behaviour 
of peaking units The status of the pumped storage scheme as a marginal unit in peak 
periods also made it an interesting candidate for the exploratory modelling. It was also 
of interest from a theoretical point of view, as its cost structure is unique, relying on 
the SMP's in the pumping hours , and lending itself to the development of demand-
side bidding models in the future (albeit from the perspective of a 'producer-buyer' of 
electricity). The notion of demand-side bidding is a useful concept paving the way for 
future inclusion of consumer participation in the market once it has advanced to that 
stage, and when the demand curve becomes non-vertical. Thus the use of a pumped 
storage unit as an illustrative client was motivated. 
In summary, the South African market (currently dominated by Eskom) - and the 
EPP itself - can be defined as a uniform-price, day-ahead market with no demand-side 
bidding (at the time of consultation), and a limited market for a few OTC derivative 
contracts traded between participants. The grid is an independent entity overseen by 
the NER. Genco's/ Clusters may offer a step-like supply function (one for each hour of 
the following day) to the EPP. Each function consists of tranches reflecting the number 
of units owned by the cluster, with cumulative volumes of power that depend on the 
potential capacities of the individual units. Assuming that a cluster wishes to make 
one or more of their units available, they must submit prices for the various blocks of 
capacity, to the EPP. Successful offers earn the SMP per unit of capacity contracted in 
the relevant hom, after the real-time production has been recorded and finalised. 
It should be noted that although the EPP represents a uniform price market, which 
tends to encourage generators to offer close to their MC, particular marginal/peaking-
type units will often tend to offer closer to their expectation of SMP. The tendency was 
examined in the analyses of Chapter 6. 
7.2.2 Relevance of Literature 
The literature f;urveyed in this dissertation was a small sample of a huge body of work 
on the subject, much of which is very recent and ongoing in nature. The important 
aspects gleaned highlight the types of problems encountered in power markets, but also 
indicate a level of diversity and disparity between the adopted approaches in tackling 
the challenges of strategic decision-making. The techniques have little in common with 
each other, or even with those used in the industry applications. It seems therefore, that 
there is a distinct lack of cohesion in the approaches, which can be explained by one or 
both of the following: 
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• Individual markets exhibit nniqnP characteristics with regard to design, level of 
deregulation, presence of derivative markets , and type of primary fuels or gener-
ating plants used. Consequently, decision support will be motivated by differing 
needs. 
• The subject is perhaps too broad (and the sample of literature too small) to reveal 
any commonalities or conseusus in approach. The model of this dissertation is no 
exception! 
One of the key insights arising from this study is the emphasis on model simplicity, and 
the wealth of detail and potential for experimentation that can be achieved using a model 
with only a few parameters . The approach is also logical as it is ground-up , building-
block in nature. The simple approach is one embraced by the model of Chapter 5, and 
herein lies a the major inconsistency with regard to simplicity. Of the models discussed 
in Chapters 2 and 3, the simple stylised simulations models are of greater appeal than 
those which are over-parameterised, and which attempt to capture every intricacy of the 
electric power system, together with the specifics of the new market conditions. 
Much of the literature was therefore more of a peripheral interest to the study in the 
local context, however it proved useful in enlightening potential modifications to the 
model and areas for further exploration. 
7.2.3 The Model 
The aims of the model were outlined in detail in the introductory chapter [Section 1.3]. 
The model, in its ultimate form, has achieved the nine express intentions outlined therein. 
The specifics of the model were discussed in detail in Chapter 5 and some of the funda-
mental features are now revised in this subsection. 
Although the model is not a complete description of reality, it has a simple structure 
with only three key variables: demand, cost and price. Its structure is one which can be 
easily modified to focus on specific areas of exploratory analysis, for example, the effect 
on the Genco's profits when it is able affect the price outcome through its own actions in 
the market. It also has a relatively small number of parameters which have a meaningful 
interpretation and fall naturally into homogenous groups pertaining to trading strategy, 
and endogenous or exogenous influences. · 
Through repeated simulations of a trader's actions in the daily auction, the effects and 
interactions of the selected parameters can be measured by carefully selecting levels 
for the parameters, and by using statistical techniques for designing and analysing the 
experimental outcomes. Several simplifications of a complex reality were made when 
designing the model, for example with regard to the supply function. Such simplifications 
were necessary, for both enabling preliminary formulation, and stressing the importance 
of ignoring unwanted complexities, which were thought to be non-relevant for the chosen 
study. 
Firstly, the state variables for a generic generation market were defined, and the set was 
refined and given specific parametric and functional definitions. One of the key advan-
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tages of the simulation model was that there was a distinction between the (unknown) ac-
tual values which had deterministic and stochastic components, and the Genco/trader's 
view of reality, used in their daily trading strategy (which itself was governed by a set 
of endogenous parameters). An analyst using this model is able to control various key 
features in the experimentation: 
• A deterministic model of the underlying variables, which may be based on historical 
data or some other model or source of information. The implementation of a fixed 
effects model using some data was given in Section 5.2 for illustrating such an 
adaptation. 
• Uncertainties occurring in reality; represented by the stochastic simulation errors 
of the actuals. 
• Proficiency of the client Genco in 'guessing' this reality before its realistic mani-
festation. 
• A particular trading strategy governed by parameter values, and an associated 
decision rule captured in the construction of the algorithm. 
The stochastic errors and forecasting ability can be sampled from prespecified parametric 
distributions. Parameter values for the other features can be chosen through preliminary 
'trial-and-error' simulation runs or by using fixed values that are representative of reality. 
The form of tbe final model is versatile, and open to adaptation with respect to both 
inputs and outputs, investigation horizon, trading rules, and parameter choices. Various 
possibilities were outlined in Chapters 5 and 6 and suggestions made where appropriate. 
7.3 Analyses and Findings 
7 .3.1 Simulation Results 
The experimental design and runs were explained in the first section of Chapter 6. The 
analysis was first conducted using mean profit as the dependent variable, and then using 
the mean acceptances. The latter served to qualify the results of the former, and further 
analysis could have been conducted on the remaining dependent variable, the mean 
offers, however the idea was left for future work. In both cases the main effects of the 
2-level design, describing the effect of each of the parameters were discussed in detaiL 
A selection of the most significant interactions were described and interpreted in each 
case. 
The meaning of the parameters was validated in most cases for the chosen levels, and 
explanations given where results were not as expected. The interactions were also of 
interest in explaining the relationships between the parameters. The main and inter-
active effects were of interest, however the emergence of other items of interest in the 
modelling process were also of great value. A prime example of the emergence of new 
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items of interest was the ability to qualify profit with offers accepted, and isolate the 
corresponding differences in the effects of parameters between the two responses. 
The immediate plausible options for future exploration under the present formulation 
range from using a different set of parameter values, to implementing 3-level designs (or 
designs of higher resolution to explore at least quadratic effects), to inclusion of other 
parameters not yet experimented with (such as the forecasting biases). Many other 
minor model modifications were also suggested and could be easily implemented. 
No difference in the analyses were observed between the one month and twelve month 
runs suggesting there is some unnecessary modelling of the deterministic functions, 
and/ or that there is something lacking with regard to the variable correlation struc-
ture. A further difficulty with the model was identifying an appropriate parameter set 
for the experiments, especially given the relatively long running time for the simula-
tions. The processing time could be mitigated through more efficient programming (and 
a faster computer!) and with greater assistance from the client in interpreting parameter 
values (including data provision). 
7.4 Recommendations for Further Study 
7.4.1 Capturing historical evolution 
One of the simplifications made in the original model formulation was that daily trading 
decisions were conducted independently of one another. Hence the model is in fact one 
of daily strategy, notwithstanding the fact that a 31 day horizon was used. 
An obvious refinement which would complicate the model to some degree - but would 
be necessary to extend the length of the strategy horizon - would be to conjecture a 
strategy dependent on the historical outcomes of previous trading actions. For example, 
in the terminology of Section 5.2, we could offer a price Yt for a block of energy in hour 
t such that 
Yt = f(Yt-24, Yt-48, · · ·, Yt-24j, Pt-24, Pt-48 , ·. ·, Pt-24k) 
Here we have a more general case where the strategy in the model would depend on a 
history of offers up to j days before, and profits in the hours up to k days prior to the 
current trading hour; the offer price for hour t would depend on the history in some way 
as governed by the function f ( ·). 
The above modification is a very simple example. Of course one would also wish to 
allow for the estimates D 1 ( t), C 1 ( t) and S 1 ( t) in such a representation of trading strategy, 
however the example does serve as an initial illustration of the type of modifications that 
could be considered if the client Genco were able to motivate the need for such detail. 
Moreover, it is only the offer price that has been considered as a potential regressor. 
The 'when' part of the strategy could also be analogously reformulated. 
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7.4.2 Forward contracting and derivatives 
A possible realistic refinement of existing model representation would be the inclusion 
of forward contracts. The profit variable in the model could be adjusted to include 
a term for the income/loss arising from any forward agreement/CFD positions in the 
daily trading model. A simple addition of the terms defined on page 50 (Chapter 2) 
would suffice a.s an initial modification to the output, although there are many possible 
variations on this theme. 
Should the South African market become completely liberalised (and a more liquid mar-
ket for contracts and derivatives becomes a reality), the techniques covered in Section 2.5 
would prove useful for designing appropriate financial instruments, and for valuing them 
and managing 1 heir associated risks. There are a range of options, swaps and risk man-
agement techniques that were explained in that section. 
7 .4.3 Risk management 
Chapter 2 gave 'lOme vital indications as to the ultimate use for many models of electricity 
markets. Herein lie many obvious adaptations to the model of this dissertation. 
One possibility is to examine the distribution of profit outcomes of the simulation ex-
periments. In Chapter 6 only the mean profits and mean acceptances were treated as 
the response of interest . From the distributions one could devise various metrics for 
risk such as Vall which could be used to measure profit variability and/or robustness to 
various parameterisations. Measurement of variability and robustness to parameterisa-
tions constitute what we understand by sensitivity analysis and can be applied to profit 
distributions or even to distributions of acceptance probabilities. Analyses of this sort 
could be achieved through simple modification of the way in which the outputs of the 
experiments are handled in the both the output module of the algorithm, and in the 
post-run analysis. 
7.4.4 Analysis of input variables 
Section 2.4 also provided a selection of models for spot prices. The models may be tested 
and/or validated on the historical data provided by Peaking, and a suitable model for 
prices in the South African market could be developed. The testing and validation of data 
would constitute a quantitative analysis of the SMP's and could be used to investigate 
whether the SMP's in the EPP exhibit the mean reversion, stochastic volatility and 
jumps which characterise the prices in other markets. 
Similar investigations could also be conducted on the other input variables such as 
demand and marginal cost (especially for thermal generators in the latter). 
Correlation structures between system variables could also be investigated through sta-
tistical analysis of historical data, and then be included in the model where appropriate. 
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7.4.5 Other possibilities 
There are many other potential modifications which could be enscted. Such modifica-
tions have been summarised above and some specifics were also mentioned in Chapters 5 
and 6. A selection of the modifications that were mentioned were: 
• Formulation of a generic representation of other types of generating units. 
• Including more detail with regard to system and technical constraints such as 
outages. 
• Introduction of demand-side bidding for the pumping costs (discussed in Chap-
ter 5). 
More generally, there is scope for more advanced research in the way of: 
• Normative modelling under a parameterised version of the model. Examples -
for a single generating unit - · include finding the optimal offering strategy (under 
various scenarios or parameterisations), and introducing multiple criteria for de-
termining the optimal strategies. The modelling could also be done with respect 
to a Genco by amalgamating generating units (i.e. increasing the complexity of 
the supply function). 
• System-wide descriptive models: by adding replicates of the single Genco into the 
system model (with some distinguishing modifications), a model could be devised 
of two or more Genco's that could even be extended to include large consumers. 
Such models could be used for supply function and price-formation analyses. 
7 .4.6 Final comment 
The theoretical nature of the study and academic interpretation should not belie the 
ability of this model to be used in a realistic implementation. The client of the analysis, 
supplied useful generic information on the importance of particular variables in the 
trading process, namely the SMP, MC, system demand and competitor behaviour. The 
system variables have all been suitably represented in the formulation and subsequent 
analysis. The one important aspect that has not been captured, but which offers a 
natural avenue for further research, is the success of historical offers and profit takings. 
The appropriate modifications for incorporating offer and profit history were explained 
earlier in this section. 
A critical examination of the suitability of the model in providing a robust method of 
strategic analysis has been made, and the approach exhibits versatility, simplicity, and 
ease of implementation. The model has much of the appeal in the manner of Bower and 
Bunn [8], who favour "stylised models, ignoring much of the complexity of market" while 
allowing isolation of design aspects (e.g. uniform price versus pay-as-bid or daily versus 
hourly trading), encouraging learning through simulation, and measuring the effects of 
information availability. Such models can succeed with a few exogenous variables for 
177 
the various uncertainties, and aim to capture the main ideals with regard to strategic 
decision-makin;~. 
The study of this dissertation has motivated the use of simple simulation-based modelling 
for understanding systems which are inherently as complex and dynamic as markets for 
electrical energy. The challenges arising from the two merging streams of production 
optimisation and market participation, can thus be explored, understood, and ultimately 
resolved. 
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Appendix A 
Appendix 
A.l Ito's Lemma and Option Valuation Formulae 
Ito's Lemma The lemma is a specific treatment of a stochastic variable and uses the 
assumption of being able to continuously hedge the value of another stochastic 
variable which is in the defining equation for the first variable. If x is the first 
variable and follows an Ito process: 
dx = a(x, t)dt + b(x, t)dz 
where dz is a Wiener process and a and bare functions of x and t. The variable 
has drift of a and variance b2 . Ito's lemma shows that a function G, of x and t 
follows the process then 
Thus G also follows an Ito process with drift equal to the term in the first bracket 
and variance rate equal to the square of the term in the second bracket. 
Black-Scholes formula for the price of a simple call option: 
1. Price of a call option on the spot asset 
where 
and 
C(t) = S<P(d)- Ke-r(T-t)<P(d- uvT- t) 
d = _In_( 8--'-/_K_)_+----,( r=+=-=~ u=-2-'--) ('-T_-_t-'-) 
uff=t 
C(t) is the value at time t of a European call option with strike 
price K and maturity date T 
<!~(·) is the cumulative distribution function of a N(O, 1) random 
variable 
r is the risk free rate of return 
u is the standard deviation of spot price returns 
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2. Formula for an option on a futures agreement 
C(t, s) = P(t , T)[F(t, s)ci>(h) - Ki.f>(h- cn/T- t)] 
where 
h = _In-=-[ F_(_t ,_s )_/_K-=] =+==1=-u_2 (_T_-_t_) 
u~ 
and 
C(t , s) is the value at time t of a European call option on a futures 
contract maturing at s and with strike price K and option 
maturity date T 
P(t , T) is the value of aT-maturity pure discount bond 
Put-Call Parity 
C(t) + Ke-r(T-t) = P(t) + S 
Here P(t) is the corresponding European put price. The put-call parity formula 
often used for calculating the value of a corresponding put option once we know 
the price of the call. 
American option - A general analytical formula for valuing an option with early ex-
ercise possibilities is: 
where 
C* (e) 
w[t,T] 
C(t) = max Et [exp (- fe r(u)du) C*(e)] 
OE'lt[t,T) lt 
is the payoff when exercised at time (} 
is the class of all early exercise strategies implicitly determined 
from the spot price tree 
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A.2 Experimental Design 
The three generators of the fract ion alias arrangements that were chosen to avoid con-
founding of main and second order effects (with each other and with higher order effects) 
were: 
p with {3 X a"! X h X f 
e with a"~ x h x aD x a s 
p with {3 X h X aD X d 
Table A.1: Design matrix for the 2(10- 3) fractional factorial 
design 
Run f3 a"' h a D as d f p e p 
1 0.2 0.12 6 0.11 0.11 22000 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.3 
2 0.8 0.12 6 0.11 0.11 22000 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.1 
3 0.2 0.29 6 0.11 0.11 22000 0.9 0.1 0.6 0.3 
4 0.8 0.29 6 0.11 0.11 22000 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.1 
5 0.2 0.12 10 0.11 0.11 22000 0.9 0.1 0.6 0.1 
6 0.8 0.12 10 0.11 0.11 22000 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.3 
7 0.2 0.29 10 0.11 0.11 22000 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.1 
8 0.8 0.29 10 0.11 0.11 22000 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.3 
9 0.2 0.12 6 0.26 0.11 22000 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.1 
10 0.8 0.12 6 0.26 0.11 22000 0.9 0.1 0.6 0.3 
11 0.2 0.29 6 0.26 0.11 22000 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.1 
12 0.8 0.29 6 0.26 0.11 22000 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.3 
13 0.2 0.12 10 0.26 0.11 22000 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.3 
14 0.8 0.12 10 0.26 0.11 22000 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.1 
15 0.2 0.29 10 0.26 0.11 22000 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.3 
16 0.8 0.29 10 0.26 0.11 22000 0.9 0.1 0.6 0.1 
17 0.2 0.12 6 0.11 0.26 22000 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.3 
18 0.8 0.12 6 0.11 0.26 22000 0.9 0.1 0.6 0.1 
19 0.2 0.29 6 0.11 0.26 22000 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.3 
20 0.8 0.29 6 0.11 0.26 22000 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.1 
21 0.2 0.12 10 0.11 0.26 22000 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.1 
22 0.8 0.12 10 0.11 0.26 22000 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.3 
23 0.2 0.29 10 0.11 0.26 22000 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.1 
24 0.8 0.29 10 0.11 0.26 22000 0.9 0.1 0.6 0.3 
25 0.2 0.12 6 0.26 0.26 22000 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.1 
26 0.8 0.12 6 0.26 0.26 22000 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.3 
27 0.2 0.29 6 0.26 0.26 22000 0.9 0.1 0.6 0.1 
28 0.8 0.29 6 0.26 0.26 22000 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.3 
29 0.2 0.12 10 0.26 0.26 22000 0.9 0.1 0.6 0.3 
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Table A.l: (continued) 
Run (3 (]""( h O"D us d f p e p 
30 0.8 0.12 10 0.26 0.26 22000 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.1 
31 0.2 0.29 10 0.26 0.26 22000 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.3 
32 0.8 0.29 10 0.26 0.26 22000 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.1 
33 0.2 0.12 6 0.11 0.11 28000 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.1 
~ 0.8 0.12 6 0.11 0.11 28000 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.3 
35 0.2 0.29 6 0.11 0.11 28000 0.9 0.1 0.6 0.1 
36 0.8 0.29 6 0.11 0.11 28000 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.3 
37 0.2 0.12 10 0.11 0.11 28000 0.9 0.1 0.6 0.3 
38 0.8 0.12 10 0.11 0.11 28000 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.1 
c---· 
39 0.2 0.29 10 0.11 0.11 28000 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.3 
40 0.8 0.29 10 0.11 0.11 28000 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.1 
41 0.2 0.12 6 0.26 0.11 28000 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.3 
42 0.8 0.12 6 0.26 0.11 28000 0.9 0.1 0.6 0.1 
43 0.2 0.29 6 0.26 0.11 28000 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.3 
~ 0.8 0.29 6 0.26 0.11 28000 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.1 
45 0.2 0.12 10 0.26 0.11 28000 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.1 
46 0.8 0.12 10 0.26 0.11 28000 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.3 
47 0.2 0.29 10 0.26 0.11 28000 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.1 
48 0.8 0.29 10 0.26 0.11 28000 0.9 0.1 0.6 0.3 
49 0.2 0.12 6 0.11 0.26 28000 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.1 
50 0.8 0.12 6 0.11 0.26 28000 0.9 0.1 0.6 0.3 
51 0.2 0.29 6 0.11 0.26 28000 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.1 
52 0.8 0.29 6 0.11 0.26 28000 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.3 
53 0.2 0.12 10 0.11 0.26 28000 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.3 
~ 0.8 0.12 10 0.11 0.26 28000 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.1 
55 0.2 0.29 10 0.11 0.26 28000 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.3 
56 0.8 0.29 10 0.11 0.26 28000 0.9 0.1 0.6 0.1 
57 0.2 0.12 6 0.26 0.26 28000 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.3 
58 0.8 0.12 6 0.26 0.26 28000 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.1 
59 0.2 0.29 6 0.26 0.26 28000 0.9 0.1 0.6 0.3 
60 0.8 0.29 6 0.26 0.26 28000 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.1 
61 0.2 0.12 10 0.26 0.26 28000 0.9 0.1 0.6 0.1 
62 0.8 0.12 10 0.26 0.26 28000 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.3 
63 0.2 0.29 10 0.26 0.26 28000 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.1 
64 0.8 0.29 10 0.26 0.26 28000 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.3 
65 0.2 0.12 6 0.11 0.11 22000 1.8 0.1 0.8 0.3 
66 0.8 0.12 6 0.11 0.11 22000 1.8 0.9 0.8 0.1 
67 0.2 0.29 6 0.11 0.11 22000 1.8 0.9 0.6 0.3 
68 0.8 0.29 6 0.11 0.11 22000 1.8 0.1 0.6 0.1 
69 0.2 0.12 10 0.11 0.11 22000 1.8 0.9 0.6 0.1 
70 0.8 0.12 10 0.11 0.11 22000 1.8 0.1 0.6 0.3 
71 0.2 0.29 10 0.11 0.11 22000 1.8 0.1 0.8 0.1 
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Table A.l: (continued) 
Run {3 a, h aD as d f p e p 
72 0.8 0.29 10 0.11 0.11 22000 1.8 0.9 0.8 0.3 
73 0.2 0.12 6 0.26 0.11 22000 1.8 0.1 0.6 0.1 
74 0.8 0.12 6 0.26 0.11 22000 1.8 0.9 0.6 0.3 
75 0.2 0.29 6 0.26 0.11 22000 1.8 0.9 0.8 0.1 
76 0.8 0.29 6 0.26 0.11 22000 1.8 0.1 0.8 0.3 
77 0.2 0.12 10 0.26 0.11 22000 1.8 0.9 0.8 0.3 
78 0.8 0.12 10 0.26 0.11 22000 1.8 0.1 0.8 0.1 
79 0.2 0.29 10 0.26 0.11 22000 1.8 0.1 0.6 0.3 
80 0.8 0.29 10 0.26 0.11 22000 1.8 0.9 0.6 0.1 
81 0.2 0.12 6 0.11 0.26 22000 1.8 0.1 0.6 0.3 
82 0.8 0.12 6 0.11 0.26 22000 1.8 0.9 0.6 0.1 
83 0.2 0.29 6 0.11 0.26 22000 1.8 0.9 0.8 0.3 
84 0.8 0.29 6 0.11 0.26 22000 1.8 0.1 0.8 0.1 
85 0.2 0.12 10 0.11 0.26 22000 1.8 0.9 0.8 0.1 
86 0.8 0.12 10 0.11 0.26 22000 1.8 0.1 0.8 0.3 
87 0.2 0.29 10 0.11 0.26 22000 1.8 0.1 0.6 0.1 
88 0.8 0.29 10 0.11 0.26 22000 1.8 0.9 0.6 0.3 
89 0.2 0.12 6 0.26 0.26 22000 1.8 0.1 0.8 0.1 
90 0.8 0.12 6 0.26 0.26 22000 1.8 0.9 0.8 0.3 
91 0.2 0.29 6 0.26 0.26 22000 1.8 0.9 0.6 0.1 
92 0.8 0.29 6 0.26 0.26 22000 1.8 0.1 0.6 0.3 
93 0.2 0.12 10 0.26 0.26 22000 1.8 0.9 0.6 0.3 
94 0.8 0.12 10 0.26 0.26 22000 1.8 0.1 0.6 0.1 
95 0.2 0.29 10 0.26 0.26 22000 1.8 0.1 0.8 0.3 
96 0.8 0.29 10 0.26 0.26 22000 1.8 0.9 0.8 0.1 
97 0.2 0.12 6 0.11 0.11 28000 1.8 0.1 0.8 0.1 
98 0.8 0.12 6 0.11 0.11 28000 1.8 0.9 0.8 0.3 
99 0.2 0.29 6 0.11 0.11 28000 1.8 0.9 0.6 0.1 
100 0.8 0.29 6 0.11 0.11 28000 1.8 0.1 0.6 0.3 
101 0.2 0.12 10 0.11 0.11 28000 1.8 0.9 0.6 0.3 
102 0.8 0.12 10 0.11 0.11 28000 1.8 0.1 0.6 0.1 
103 0.2 0.29 10 0.11 0.11 28000 1.8 0.1 0.8 0.3 
104 0.8 0.29 10 0.11 0.11 28000 1.8 0.9 0.8 0.1 
105 0.2 0.12 6 0.26 0.11 28000 1.8 0.1 0.6 0.3 
106 0.8 0.12 6 0.26 0.11 28000 1.8 0.9 0.6 0.1 
107 0.2 0.29 6 0.26 0.11 28000 1.8 0.9 0.8 0.3 
108 0.8 0.29 6 0.26 0.11 28000 1.8 0.1 0.8 0.1 
109 0.2 0.12 10 0.26 0.11 28000 1.8 0.9 0.8 0.1 
110 0.8 0.12 10 0.26 0.11 28000 1.8 0.1 0.8 0.3 
111 0.2 0.29 10 0.26 0.11 28000 1.8 0.1 0.6 0.1 
112 0.8 0.29 10 0.26 0.11 28000 1.8 0.9 0.6 0.3 
113 0.2 0.12 6 0.11 0.26 28000 1.8 0.1 0.6 0.1 
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Table A.1: (continued) 
r-=--· 
Rmt (3 u, h CJD us d f p e p 
114 0.8 0.12 6 0.11 0.26 28000 1.8 0.9 0.6 0.3 
115 0.2 0.29 6 0.11 0.26 28000 1.8 0.9 0.8 0.1 
11(. 0.8 0.29 6 0.11 0.26 28000 1.8 0.1 0.8 0.3 
111 0.2 0.12 10 0.11 0.26 28000 1.8 0.9 0.8 0.3 
liE- 0.8 0.12 10 0.11 0.26 28000 1.8 0.1 0.8 0.1 
119 0.2 0.29 10 0.11 0.26 28000 1.8 0.1 0.6 0.3 
120 0.8 0.29 10 0.11 0.26 28000 1.8 0.9 0.6 0.1 
121 0.2 0.12 6 0.26 0.26 28000 1.8 0.1 0.8 0.3 
122 0.8 0.12 6 0.26 0.26 28000 1.8 0.9 0.8 0.1 
~ 0.2 0.29 6 0.26 0.26 28000 1.8 0.9 0.6 0.3 
124 0.8 0.29 6 0.26 0.26 28000 1.8 0.1 0.6 0.1 
125 0.2 0.12 10 0.26 0.26 28000 1.8 0.9 0.6 0.1 
126 0.8 0.12 10 0.26 0.26 28000 1.8 0.1 0.6 0.3 
127 0.2 0.29 10 0.26 0.26 28000 1.8 0.1 0.8 0.1 
128 0.8 0.29 10 0.26 0.26 28000 1.8 0.9 0.8 0.3 
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A.3 Simulation Results 
Table A.2: Results for the 2(l0- 3) fractional factorial design 
Run Mean Mean Mean 
Profit Acceptances Offers 
1 902502 118 185 
2 379372 185 185 
3 869421 182 185 
4 651059 108 185 
5 668507 230 273 
6 398696 137 276 
7 969996 160 262 
8 373778 266 269 
9 386549 69 185 
10 134099 178 185 
11 1093194 184 185 
12 515773 81 185 
13 1024575 277 285 
14 493733 133 283 
15 383415 106 249 
16 107272 201 244 
17 582020 107 185 
18 251723 183 185 
19 1115600 185 185 
20 885156 120 185 
21 1035930 263 265 
22 697626 159 266 
23 563638 124 232 
24 200880 203 238 
25 545421 79 185 
26 235621 185 185 
27 763023 176 185 
28 326973 76 184 
29 438613 192 244 
30 175943 98 243 
31 623018 118 252 
32 253783 237 249 
33 359944 61 92 
34 127375 81 82 
35 522913 126 137 
36 302628 72 124 
37 176579 56 66 
38 119910 38 73 
39 412996 71 117 
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Table A.2: (continued) 
Run Mean Mean Mean 
Profit Acceptances Offers 
40 197821 128 130 
41 139573 37 75 
42 32980 77 83 
43 581553 130 134 
44 355372 77 148 
45 297897 74 75 
46 132494 34 68 
47 216796 52 118 
48 39660 89 109 
49 333540 80 139 
50 135335 129 139 
51 812849 160 163 
52 549951 103 159 
53 508039 128 129 
54 352724 78 130 
55 276868 67 129 
56 131967 117 134 
57 383333 77 146 
58 129056 143 148 
59 423337 131 146 
60 237767 71 152 
61 230895 96 119 
62 86758 48 117 
63 394425 68 144 
64 126412 133 139 
65 1089720 170 170 
66 771593 104 168 
67 434977 47 83 
68 225197 92 92 
69 158811 17 34 
70 78419 34 34 
71 872332 120 120 
72 552136 69 116 
73 501468 105 106 
74 198571 30 107 
75 637721 71 165 
76 270225 163 163 
77 343159 43 136 
78 189220 135 135 
79 327040 61 61 
80 160307 19 66 
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Table A.2: (continued) 
Run Mean Mean Mean 
Profit Acceptances Offers 
81 424027 65 65 
82 271390 34 66 
83 833577 97 152 
84 370634 157 157 
85 477194 57 101 
86 203527 98 98 
87 377995 47 47 
88 181023 19 39 
89 861395 162 162 
90 391928 61 161 
91 337431 37 105 
92 120228 98 99 
93 70161 8 47 
94 56097 48 49 
95 698334 123 124 
96 369831 48 129 
97 342473 52 52 
98 225507 30 47 
99 262893 27 46 
100 87449 37 37 
101 46367 5 9 
102 25341 10 10 
103 361963 51 51 
104 299382 35 59 
105 137475 27 27 
106 60702 8 29 
107 281528 34 81 
108 154412 92 92 
109 103107 12 38 
110 50743 34 34 
111 198852 32 32 
112 57310 7 27 
113 220829 32 32 
114 132726 16 32 
115 567845 64 99 
116 202590 92 92 
117 219404 26 48 
118 107660 50 50 
119 167046 21 21 
120 149912 15 28 
121 444296 86 86 
187 
Table A.2: (continued) 
Run Mean Mean 
Profit Acceptances 
122 227300 
123 148074 
124 88993 
125 41548 
126 26495 
127 455720 
128 168805 
A.4 VBA Code 
Option Explicit 
'SIMULATION PARAMETERS: 
'Iterations and time horizon 
Public N As Integer, T As Integer 
'Offer price factor 
Public bidprop As Double 
'Strategy parameters 
Public min_D As Double, bidfac As Double 
'Bias parameters 
Public xi_D As Double, xi_S As Double 
'Precision parameters 
Public sigma_D As Double, sigma_S As Double 
'Noise in actuals 
Public rho As Double, sigma_gamma As Double 
36 
17 
62 
4 
23 
73 
23 
'Efficiency parameter for pumped storage scheme 
Public eff As Double 
'Influence parameter for a price-setter 
Public beta As Double 
'Hours of pumping/trading 
Public hrs As Double 
'assigning dimensions and types to variables 
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Mean 
Offers 
88 
55 
62 
24 
24 
73 
68 
'Unit fixed capacity per hour 
Dim g As Double 
'variables for actuals' stochasticity 
Dim gammaD(O To 8760) As Double, gammaS(O To 8760) As Double 
'Actual demands and SMP's 
Dim D_a(l To 8760) As Double, S_a(l To 8760) As Double 
'Forecast demands and SMP's 
Dim D_f(l To 8760) As Double, S_f(l To 8760) As Double 
'Daily, yearly and final profits 
Dim Sum_profit(O To 24) As Double, yearly_profit() As Double, _ 
yvalues() As Double 
'Daily, yearly and final numbers of offers accepted 
Dim Sum_accept(O To 24) As Integer, yearly_accept() As Integer, _ 
total_accept() As Integer 
'Daily, yearly and final numbers of offers made 
Dim Sum_offer As Integer, yearly_offer() As Integer, _ 
total_offer() As Integer 
'Day and iteration indexes 
Dim day As Integer, Iter As Integer 
'row offset for outputs 
Dim row_offset As Integer 
'metasimulation variable 
Public v As Integer 
Dim vmax As Integer 
Sub Metasimulation() 
Application.ScreenUpdating False 
'Clear output area 
Worksheets("Results").Range("a:z").Clearcontents 
vmax = Application.WorksheetFunction . CountA(Worksheets("Inputs"). _ 
Range ( "a50", "a30000")) 
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Call Actual 
Call Set_parameters 
For v = 1 To vmax 
beta= Worksheets("Inputs") .Range("a50") .Offset(v- 1, 1) .Value 
sigma_gamma = Worksheets("Inputs").Range("a50") .Offset(v- 1, 2)_ 
.Value 
hrs = Worksheets("Inputs").Range("a50").0ffset(v- 1, 3).Value 
sigma_S = Worksheets("Inputs").Range("a50") .Offset(v- 1, 4).Value 
sigma_D = Worksheets("Inputs").Range("a50").0ffset(v- 1, 5).Value 
min_D = Worksheets("Inputs").Range("a50").0ffset(v- 1, 6).Value 
bidfac = Worksheets("Inputs").Range("a50").0ffset(v- 1, 7).Value 
bidprop = Worksheets("Inputs").Range("a50").0ffset(v- 1, B).Value 
eff = Worksheets("Inputs").Range("a50") .0ffset(v- 1, 9).Value 
row_offset = (N + 7) * (v - 1) 
Randomize 
Call Simulate 
Call Output 
'save workbook after each simulation 
ActiveWorkbook.Save 
Next v 
End Sub 
Sub Set_parameters() 
'time horizon 
T = Worksheets("Inputs").Range("c10").Value 
'simulation iterations 
N = Worksheets("Inputs").Range("c11").Value 
'Capacity 
g = Worksheets("Inputs").Range("e31").Value 
'SMP influence 
'beta= Worksheets("Inputs").Range("e35").Value 
'Pumped Storage efficiency 
'eff = Worksheets("Inputs") . Range("f11").Value 
'Trading/Pumping hours 
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'hrs = Worksheets("Inputs") . Range("e39").Value 
'Actuals' stochasticity 
rho= Worksheets("Inputs") . Range("c20").Value 
'sigma_gamma = Worksheets("Inputs").Range("c21") . Value 
'Trader's conjecture biases and precisions (forecasts) 
xi_D Worksheets("Inputs").Range("c15").Value 
xi_S = Worksheets("Inputs").Range("c16").Value 
'Forecast precisions 
'sigma_D Worksheets("Inputs").Range("f15").Value 
'sigma_S = Worksheets("Inputs").Range("f16").Value 
'Offer price proportion 
'bidprop = Worksheets("Inputs").Range("c25").Value 
'Demand Threshold (when to bid) 
'min_D = Worksheets("Inputs").Range("e21").Value 
'Strategy factor (when to bid) 
'bidfac Worksheets("Inputs").Range("e25").Value 
End Sub 
Sub Actual() 
'Worksheets("test").Range("b1:d8761").Clearcontents 
Call Demand 
Call SMP 
End Sub 
Sub Demand() 
Dim i As Integer, j As Integer, k As Integer, l As Integer 
Dim mu_D As Double 
'Hourly, daily and monthly effects 
Dim h(1 To 24) As Double, d(1 To 7) As Double, m(1 To 12) As Double 
'variable for actuals 
Dim Days(1 To 31) As Integer 
Dim Sumdays(O To 365) As Integer 
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'mean demand 
mu_D = 1Jorksheets("Demand").Range("c3").Value 
'hourly factors 
For k = 1 To 24 
h(k) = Worksheets("Demand").Range("b6") .0ffset(k- 1, O).Value 
Next k 
'daily factors 
For k = 1 To 7 
d(k) = Worksheets("Demand").Range("e6").0ffset(k- 1, O).Value 
Next k 
'monthly factors 
For k = 1 To 12 
m(k) = Worksheets("Demand").Range("h6").0ffset(k- 1, O).Value 
Next k 
'algorithm for producing hourly log demand values 
Sumdays(O) = 0 
Worksheet~("test").Range("b1").Value ="Demand" 
For 1 = 1 To 12 
Days(l) = Worksheets("demand"). Range("i6"). Offset(! - 1, 0). Value 
Sumdays(l) = Sumdays(l - 1) + Days(l) 
For i = (24 * Sumdays(l - 1) + 1) To (Sumdays(l - 1) + Days(l)) * 24 
'Day of the week effects 
If (Int((i - 1) I 24) + 1) Mod 7 > 0 Then 
j = (Int((i - 1) I 24) + 1) Mod 7 
Else: j = 7 
End If 
'Hourly effects 
If i Mod 24 > 0 Then 
k = 1 Mod 24 
Else: k = 24 
End If 
'Total deterministic effect 
D_a(i) = mu_D + d(j) + h(k) + m(l) 
'Output demand to test 
'Worksheets("test") .Range("b1 "). Offset(i, 0) 
Next i 
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Exp(D_a(i)) 
Next l 
End Sub 
Sub SMP() 
Dim i As Integer, j As Integer, k As Integer, l As Integer 
Dim mu_S As Double 
'Hourly, daily and monthly effects 
Dim h(1 To 24) As Double, d(1 To 7) As Double, m(1 To 12) As Double 
'variable for actuals 
Dim Days(1 To 31) As Integer 
Dim Sumdays(O To 365) As Integer 
'mean demand 
mu_S = Worksheets("SMP") .Range("c3") .Value 
'hourly factors 
For k = 1 To 24 
h(k) = Worksheets("SMP").Range("b6").0ffset(k- 1, O) .Value 
Next k 
'daily factors 
For k = 1 To 7 
d(k) = Worksheets("SMP").Range("e6").0ffset(k- 1, O).Value 
Next k 
'monthly factors 
For k = 1 To 12 
m(k) = Worksheets("SMP").Range("h6").0ffset(k- 1, O).Value 
Next k 
'algorithm for producing hourly log SMP values 
Sumdays(O) = 0 
Worksheets("test").Range("c1").Value = "SMP" 
For l = 1 To 12 
Days(l) = Worksheets("SMP").Range("i6").0ffset(l- 1, O).Value 
Sumdays(l) = Sumdays(l - 1) + Days(l) 
For i = (24 * Sumdays(l - 1) + 1) To (Sumdays(l - 1) + Days(l)) * 24 
'Day of the week effects 
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If (Int((i - 1) I 24) + 1) Mod 7 > 0 Then 
j = (Int((i - 1) I 24) + 1) Mod 7 
Else: j = 7 
End If 
'Hourly effects 
If i Mod 24 > 0 Then 
k = i Mod 24 
Else: k = 24 
End If 
'Total deterministic effect 
S_a(i) = mu_S + d(j) + h(k) + m(l) 
'Output SMP's to test 
'Worksheets("test").Range("c1").0ffset(i, 0) 
Next i 
Next 1 
End Sub 
Sub Dailytrade() 
'daily variables ordered as per forecast SMP's 
Dim OS_f(1 To 24) As Double, OS_a(1 To 24) As Double 
Dim 0Sinf_a(1 To 24) As Double 
Dim OD_f(1 To 24) As Double, OD_a(1 To 24) As Double 
Dim SumOS_f(O To 24) As Double, SumOS_a(O To 24) 
'Actual and forecast marginal costs 
Dim MC_a As Double, MC_f As Double 
'Offer price 
Dim y(1 To 24) As Double 
'Potential offers 
Exp(S_a(i)) 
Dim offer(1 To 24) As Integer, countoffer(O To 25) As Integer 
'Hourly profits 
Dim prof(1 To 24) As Double 
'Accepted offers 
Dim accept(1 To 24) As Integer 
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'Miscellaneous integers 
Dim hr As Integer, k As Integer, l As Integer, mAs Integer, _ 
r As Integer, s As Integer 
For hr = 1 To 24 
Randomize 
'Generate actuals' noise 
gammaD(hr + 24 * (day- 1)) = rho * gammaD(hr - 1 + 24 * (day - 1))_ 
+(1 - rho) * Application.WorksheetFunction.Norminv(0.001 + 0.998 * 
Rnd(), 0, sigma_gamma) 
gammaS(hr + 24 * (day - 1)) = rho * gammaS(hr - 1 + 24 * (day- 1))_ 
+(1 - rho) * Application.WorksheetFunction.Norminv(0.001 + 0.998 * 
Rnd(), 0, sigma_gamma) 
'Forecast, demands and spot prices 
D_f(hr + 24 * (day- 1)) = D_a(hr + 24 * (day- 1)) + _ 
gammaD(hr + 24 * (day - 1)) + Application.WorksheetFunction._ 
Norminv (0.001 + 0.998 * Rnd(), xi_D, sigma_D) 
S_f(hr + 24 * (day - 1)) = S_a(hr + 24 * (day - 1)) + _ 
gammaS(hr + 24 * (day - 1)) + Application.WorksheetFunction._ 
Norminv (0.001 + 0.998 * Rnd(), xi_S, sigma_S) 
'Output demands and SMP's 
Worksheets("Calc").Range("b1").0ffset(hr, 0) 
(day- 1))) 
Worksheets("Calc").Range("c1").0ffset(hr, 0) 
(day - 1))) 
Worksheets("Calc").Range("d1").0ffset(hr, 0) 
(day- 1)) + gammaD(hr + 24 * (day - 1))) 
Worksheets("Calc").Range("e1").0ffset(hr, 0) 
(day - 1)) + gammaS(hr + 24 * (day - 1))) 
Next hr 
'Sort all by forecast SMP's 
Call Sort 
'Read in ordered variables 
For k = 1 To 24 
Exp(D_f(hr + 24 * 
Exp(S_f(hr + 24 * 
Exp(D_a(hr + 24 * 
Exp(S_a(hr + 24 * 
OD_f(k) Worksheets("Calc").Range("b1").0ffset(k, 0) 
OS_f(k) Worksheets("Calc").Range("c1").0ffset(k, 0) 
OD_a(k) Worksheets("Calc").Range("d1").0ffset(k, 0) 
OS_a(k) Worksheets("Calc").Range("e1").0ffset(k, 0) 
Next k 
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SumOS_f(O) 0 
SumOS_a(O) 0 
'Calculate average HC's: forecast and actual 
For l = 1 To hrs 
SumOS_f(l) SumOS_f(l - 1) + OS_f(l) 
SumOS_a(l) = SumOS_a(l - 1) + OS_a(l) 
Next l 
HC_f = (SumOS_f(hrs) I eff) I hrs 
HC_a = (SumOS_a(hrs) I eff) I hrs 
'Worksheets("Calc").Range("g1").Value = HC_f 
'Worksheets("Calc").Range("h1").Value = HC_a 
'Count total potential offers for the day 
countoffer(hrs) = 0 
For m = hrs + 1 To 24 
If OD_f(m) > min_D And OS_f(m) > bidfac * HC_f Then 
offer(m) = 1 
Else: offer(m) = 0 
End If 
'Worksheets("Calc").Range("h2").0ffset(m- 1, 0) 
countoffer(m) = countoffer(m - 1) + offer(m) 
Next m 
offer(m) 
'Limit number of actual offers to number of pumping hours and_ 
calculate offer prices 
countoffer(O) = 0 
For r = 1 To 24 - hrs 
If offer(24 - r + 1) = 1 Then 
- HC_f) 
'Check offer greater than HC_f else bid at HC 
If OS_f(24 - r + 1) > HC_f Then 
y(24 - r + 1) = HC_f + bidprop * (OS_f(24 - r + 1)_ 
'y(24 - r + 1) = HC_f * (1 + bidprop) 
'Worksheets("Calc").Range("g2").0ffset(24- r).Value 
y(24 - r + 1) 
Else: y(24 - r + 1) = HC_f 
End If 
'effect on price through submission of offer (i.e exerting an _ 
influence on the price) 
0Sinf_a(24 - r + 1) = (1 - beta) * OS_a(24 - r + 1) + beta *-
y(24 - r + 1) 
'Worksheets("Calc").Range("f2").0ffset(24- r).Value = _ 
0Sinf_a(24 - r + 1) 
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Else: y(24 - r + 1) = 0 
End If 
countoffer(r) = countoffer(r - 1) + offer(24 - r + 1) 
If countoffer(r) = hrs Then 
Exit For 
End If 
Next r 
'Market clearing process: determining which of the offers are accepted 
Sum_accept(hrs) 0 
Sum_profit(hrs) = 0 
For s = hrs + 1 To 24 
If y(s) > 0 And y(s) <= OSinf_a(s) Then 
accept(s) = 1 
prof(s) = (OSinf_a(s) - MC_a) * g 
Else 
0 accept(s) 
prof(s) = 0 
End If 
Sum_accept(s) 
Sum_profit(s) 
Sum_accept(s - 1) + accept(s) 
Sum_profit(s- 1) + prof(s) 
Next s 
Sum_offer = Application.WorksheetFunction.Min(countoffer(24), hrs) 
'Worksheets("Calc") .Range("k1") .Value 
'Min(countoffer(24), hrs) 
'Worksheets("Calc").Range("i1").Value 
'Worksheets("Calc") . Range("j1").Value 
End Sub 
Sub Sort() 
Application.WorksheetFunction._ 
Sum_accept(24) 
Sum_P(24) 
' Sorts a day's demands and prices by the forecast price value from _ 
smallest to largest 
Worksheets("Calc").Range("B2:E25") . Select 
Selection.Sort Key1:=Range("C2"), Order1 : =xlAscending, Header:= 
xlGuess, _ 
OrderCustom:=1, MatchCase:=False, Orientation:=xlTopToBottom 
End Sub 
Sub Simulate 0 
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ReDim yvalues(1 ToN), total_accept(1 ToN), total_offer(1 ToN) 
For Iter = 1 To N 
gammaD(O) 0 
gammaS(O) = 0 
ReDim yearly_profit(O To T) 
ReDim yearly_accept(O To T) 
ReDim yearly_offer(O To T) 
yearly_profit(O) = 0 
yearly_accept(O) = 0 
yearly_offer(O) = 0 
Worksheets("Calc").Select 
'yearly trade 
For day = 1 To T 
Worksheets("Calc").Range("b2:i25").Clearcontents 
Call Dailytrade 
yearly_offer(day) = yearly_offer(day - 1) + Sum_offer 
yearly_accept(day) yearly_accept(day - 1) + Sum_accept(24) 
yearly_profit(day) = yearly_profit(day - 1) + Sum_profit(24) 
Next day 
yvalues(Iter) = yearly_profit(T) 
total_accept(Iter) = yearly_accept(T) 
total_offer(Iter) = yearly_offer(T) 
'Worksheets("Results") .Range("b1").0ffset(Iter, O).Value 
'yvalues(Iter) 
'Worksheets("Results").Range("c1").Dffset(Iter, O).Value 
'total_accept(Iter) 
'Worksheets("Results").Range("d1").0ffset(Iter, 0) .Value 
total_offer(Iter) 
Next Iter 
End Sub 
Sub Out put () 
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'Summary Statistics for profits and acceptances 
Dim Max_prof As Double, Min_prof As Double, Av_prof As Double,_ 
SD_prof As Double, _ 
Max_acc As Double, Min_acc As Double, Av_acc As Double, SD_acc 
As Double, _ 
Max_off As Double, Min_off As Double, Av_off As Double, SD_off 
As Double 
Worksheets("Results").Select 
'Column of iteration numbers 
For Iter = 1 To N 
Worksheets("Results") .Range("a1") .Offset (Iter+ row_offset, 0)_ 
. Value = Iter 
Next Iter 
'Headings for summary statistics rows 
Worksheets("Results").Range("a1").0ffset(row_offset + N + 2, O).Value_ 
= "Mean " & v 
Worksheets("Results").Range("a1").0ffset(row_offset + N + 3, O).Value_ 
= "Stddev " & v 
Worksheets("Results").Range("a1").0ffset(row_offset + N + 4, O).Value_ 
= "Min " & v 
Worksheets("Results").Range("al").Offset(row_offset + N + 5, O).Value_ 
= "Max " & v 
'headings for columns in "Results" 
Range("a1").0ffset(row_offset, O).Value ="RUN" & v 
Range("b1").0ffset(row_offset, 0) beta 
Range("c1").0ffset(row_offset, O) sigma_gamma 
Range("d1").0ffset(row_offset, 0) hrs 
Range("e1").0ffset(row_offset, 0) sigma_S 
Range("f1").0ffset(row_offset, 0) sigma_D 
Range("g1").0ffset(row_offset, 0) min_D 
Range("h1") .Offset(row_offset, 0) bidfac 
Range("i1").0ffset(row_offset, 0) bidprop 
Range("j1").0ffset(row_offset, 0) eff 
'Printing out results 
For Iter = 1 To N 
Range("b1").0ffsetCiter + row_offset, O).Value 
yvalues (Iter) 
Range("cl ") .Offset(Iter + row_offset, 0). Value 
total_accept(Iter) 
Range("d1").0ffset(Iter + row_offset, O).Value 
total_offer(Iter) 
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Next Iter 
Range("b1").0ffset(row_offset + 1, O).Select 
Range(ActiveCell, ActiveCell.End(xlDown)) .Name = "Profits" 
Range("c1").0ffset(row_offset + 1, O).Select 
Range(ActiveCell, ActiveCell.End(xlDown)) .Name= "Acceptances" 
Range("d1").0ffset(row_offset + 1, O).Select 
Range(ActiveCell, ActiveCell.End(xlDown)).Name ="Offers" 
'Calculate summary statistics 
Hax_prof = Application.WorksheetFunction.Hax(Range("Profits")) 
Hin_prof = Application.WorksheetFunction.Hin(Range("Profits")) 
Av_prof = Application.WorksheetFunction.Average(Range("Profits")) 
SD_prof = Application.WorksheetFunction.StDev(Range("Profits")) 
Hax_acc = Application.WorksheetFunction.Hax(Range("Acceptances")) 
Hin_acc = Application.WorksheetFunction.Hin(Range("Acceptances")) 
Av_acc = Application.WorksheetFunction.Average(Range("Acceptances")) 
SD_acc = Application.WorksheetFunction.StDev(Range("Acceptances")) 
Hax_off = Application.WorksheetFunction.Hax(Range("Offers")) 
Hin_off = Application.WorksheetFunction.Hin(Range("Offers")) 
Av_off = Application.WorksheetFunction.Average(Range("Offers")) 
SD_off = Application.WorksheetFunction.StDev(Range("Offers")) 
'Printing out summary statistics 
Range("b1").0ffset(row_offset + N + 5, O).Value Max_ prof 
Range("b1").0ffset(row_offset + N + 4, O).Value Hin_prof 
Range("b1").0ffset(row_offset + N + 2, O).Value Av_prof 
Range("b1").0ffset(row_offset + N + 3, O).Value SD_prof 
Range("c1").0ffset(row_offset + N + 5, O).Value = Hax_acc 
Range("c1").0ffset(row_offset + N + 4, O).Value = Hin_acc 
Range("c1").0ffset(row_offset + N + 2, O).Value Av_acc 
Range("c1").0ffset(row_offset + N + 3, 0). Value SD_acc 
Range("d1").0ffset(row_offset + N + 5, 0). Value Max_ off 
Range("d1").0ffset(row_offset + N + 4, O).Value = Min_ off 
Range("d1").0ffset(row_offset + N + 2, O).Value Av_off 
Range("d1").0ffset(row_offset + N + 3, O).Value = SD_off 
End Sub 
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